Secret Intelligence Service

Room No. 15


Role Play


Operation ******* *******


“An essentially human contriving; to create and seize what is akin to an emotional intoxicant and which consequently does disable the defenses, thus rendering the target extremely vulnerable to control.”




Perhaps to present this is a questionable thing to do. The reason we say this is because it is not what usually appears for reading, as reading reflects events and descriptions of such, what’s happening, who are the interlocutors, and so on. This is a trite different.


OPERATION ***************


This is a large topic. The risk of opening up the ‘Operation’ beckons a multiplicity of facets, and it has to be said that the manipulating of one facet in particular; that of emotion, is fraught with what becomes more than circumstantial. In some ways then, it might be a good idea to go ahead because such an additional and personal thread is to be examined. We are talking about our being touched by the power of what we are doing. By power, we are referring to the authority over the subject (target) and in this dynamic, there is a response, not merely from the one under our control, or manipulation if you wish to view it that way, of the target, but how we deal with it. Indeed, how others should deal with it.  We can help you imagine a theatre, where both the actress and the audience (ourselves) are affected deeply by the play. It is not a play in the conventional sense, no, not at all, but much if not everything we do can appear to be so, the more the exaggeration that does ensue, and especially when the overriding ethical dilemma arguably, is ignored. We do not ignore it.

There is a great deal to discuss in this and during the first instance, especially with regard to the latter issue, that of ethics. One argument we address, which is really a question, is; what of ethics in the wider, ie. global arena? Another that we address is; while considering the analytical (the psychological), what of emotion – is this, once controlled, the sole arbiter of what colors the mental space, or are other factors more important, if so what are they? Where does emotion and what it contains fit with regard to the artifact / resource / knowledge led society we inhabit? If these latter are stripped away, which they can be quite easily, for a certain period of time, is what remains the basis for whatever we, as controllers, want to be the case? If so, what is it that is significant with regard to emotion that we are choosing to put there?


>> So we will call this a three-dimensional, fictional account, illustrating the issues of which we are aware. <<


Section High Relevance : ‘Acting Skills and the Spy’




COUNTER-INTELLIGENCE : Refers to the information gleaned and activities conducted so to protect against; espionage, other intelligence activities, sabotage, or assassinations conducted for or on behalf of foreign powers, organizations, or persons, or international terrorist activities.

In Defensive CI Mode : One is preventing efforts by hostile intelligence services to penetrate the service.

In Offensive CI Mode : One is identifying an opponent’s efforts against the service and / or system as a whole, so to manipulate these efforts either by turning the opponent’s agents into double-agents, or by feeding the opponent false information that they will report back. (Essentially, here in particular ).

Defensive CI begins by searching for where in one’s own organization there exists, or might exist, what could be exploited by foreign intelligence services (or indeed, exploited by anyone).

The best defence against foreign attacks, or of infiltration, is achieved by having in place active measures against those hostile services – counter – espionage

Counter-HUMINT : Here one is detecting hostile HUMINT sources, and those likely to become hostile HUMINT sources, moles, or double-agents. Additionally relevant to the broad spectrum of counter-intelligence is the question; why someone becomes radicalized (becomes a terrorist – see Counter Terrorism Library).






MICE : The common reasons people break trust, disclose classified materials, reveal operations to hostile services, and / or join terror groups.


Background : ‘Fear and Enhanced Interrogation’ (Extensive)

‘The Drug Assisted Interview’


In everyday moral parlance, empathy is related to compassion.  However, in intelligence work, the other (or others) is considered to be a potential threat to persons and interests that the intelligence officer is sworn to protect.  Knowing one’s enemy in this role means understanding the other, but not in the interest of enhancing his or her freedom, or well-being. On the contrary, empathy becomes a manipulative tool. This altered meaning of empathy holds true beyond the practice of interrogation.  It also characterizes a significant part of the professional skill involved in recruiting and handling agents, whose trust is often essential to gaining their control. 

Empathy is also useful in the creation of propaganda (as we do discuss in the requisite Psyop Sections), since the power of propaganda to influence an intended audience is largely dependent upon how well propaganda is crafted to address that audience’s peculiar cultural atmosphere.


We have already covered the phenomena referred to as the Stockholm Syndrome, but it is prudent to mention this again, vis a vis its relevance here, and who share the designation ‘interrogator’ – in fact, as manifested in many ”unequal status” situations. Here is a paragraph that C-V wrote on the internet recently.  This is humorous, just to inject a change of tone, because we think humor is important, though many disagree (with regard to this issue and particularly because humor rarely, if ever forms a part of the dynamic).  :

I mean, everyone knows about the ‘Stockholm Syndrome’, you know when that sweet girlish guy in the store gets promoted to assistant in charge of the feminine hygiene products and suddenly turns into a genocidal maniac. Well, it’s Facebook here, free and all, and these sorts who start a page and then lay down all these rules about who, what and where. The thing becomes the Reich Chancellery, and when someone, namely yours truly, says something on it, the whole weight of the Waffen-SS comes down on me with vengeance. “Please, Mr. Himmler, Reichsführer Heinrich, I don’t know where I got the audacity to post on your glorious Facebook page, and I beg of you, I’m just a no good useless thing, don’t torture me and dump my body in that pit, I have a cat at home.” Huh.

