Seminar Discussion : Information Space Activity. Secret Intelligence Service

Secret Intelligence Service
(C-I) Unit
Seminar. Harrogate. 10 07 2018

Topic : OFFENSIVE INFORMATION OPERATIONS

Recap / notes – Offensive information operations; mass disruption and / or mass protection with potential economic and social consequences accused by some to be on the order of those caused by chemical, biological, and even nuclear weapons of mass destruction. (Yes, no, it depends…?)

Because of the uncertainty of consequences and the potential impact of information operations on civilian populations, policy and strategy must be carefully developed to govern the use of information operations technologies – technologies that may even provide capabilities before
consequences are understood and policies for their use are fully developed.

Information Warfare Policy and Strategy

The technical methods of information warfare are the means at the bottom of a classical hierarchy that leads from the
ends (objectives) of national security policy. The hierarchy proceeds from the policy to an implementing strategy, then
to operational doctrine (procedures) and a structure (organisation) that applies at the final tactical level the technical operations of information war. The hierarchy flows
down the security policy, with each successive layer in the hierarchy implementing the security objectives of the policy.

Policy then, is the authoritative articulation of the position of the nation, defining our interests (the objects being secured), the security objectives for those interests, and our intent and willingness to apply resources to protect those interests. The
interests to be secured and the means of security are defined by policy. The policy may be publicly declared or held private, and the written format must be concise and clear to permit the implementing strategy to be traceable to
the policy.

Any security policy addressing the potential of information warfare has to consider the following premises:

National interest

The national information infrastructure – the object of the information security policy, is a complex structure comprised of public (military and non-military) and private elements. This infrastructure includes the information, processes, and structure, all of which may be attacked. The structure, contents, owners, and security responsibilities must be defined to clearly identify the object being protected.

New vulnerabilities

Past security due to geographic and political positions no longer apply to information threats, in which geography and political advantages are eliminated. New vulnerabilities and threats must be assessed because traditional defences may not be applicable.

Security objective

The desired levels of information security must be defined in terms of integrity, authenticity, confidentiality, non-repudiation, and availability.

Intent and willingness

We must define intent to use information operations and willingness to apply those weapons. Questions that must be answered include the following :

What actions against the nation will constitute sufficient justification to launch information strikes?

What levels of information operations are within the remit? What falls outside it?

What scales of operations are allowable, and what levels of direct and collateral damage resulting from information strikes are permissible?

How do info ops reinforce conventional operations?

What are the objectives of information strikes?

What are the stages of offensive information escalation, and how are information operations to be used to de-escalate crises?

Authority………………

Continued

Secret Intelligence Service
(C-I) Unit
Seminar. Harrogate. 10 07 2018

Topic : OFFENSIVE INFORMATION OPERATIONS

.

Secret Intelligence Service
(C-I) UNIT. London

Chart for Discussion 14 07 2018. Harrogate

.

.

Secret Intelligence Service
(C-I) Unit
Seminar. 17 07 2018. Harrogate

TOPIC : INFORMATION WAR AND SOCIAL MEDIA (I)

.

Secret Intelligence Service
(C-I) Unit. London

Introductory and brief notes (No. III). from Seminar ‘Information War and Social Media’. Harrogate.

.

SEMINAR NOTES  – HARROGATE

SO, WHAT IS INFORMATION?

This question is elementary, but pivotal. It is impossible to discuss information warfare meaningfully without rigorously defining the central concept: information.

Information derives from phenomena. Phenomena, observable facts or events, are everything that happens around us. Phenomena must be perceived and interpreted to become information. Information, then, is the result of two things: perceived phenomena (data) and the instructions required to interpret that data and give it meaning.

This distinction is important, and easily encompassed by a familiar paradox: If a house falls, but no one was
around to hear it, did it make a noise? The falling house caused pressure waves in the atmosphere, a phenomenon. Noise, the information denoting a falling house, occurs when someone’s ear detects the pressure waves, creating data, and the brain’s instructions manipulate that data into the sound recognisable as a falling house. Within that person’s context, there is no falling house until the person hears (or sees) it.

Phenomena become information through observation and analysis. Therefore, information is an abstraction of phenomena. Information is the result of our perceptions and interpretations, regardless of the means. As falling houses make clear, to define information requires only two characteristics :

Information: data and instructions

Note that the definition for information is absolutely distinct from technology. However, what we can do with information, and how fast we can do it, is very dependent on technology. Technology dramatically enhances our observational means, expands and concentrates data storage, and accelerates instruction processing. We use the following term to encompass the technology-dependent elements associated with information:

Information Function: any activity involving the acquisition, transmission, storage, or transformation of
information.

For example, the system that tells a machine to stamp eighty hubcaps is performing an information function. The sheet metal press stamping those hubcaps is not.

.

WHAT ARE SOME MILITARY INFORMATION FUNCTIONS?

Quality information is the counter to the fog of war. As mentioned earlier, the commander with better information
holds a powerful advantage over an adversary. Military operations make special demands on information functions in seeking to give the commander an information advantage.

Surveillance and reconnaissance are our powers of observation. Intelligence and weather analysis are the bases for orienting observations. We use those bases to command and control operations, execute and monitor in directing the conflict. Precision navigation enhances mission performance.
Together, these are the kinds of military information functions that enhance all military operations. one One uses the term military information functions to describe force enhancing information functions.

Military Information Function : any information function supporting and enhancing the employment of military
forces.

This definition serves to delineate militarily important information functions from the total universe of information functions.

.

AGAIN : WHAT IS INFORMATION WARFARE?

At the grand strategy level, nations seek to acquire, exploit, and protect information in support of their
objectives. This exploitation and protection can occur in the economic, political, or military arenas. Knowledge of the adversary’s information is a means to enhance our own capabilities, degrade or counteract adversary capabilities, and protect our own assets, including our own information. This is not new of course. The struggle to discover and exploit information began the first time one group of people tried to gain advantage over another.

Information warfare consists of targeting the enemy’s information and information functions, while protecting our own, with the intent of degrading an enemy’s will or capability to fight. Drawing on the definitions of information and information functions, we define information warfare as :

> Information Warfare : any action to deny, exploit, corrupt, or destroy the enemy’s information and its functions; protecting ourselves against those actions; and exploiting our own military information functions <

This definition is the basis for the following assertions :

Information warfare is any attack against an information function, regardless of the means. Bombing a telephone switching facility is information warfare. So is destroying the switching facility’s software.

Information warfare is any action to protect our information functions, regardless of the means. Hardening and defending the switching facility against air attack is information warfare. So is using an anti-virus programme to protect the facility’s software.

Information warfare is a means, not an end, in precisely the same manner that air warfare is a means, not an
end. We may use information warfare as a means to conduct strategic attack and prohibition, for example, just as we may use air warfare to conduct strategic attack and prohibition.

Militaries have always tried to gain or affect the information required for an adversary to effectively employ
forces. Past strategies typically relied on measures such as feints and deception to influence decisions by
affecting the decision maker’s perceptions. Because these strategies influenced information through the
perception process, they attacked the enemy’s information indirectly. That is, for deception to be effective, the enemy had to do three things :

(I) observe the deception

(II) analyse the deception as reality

(III) act upon the deception according to the deceiver’s goals

However, modern means of performing information functions give information added vulnerability: direct access and manipulation. Modern technology now permits an adversary to change or create information without relying on observation and interpretation. Here is a short list of modem information system characteristics creating this vulnerability: concentrated storage, access speed, widespread information transmission, and the increased capacity for information systems to direct actions autonomously. Intelligent security measures can reduce, but not eliminate, this vulnerability; their absence makes it glaring.

Militaries are not inclined to trust their success to the fortunes of war. So we must direct our information warfare efforts to more than just targeting an adversary’s information: we must also defend our own information, and all its operations.

.

SO, WHAT COMPRISES INFORMATION WARFARE?

Recalling the definition, information warfare consists of activities that deny, exploit, corrupt, destroy, or protect information. Traditional means of conducting information warfare include psychological operations, electronic warfare, military deception, physical attack, and various security measures.

Psychological Operations use information to affect the enemy’s reasoning.

Electronic Warfare denies accurate information to the enemy.

Military Deception misleads the enemy about our capabilities or intentions.

Physical Destruction can do information warfare by affecting information system elements through the
conversion of stored energy to destructive power. The means of physical attack range from conventional
bombs to electromagnetic pulse weapons.

Security Measures seek to keep the adversary from learning about our military capabilities and intentions.

The Information Age has provided new and practical means to deny, exploit, corrupt, or destroy information, as well as the vulnerabilities to make those attacks possible.

Information Attack: directly corrupting information without visibly changing the physical entity within
which it resides.

Information attack, constrained by the definition of information, is limited to directly altering data or instructions.
It is, therefore, just another means of conducting information warfare, one whose immediate effects do not
include visible changes to the entity within which the information resides. That is to say, after being subjected to information attack, an information function is indistinguishable from its original state except through inspecting its data or instructions.
.