So, that is one facet, and the other, much more important and of concern to us, is the changing psychological condition of the ”subordinate” – target (made subordinate, and in addition one must note, ”subordinate” obviously includes a wider range of roles than the one herein). The issue is the change, that is, the becoming (thinking and acting) in ways that are envisaged at the outset, and though it has taken a while to arrive at it; what are the dynamics vis a vis the relationship of  the ‘subordinate’ to who are in control.

Notes / discussions historical records regarding ethics and ‘enhanced interrogation’ to be included.




The disparity in attitudes taken towards ‘targeted killing’ – assassination, does reveal a fundamental disagreement.

>> The granting of license to state authorities to kill suspected enemies of the state cannot appeal to anyone sensitive to human rights and suspicions of the ‘uses and abuses’ of state power. One does recognize this. However, and on the other hand, one simply cannot dismiss the parallels drawn by the state involved in the legitimate killing of enemy combatants during an armed conflict and the targeting of active members of terrorist organizations which have for all intents and purposes, declared war on the state.<<



Relevant Articles (external) : Targeted Killing – Assassination

Article No. I

Article No. II

Article No. III

(C-I) ‘Use of Kidnapping and Assassination by the USSR’ (KGB, GRU)

Article No. III


Targeted killing – A Broad Sweep – Background in Brief

Admittedly, targeted killing is a form of assassination based on the presumption of criminal guilt. Some do argue targeted killing to be a modern euphemism for the assassination (premeditated killing) of an individual by a state organization or institution outside a judicial procedure or a battlefield.

It is especially forbidden * * * to kill or wound treacherously individuals belonging to the hostile nation or army. (Article 23(b) of the 1907 Hague Regulations).

This article is construed as prohibiting assassination, proscription, or outlawry of an enemy, or putting a price upon an enemy’s head, as well as offering a reward for an enemy dead or alive.

>> It does not, however, preclude attacks on individual soldiers or officers of the enemy whether in the zone of hostilities, occupied territory, or elsewhere. <<

Targeted killings were employed extensively by death squads in; El Salvador, Nicaragua, Colombia, and Haiti within the context of civil unrest and war during the 1980s and 1990s. Targeted killings have also been used in Somalia, Rwanda, and in the Balkans during the Yugoslav Wars. The US government carries out targeted killings, such as the killing of Anwar al-Awlaki.

Use of targeted killings by Israeli conventional military forces became commonplace after the Second Intifada, when Israeli security forces used the tactic to kill Palestinian opponents. Though initially opposed by the Bush Administration, targeted killings became a frequent tactic of the US government in the War on Terror. Instances of targeted killing by the US that have received attention include the killing of Osama bin Laden, and of American citizens Anwar al-Awlaki and his teenage son in 2011. Under the Obama administration use of targeted killings did expanded, most frequently through use of combat drones operating in Afghanistan, Pakistan or Yemen.

The legality of targeted killing is disputed, as stated above. Certain academics, military personnel and others have described targeted killing as being legitimate within the context of self-defense, when employed against terrorists or combatants engaged in asymmetrical warfare. The argument is that drones are more humane and more accurate than manned vehicles, and that targeted or named killings do not occur in any context other than a declared state of war.

Use by the Government of the Russian Federation

During the First Chechen War Chechen President Dzhokhar Dudaev was killed on 21 April 1996, by two laser-guided missiles when he was using a satellite phone, after his location was detected by a Russian reconnaissance aircraft, which intercepted his phone call.

On 20 03 2002, Ibn al-Khattab who, during the Second Chechen War, participated in leading his militia against Russian forces in Chechnya, as well as managing the influx of foreign fighters and money was killed when a Dagestani messenger hired by the Russian FSB gave Khattab a poisoned letter. Chechen sources said that the letter was coated with a fast-acting nerve agent, possibly sarin or a derivative.