SO, HOW IS INFORMATION ATTACK DIFFERENT?

As previously described, there are two ways to influence the adversary’s information functions :

indirectly
directly

Indirect information warfare affects information by creating phenomena, which the adversary will perceive,
interpret, and act upon. Military deception, physical attack achieved their ends indirectly. For example, the goal of deception is to cause the adversary to make incorrect decisions; deception does this by creating an apparent reality. Generally, this entails creating phenomena for the enemy to observer Success, however, depends on several conditional events : the adversary actually observes the phenomenon, thereby turning it into data; analyses it into the desired information; and acts upon the information in the desired manner.

Direct information warfare affects information through altering its components without relying on the adversary’s powers of perception or interpretation. Information attack acts directly upon the adversary’s information. Since nearly all modem information functions are themselves controlled by information, information attack may be directed against most information functions.

Direct information warfare, the point of information attack, acts on the adversary’s information without relying on the adversary’s collection, analysis, or decision functions. It can short circuit the OODA loop through creating observations and skewing orientation, or decapitate it by imposing decisions and causing actions.

A short illustration will serve to demonstrate the difference between indirect and direct information warfare
applications:

Our goal, using military deception, is to make the adversary think there is a wing of combat aircraft where, in fact, there is none, and act on that information in a manner benefiting our operations.

Indirect information warfare: Using military deception, we could construct fake runways and parking areas, and generate enough other activities to present a convincing image. We rely on the adversary to observe the pseudo combat operation and interpret it as real (as opposed to detecting the fake). Only then does it become the information we want the adversary to have.

Direct information warfare: Conversely, if we use information attack to create the pseudo combat wing in the
adversary’s store of information, the result-deception-is precisely the same. But the means to that result, never mind the resources, time, and uncertainty, are dramatically different.

.

WHAT IS THE OTHER EDGE OF THE INFORMATION WARFARE SWORD?

The defensive side of information warfare security measures aimed at protecting information-prevents an adversary from conducting successful information warfare against our information functions. In contrast, security measures encompass preventing, detecting, and subverting direct information actions on our information functions. Future security measures must evolve as information technology advances. Consequently, new-measures will likely take forms entirely different from today’s security measures, rooted as they are in previous security requirements. As the simple examples in this paper illustrate, we must avoid falling victim to profound, debilitating effects of direct information warfare.
.

In many respects, one can consider information as a realm, just as land, sea, air, and space are realms,
information has its own characteristics of motion, mass, and topography, just as air, space, sea, and land have
their own distinct characteristics. There are strong conceptual parallels between conceiving of air and
information as realms. Before the Wright brothers, air, while it obviously existed, was not a realm suitable for practical, widespread military operations. Similarly, information existed before the Information Age. But the Information Age changed the information realm’s characteristics so that widespread military operations within it became practical.

Information warfare, like air warfare, is the means defined by the environment to execute military missions.

There are three objectives of information warfare :  

(I) to control the information realm so we can exploit it while protecting our own military information functions from enemy action

(II) to exploit control of information to employ information warfare against the enemy

(III) to enhance overall force effectiveness by fully developing military information functions.

The first objective of information warfare, to control the realm so we can exploit it while protecting our own
military information functions from enemy action, contributes significantly to controlling the combat environment.

Counter-information : actions dedicated to controlling the information realm.

Counter-information has both offensive and defensive aspects.
Offensive counter-information enables us to use the information realm and impedes the adversary’s use of the
realm. Typical means include physical attack, military deception, psychological operations, electronic warfare,
and information attack. Defensive counter-information includes both active and passive actions to protect
ourselves from the adversary’s information warfare actions. Defensive counter-information is accomplished, for
instance, through physical defense, physical security and counterintelligence.

Successful aerospace control enables us to use the air and space realms without suffering substantial losses,
and inflict substantial losses on the enemy’s use of those realms. Counter-information, working with counter-air
and counter-space, seeks to create such an environment.

The second objective of information warfare is to exploit our control of information. In air warfare’s force
application role, the missions of strategic attack, interdiction, and close air support exploit air control. Similarly, information warfare might also be used to achieve the same ends.

.

Information technology is already tightly woven with our military operations, providing heretofore unimaginable
amounts of information. Exploiting this information has provided us striking capabilities; relying on it inevitably
creates potentially crippling vulnerabilities. This, coupled with advances in the ability -to both locate and destroy command and control nodes makes command and control, more than ever, a lucrative target set. History has shown
successful militaries can achieve striking success through paralyzing the enemy’s ability to exercise command
and control.

.