On 13 02 2004, Zelimkhan Yandarbiyev who served as acting president of the breakaway Chechen Republic of Ichkeria between 1996 and 1997, was killed when a bomb ripped apart his SUV in the Qatari capital, Doha. Yandarbiyev was seriously wounded and died in hospital. The day after the attack, Qatari authorities arrested three Russians in a Russian embassy villa. One of them, the first secretary of the Russian Embassy in Qatar, Aleksandr Fetisov, was released in March due to his diplomatic status and the remaining two, the GRU agents Anatoly Yablochkov (also known as Belashkov) and Vasily Pugachyov (oftentimes misspelled as Bogachyov), were charged with the assassination of Yandarbiyev, and smuggling weapons into Qatar. There were some speculations that Fetisov had been released in exchange for Qatari wrestlers detained in Moscow. On 30 06 2004, both Russians were sentenced to life imprisonment; passing the sentence, the judge stated that they had acted on orders from the Russian leadership. But on 23 12 2004, Qatar agreed to extradite the prisoners to Russia, where they would serve out their life sentences. The agents however received a heroes’ welcome on returning to Moscow in January 2005 but disappeared from public view shortly afterwards. The Russian prison authorities admitted during month 02 2005 that they were not in jail, but stated that a sentence handed down in Qatar was irrelevant in Russia.

On 10 07 2006 Shamil Basayev, a Chechen militant leader, who was alleged to be responsible for numerous guerrilla attacks on security forces in and around Chechnya and the 2002 Moscow theater hostage crisis and described as one of the most-wanted terrorists in the world” was killed by an explosion near the border of North Ossetia in the village of Ali-Yurt, Ingushetia, a republic bordering Chechnya. According to the official version of Basayev’s death, the FSB, following him with a drone, spotted his car approach a truck laden with explosives that the FSB had prepared, and by remote control triggered a detonator that the FSB had hidden in the explosives

Alexander Litvinenko was poisoned with polonium by Russian FSB agents.

Russian operatives are behind at least fourteen targeted killings on UK soil.

Use by the Government of the United States

Targeted killing operations, according to Harvard Law School Professors Gabriella Blum and Philip Heymann, amplify the tension between addressing terrorism as a crime versus addressing terrorism as an act of war. Governments pursuing a law enforcement strategy punish persons for their individual guilt, which must be proven in a court of law, where the accused enjoys the protections of due process guarantees. Governments in the midst of war, on the other hand, may claim a legal obligation to take advantage of the relaxation of peacetime constraints on the use of deadly force. Enemy combatants may be targeted and killed not because they are guilty, but because they are potentially lethal agents of a hostile party. No advance warning is necessary, no attempt to arrest or capture is required, and no effort to minimize casualties among enemy forces is demanded by law. Despite this inherent tension, the United States has made targeted killing—the deliberate assassination of a known terrorist outside the country’s territory, usually by airstrike—an essential part of its counter-terrorism strategy. Hence, the US has justified the killing of terrorists under a war paradigm. Using the war paradigm for counter-terrorism enabled government lawyers to distinguish lethal attacks on terrorists from prohibited assassinations and justify them as lawful battlefield operations against enemy combatants, much like the uncontroversial targeted killing of Japanese Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto while he was traveling by a military airplane during World War II.

Further support for the U.S. government’s use of drone strike tactics is found in a report found in the Journal of Strategic Security concerning the surgical nature of drone strikes for use in a populated area. > Indeed the tactic of using drones promises the ability of eliminating enemies in complex environments, while minimizing the political implications of resorting to war. < During early 2010, with the then President, Barack Obama’s approval, Anwar al-Awlaki became the first U.S. citizen to be approved for targeted killing by the CIA.. Awlaki was killed in a drone strike in month 09 2011.

 In a letter dated 22 05 2013 to the then chairman of the U.S. Senate Judiciary committee, Patrick J. Leahy, U.S. attorney general Eric Holder wrote that the United States will use lethal force by combat drones in a foreign country against a US citizen who is a senior operational leader of al Qa’ida or its associated forces, and who is actively engaged in planning to kill Americans, in the following circumstances: (I) the US government has determined, after a thorough and careful review, that the individual poses an imminent threat of violent attack against the United States; (II) capture is not feasible; and (III) the operation would be conducted in a manner consistent with applicable law of war principles. In a Presidential Policy Guidance entitled; ‘U.S. Policy Standards and Procedures for the Use of Force in Counter-Terrorism Operations Outside the United States and Areas of Active Hostilities’ from 05 2013 the US government stated that lethal force by combat drones will be used only to prevent or stop attacks against U.S. persons, and even then, only when capture is not feasible and no other reasonable alternatives exist to address the threat effectively. The U.S. government further declared, ‘lethal force will be used outside areas of active hostilities only when the following preconditions are met:

(I) There must be a legal basis for using lethal force.

(II) The United States will use lethal force only against a target that poses a continuing, imminent threat to U.S. persons.

(III) The following criteria must be met before lethal action may be taken:

Near certainty that the terrorist target is present

Near certainty that non-combatants will not be injured or killed

An assessment that capture is not feasible at the time of the operation

An assessment that the relevant governmental authorities in the country where action is contemplated cannot or will not effectively address the threat to U.S. persons

An assessment that no other reasonable alternatives exist to effectively address the threat to US persons.


Currently in construction and consideration / debate regarding content – to be presented 15/07/2017




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ROOM No. 15

Secret Intelligence Service

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