COMMAND AND CONTROL ATTACK : any action against any element of the enemy’s command and control system.

The third objective of information warfare is to develop information functions to enhance total force
effectiveness. Previously I described military information functions as supporting the employment of military forces. I will include information operations under force enhancement. Some examples of information operations are : surveillance,
reconnaissance, command and control, communications, combat identification, intelligence, precision navigation,
and weather. The distinguishing characteristic of the information operations mission is that it deals primarily with information as both its resource and product.
.

WHAT IS THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN INFORMATION WARFARE AND COMMAND AND CONTROL WARFARE?

The focus of information warfare is any information function, whether it is command and control, a refinery’s control system, or a telephone switching station. Command and control  represents only part of the gamut of military information functions.

Command and Control : the exercise of authority and direction by a properly designated commander over
assigned forces in the accomplishment of the mission. Command and control warfare only addresses activities directed against the adversary’s ability to direct the disposition and employment of forces, or those which protect the friendly commander’s ability to do so. As we have illustrated, information warfare not only attacks the command and control process, but it also attacks the enemy’s combat power itself. Conversely, by definition, command and control warfare is not associated with reducing or nullifying the ability or desire of combat units to execute their orders. Tactical psychological operations and electronic counter-measures self-protection hinder the ability of units to execute orders. But they in no way affect commanders’ ability to issue orders to those units, nor their ability to receive those orders.

Information warfare, and its attendant organising, training, and equipping issues, is essential to fully effective command and control warfare.
.
Counter information : controlling the information realm.

Command and Control Attack : any action against the enemy’s command and control system.

Information Operations : any action involving the acquisition, transmission, storage, or transformation of
information that enhances the employment of military forces.

Since WW I, airmen have had to control the air environment effectively to employ air power. What is
more, air and space superiority are virtually a sine qua non for employing ground and naval forces. Information is the next realm we must control to operate effectively and with the greatest economy of force.

At the outset we stated the competition for information is as old as human’s first conflict. It involves increasing and protecting our own store of information while limiting and penetrating the adversary’s. The recent explosion in information technologies is prompting the current discussion in and outside government on the topic of information warfare – targeting the enemy’s information functions, while protecting ours, with the intent of degrading his will or capability to fight.

For air force, controlling the combat environment is imperative. With the advances in information technology, air force must pursue information superiority just as they do air and space superiority. Only with these realms under our control can we effectively employ all our combat assets. Military information functions are essential to our combat operations, they are a tool for achieving campaign objectives. Targeting the adversary’s information functions keeps them from achieving theirs.
.

RE : DEFINITIONS

Command and Control Attack : Any action against any element of the enemy’s command and control system.

Command and Control: The exercise of authority and direction by a properly designated commander over
assigned forces in the accomplishment of the mission.

Counter-information : Actions dedicated to controlling the information realm.

Defensive counter-information : Actions protecting our military information functions from the adversary.

Direct Information Warfare : Changing the adversary’s information without involving the intervening perceptive
and analytical functions.

Indirect Information Warfare : Changing the adversary’s information by creating phenomena that the adversary must then observe and analyse.

Information : Data and instructions.

Information Attack : Directly corrupting information without visibly changing the physical entity within which it resides.

Information Function : Any activity involving the acquisition, transmission, storage, or transformation of
information.

Information Operations : Any action involving the acquisition, transmission, storage, or transformation of
information that enhances the employment of military forces.

Information Warfare : Any action to deny, exploit, corrupt, or destroy the adversary’s information and its
functions; protecting ourselves against those actions and exploiting our own military information functions.

Military Information Function : Any information function supporting and enhancing the employment of military forces.

Offensive counter-information : Actions against the adversary’s information functions.

.

Secret Intelligence Service
(C-I) UNIT. London.

MY NOTES in brief for Seminar : DEFINING INFORMATION WEAPONRY. (Not confined to).
26 07 2018 Harrogate

Information operations conjures up a distinctive mental model composed of many elements that exist independently from other forms of warfare. One can list the following :

military deception

counter deception

operations security

electronic warfare (e-attack, protection, support)

information assurance **

physical destruction

psychological operations

counter-propaganda

counter-intelligence

computer network attack and defence

** Note : Information assurance refers to measures intended to protect and defend information and information systems by ensuring their availability, integrity, authenticity, confidentiality and non-repudiation (ability to confirm source of transmission and data). This includes providing for restoration of information systems by incorporating protection, detection, and reaction capabilities.

If the goal is to produce a disparity in the adversary’s mind between reality and the perception of reality in order to disrupt the ability to exercise command and control, then information operations is really nothing new. Deception has been doing this for years. The methods are the same, but the means (sensors, satellites, etc.) are very different as well as the precision and speed of destruction involved.

However, information operations really is something new. Today, weaponry does more than just disrupt the ability to conduct command and control via deception or Psyop. Now weaponry can shut down the data processors of both weapons (computer chips) and the mind (neurons). There is more at stake than just deception.

In its purest form, attacks with electrons or leaflets or other means attack equipment and weaponry on the one hand, but also can attack the logic and decision-making ability on the other, That is, there is a huge psychological warfare component of information operations. (Note, there are
information operations against the brain on a daily basis across countries worldwide, especially in advertising and the mass media, where the goal is to influence or persuade).

Less deliberated is another form of an information operation against the brain that employs acoustics (low frequency waves) or ‘other devices’ so to shut down the normal processing of the brain, much like a laser tries to destroy computer chips. One might want to put these operations out of the information operations folder and into ‘non-lethal operations’. Most definitions of Psyop are all about the first, or soft, use of information operations; to influence the logic in someone else’s brain or to use counter-propaganda as an element of defensive Psyop.

Soft Psyop is not the same thing as is protecting the neurons in one’s brain from being fried by a non-lethal device. Data attacks a human’s logic in a soft information Psyop attack, and electronic or non-lethal streams of data attack neurons in the brain in a hard information Psyop attack. Lasers do the same to computer chips, but the latter is more easily identifiable with informaton operations (physical destruction).

What about mental damage / obliteration of the mind?

Well, data processors form the core element, the heart if you like, of sensors, satellites, and computers. Thus, computer network operations and computer network exploitation, or attacks on sensors or satellites, are in reality attacks against data processors. In similar fashion manner, psychological operations, deception, and even ‘non-lethal operations’ are directed against the data processor one refers to as the mind, the brain, the CNS, capacity for consciousness, call it what you like.

Psyop and deception have reached new levels of effectiveness, in that morphed images, and other virtual representations of reality now have the capacity to influence people just as leaflets and loudspeakers once did (not so long ago).

‘Non-lethal weaponry’, such as acoustics or ****** (omitted), low frequency waves – is capable of momentarily shutting down the brain altogether. ‘Non-lethals’ can be
described as’ soft influence means’ (leaflets, ‘soft attacks’) and / or incapacitating and even debilitating (hard attack) means.

‘Non-lethals’ are in a separate category for consideration.

People tend to ignore the fact that the mind has no defensive firewall (although any some would argue this, because to accept it is disturbing to them).

The emphasis on networks and pieces of equipment misses the most exposed computer / data-processor on the battlefield or indeed, anywhere – the human head. Psyop and military deception are the only elements of those accredited to information operations that are concerned with the human information security feature – logic.

A non-lethal substance is much more stealthy (some would accuse insidious) – it attempts to alter or destroy altogether the functioning of the brain’s neuronal structure, just as an electron stream or laser beam attacks the data-processor (computer chip).

One might underline the importance of the mind and its implications for future warfare scenarios.

One should (as we shall in due course) consider neural pharmacology more in seminar, and the new classes of pharmacologic agents available. These drugs mimic natural chemicals inside people, not only confined to behaviour-modifying and performance-enhancing characteristics. A future intelligence problem is going to be knowing what pharmacologic agents other people are unwittingly on? Question.

Thus the data processor, possessed by both equipment (computer chips) and humans (neurons), is the actual centre of gravity of future attacks. It might be soft attacks on logic or hard attacks on chips or neurons.

Many are neither accustomed to, nor do they put ‘non-lethals’ into the information operations paradigm as a result. Physical destruction appears to have a comfort level of acceptance, but total mental destruction does not. Interesting!

Further, the human is always the interface between the input and output of data processing. The mind must not only ward off deception and acoustic attacks made against it, it must also interpret what is downloaded from a computer or satellite, and what is acquired by counter-intelligence means (for example, via HUMINT, SIGINT operations, or developed via counter-propaganda operations). Equipment can produce false outputs that the human interface must process, analyse, and interpret. Once again, the focus is on a human’s ability to use proper logic so to arrive at the proper conclusion. The computer-operator or machine-mind interface is one of the centres of gravity that people seldom mention.

Efforts to link brains and computers could result in, enhanced perception and communications, and might make one smarter. Knocking out or manipulating the organiser and distributor of data, the data processor, is the focus of the paradigm. The data processor is the objective.

As a consequence, it would be more pertinent to place data-processor wars at the top of the hierarchy of the concept, and to position information as a sub-element, a means to influence the data processor.

Attacks on computers or the mind, whether electronic, laser, or ‘other’, are designed not to attack information but rather to disable, manipulate or destroy the data processor. In the case of a sensor, satellite, electronic warfare platform, or a computer, it is an attack on ones and zeros of computer-based language, or on the computer chip itself.

With regards to humans, requisite special light or low frequencies that induce photoelectric epilepsy, or other forms of debilitating ****** (omitted) that attack the actual functioning of a human’s data processor – the brain, are the areas of interest and we will expand on these more (ref; see website).

.

Secret Intelligence Service
(C-I) UNIT
Seminar : Harrogate. 26 07 2018

Topic : DEFINING INFORMATION WEAPONRY – DISCUSS

So, the term information war has helped describe one aspect of the unfolding revolution in military affairs 1990s – 2000, or thereabouts. Now however, technological developments are integrating the data processing capabilities of machines and the mind in ways not possible two decades ago or even one for that matter. As a result, the older information war paradigm may no longer be applicable, making other potential paradigms and terms worthy of our consideration. As the future becomes reality, it will be interesting to see if we use information war or an altogether new term to express a threat to the security of the United Kingdom, a category of warfare, a method of defence or influence, or leave the concept as a conceptual umbrella to cover a host of terms. Or, will we simply update information war theory, perhaps developing information / mind-machine concepts that complement information war…….

Information War : >> “open and declared armed hostile conflict by nations or states that utilise information or information-based systems and processes to attack our human or system processors.” <<

An odd question to consider, does information actually go to war against other information? If the answer is no (most would say yes), then it casts doubt on the idea of information war. Data or electron streams can be directed against one another to collide or interfere or influence movement, but they are not in open and declared armed conflict. Electrons might collide with other electrons, laser beams may try to destroy computer chips, and directed energy beams may try to destroy satellites. But this is not information war.

Perhaps it could be called beam confrontation, or electron stream conflict where computer chips and other data-processing elements are the objectives of attack. However, this is a contentious point but perhaps worthy of consideration.

There are several nations, such as the Russian Federation and the PRC who define other information-related issues. These include terms such as information weapons and information-psychological actions. There appears to be a long-term unwritten policy in military circles across NATO not to define an information weapon. Yet much of today’s weaponry is loaded with computer chips and other information technology, the cornerstones of the information age. The Russians define information weapons in great depth and specificity. They pose the question; how can one have an information war if one does not have information weapons? Can we have tank warfare without tanks? This term and others might, in addition, be worthy of future consideration.

One of the greatest strengths of any armed forces is its ability to learn (take) from other armed forces (for example, studying and then adapting the term operational art from Soviet theoreticians). Perhaps now is the time to examine/data-mine foreign information operations theory for some of the ideas that they are developing, and see if they are applicable to our own paradigm…..

Secret Intelligence Service
(C-I) UNIT
Seminar : Harrogate. 26 07 2018

Topic : DEFINING INFORMATION WEAPONRY – DISCUSS

.

Secret Intelligence Service
(C-I) UNIT
London

This is for discussion at the next seminar. I mean, this is the ideal situation mapped, but is it adhered to, or even plausible? If not plausible, what parts is it not, and why?
22 07 2018. Harrogate

.

Secret Intelligence Service
(C-I) UNIT. London
21 07 2018

From our discussion : ON THE LIMITATIONS OF MIND WAR. (Harrogate)

.

25 07 2018

Notes from Discussion. Unit

.

Secret Intelligence Service

(C-I) UNIT. 12 09 2018. Harrogate

Seminar Topic (No.I) :

.

UNDERSTANDING CHINESE APPROACHES IN PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE

.

An Eastern definition of  psychological warfare is as a kind of propaganda, as persuasion that utilises real force as its foundation. Accordingly such an approach can use political, economic, scientific, military, diplomatic, ideological or cultural factors so to change an opponent’s national will, or to influence and change an opponent’s belief in, attitude toward, or hostility toward a population, toward organisations, or toward military and government agencies.

One can stress the need for utilising power and intimidation as key psychological warfare tools. Regarding the importance of psychological warfare, there is a dictum; “You may not be interested in psychological warfare, but psychological warfare is interested in you.”

What do you think?

Psychological warfare is also the exploration and study of the psychological quality of the thinking practiced by a nation’s strategic leadership. To the Chinese, psychological quality includes the aspects of psychological attainments and psychological character. Psychological attainments primarily reflect the level at which a person grasps and understands psychology. Psychological character is the individual human aspect, primarily the psychological character that an individual has already formed or is developing; e.g., an individual’s intellect, temperament, disposition, emotions and will.

Such Eastern psychological attainments are developed through education in both dialectical materialism and historical materialism, and through the influence and enlightening effects of Eastern culture. This applies particularly to strategic thought, in which how one thinks is the key element and the most valuable quality.

In the end, the most important battles of modern psychological war will be fought over values. The superpowers, are indeed using armed force to impose value systems on other people, for example when politicians have used the idea that human rights are greater than sovereign rights.

After 50 years of Marxism, western culture has entered China. Foreign culture has constantly infiltrated China in the form of weapons and then at the mental and conceptual level. In particular, the value system of Western culture, with the idea of individualism at the core, a decadent lifestyle if you like, based upon materialism, and a concept of gain or benefit in interpersonal relations, has produced a profound effect on certain people’s values.

Looking at it from a slightly different perspective;  psychological warfare theory is a field of study that serves both as the point of intersection and as the boundary line between psychology and the study of strategy and tactics. In psychological warfare theory therefore has a psychological foundation as well as an ideological/theoretical foundation. The latter foundation is determined by national characteristics, but the former foundation is more constant. Psychological warfare strategy is a psychological embodiment of the orientation of a country’s national and military strategies.

One can define psychological warfare as a multi-level activity employed at the strategic, operational and tactical levels. The targets of psychological warfare is national will, the state of social awareness, cultural traditions, a nation’s economic pulse, an opponent’s public sentiment, the tendencies of popular will, military morale, and the opponent’s various social groups, classes and strata.

Because of the increased use of information technology, the number of people who are subjected to psychological war is greater than ever before.

The increase in psychological warfare targets requires the development of a kind of people’s war defence mentality –  – focusing on values and defining a system of values as a system of psychological tendencies used so to discriminate between good and bad. A system of values also provides the basis by which a person recognises the correct way of thinking and acting. The highest strategic objective in psychological warfare  is thus achieved by changing a country’s fundamental social concepts and its society’s sense of values.

In this regard, the West uses a system of values (democracy, freedom, human rights and so on) in a long-term attack on socialist countries. The West used the ideas of democracy and human rights to undermine the communist party in the USSR, and intends to use the same rationale for interfering in China’s internal affairs. The strategy is to attack political, moral, social and cultural values in target countries.

A key aspect of conducting psychological warfare is to understand the psychological characteristics of an opponent’s strategic leadership and to conduct psychological attacks against them.

The differences in Eastern and Western minds; so to highlight East/West variances both in the characteristics and in the laws of psychological warfare – differences in environment, cultural traditions, political systems, economic strength, national defence capability and national spiritual belief has lead to a great distinction in various nations in subjective cognition, ideological basis, principles of applications and structure of organisation of psychological warfare.

Even though China is a socialist country, the Marxist theory of war provides the theoretical basis for Chinese psychological warfare and gives Chinese psychological warfare its ‘advanced, moral, open and unified nature’.

Marxist theory regarding proletarian strategy and tactics was one of Mao Zedong’s weapons during the Chinese revolution. And even though psychological warfare is characterised by active defence, China’s approach emphasises psychological attacks and the use of stratagems, particularly the use of deception activities.

Marxist theory opposes peaceful evolution, which is the basic Western tactic for subverting socialist countries. Peaceful evolution is the process that caused the disintegration of the USSR, and the Chinese are determined that peaceful evolution will not take place in China.

Mao Zedong developed a theory and a complete set of tactics designed to counter the Western strategy.

In ‘On Defense in Modern Psychological Warfare,’ author Li, Wang emphasises that China must take the initiative in psychological warfare defence because psychological security is now an important aspect of national security. Information and psychological factors are now political and diplomatic weapons, and their power cannot be ignored. Psychological warfare requires a low investment; it involves low risk; and it is highly effective. The greater the amount of information that is available to a population, the more room there will be for psychological warfare. Any corner into which information can spread can become a battlefield for psychological warfare. China will establish the strategic idea of an active psychological warfare defence. Active defence including the tempering of minds of the Chinese people by inoculation, thus allowing the population to come into contact with other ideas and, through education and guidance, allowing them to see what is wrong with those ideas. This approach allows people to develop psychological immunity.

Opening their minds up to other ideas is not the same as cutting them loose. The main form of psychological warfare will be competing for public opinion. To be able to seize public opinion, China has developed its own independent information and media power, guiding public opinion, and the conducting of public opinion propaganda. The demand for information is a universal psychological need. Passive psychological defence cannot suffice. With initiative and offense China has taken the strategic initiative with regard to public opinion.

Propaganda prepared in advance, to include material designed to counter the attacks to be made against the initial release of propaganda.

The importance of attaining media superiority and of controlling the negative effects of media coverage :

Media control is one of the front lines in psychological wars. News broadcasts and computer technology allow people to watch a battle in progress, as they would watch a sporting event. An event that might have been known to only a few people in the past can now be witnessed by millions. Such access to information affects public sentiment and morale. China accuses the West of fulfilling its hegemonic wishes by manipulating public opinion, by attaining media superiority, and by guiding people’s psychological tendencies.

Yet all Chinese approaches are what the Chinese are proud to claim elsewhere as their heritage; i.e,; ‘Focus on Psychological War Against the Background of Grand Strategy,’ intimidation being a key strategy that can be used to influence both public opinion and the media. In fact, psychological war and intimidation are so difficult to tell apart that they are almost twins. Intimidation is both a strategy and a method. Now the use of nonviolent intimidation, which includes alliances, media manipulation, economic sanctions, financial attack, information isolation and network attacks, have increased manifold.

The U.S. according to the Chinese uses its advantage of power as the foundation of psychological war, employing arms displays, arms sales, and military exercises as intimidation.

In response, China has implemented its own intimidation psychological war plan that includes Chinese threat forces and mechanisms, and intimidation psychological war strategy.

China has developed an elite and effective military intimidation force, fully applying all kinds of nonmilitary intimidation methods, establish a psychological intimidation mechanism that has strategic maneuvering at its core, and organising and applying all kinds of psychological intimidation factors, thus developing the greatest psychological intimidation effect. Intimidation established on the foundation of power; because without power,intimidation is hollow.

Strategy

Strategy is fundamental, and mapping out a strategy is the most traditional Chinese characteristic of psychological warfare. Mapping out the strategy is followed by attacking an opponent’s alliances, attacking their army, and attacking their cities — in that order. The best strategy is to attack the enemy’s mind, leaving them unable to plan. Strategy can create psychological misperceptions that will cause one side to remain unprepared. The prepared side can then win without fighting. In a more narrow sense, the use of strategy may be seen in demonstrations and feints that surprise the enemy by hitting them where they are unprepared.

Major differences between China and the West :
Regarding the strategic starting points and the orientation of psychological warfare. By strategic starting points, the is meant psychological warfare’s nature, objectives and factors for victory. China looks at psychological warfare as a method of spreading truth and justice, of trying to win people’s minds and of exposing an enemy’s plot to confuse, corrupt or penetrate China’s mental space. The West according to the Chinese, views psychological  warfare as a way of promoting its hegemonic strategy, designed to create turmoil and division within other countries. (Obviously many might disagree.)

Regarding the orientation of China’s psychological warfare strategy, one can list two strategic orientations : offensive and defensive. The orientations differ in their roles, in their employment, and in the structure of their deployment. China will continue to combine offence with defence, and use offence for defence (so to shift from passive to active modes and expand room for maneuver).

From this perspective,demonstrations and shows of force are the basic strategic methods of conducting psychological operations. Demonstrations were used in ancient times, as detailed in the ‘Thirty Six Stratagems of War,’ a collection of Chinese proverbs and instructions for winning at war. A demonstration is an attack that exploits strengths and weaknesses, and its objective is to take the enemy by surprise. One may exploit strengths and weaknesses by appearing to be strong when one is weak, or by appearng to be weak when one is strong.

In short, demonstrations are a way of getting friendly and enemy forces to interact psychologically. Demonstrations are also a form of deterrence, which is another psychological-warfare concept. Demonstrations establish credibility and fear, two of the three elements of deterrence theory (reliability is the third).

Strategy’s essence is thinking, and the quality of one’s thinking determines the quality of one’s strategy. Strategic thinking is a ‘big screen’, integrated method of thought, a bird’s-eye-view way of thinking. It is anticipatory, realistic and response oriented, and it is a kind of rational thinking.

Information technology

Information technology has made it possible for psychological warfare to become both a strategic resource and a method, and psychological specialists in China as in the West are exploiting many information era technologies. For example, future military attacks will be (are) combined with attacks on electronic technology, virtual reality can plant false information into an enemy’s command information system, creating gross mis-perceptions among commanders; and network intruders are able to penetrate terminals on the network, executing an all-directional psychological attack.

In the current era the vast development in information science, psychology, the science of broadcasting, and other sciences, and in particular the emergence of new and high technologies such as satellite communications, massively powerful computers, networking technology, and multimedia technology, provides a firm theoretical foundation and era specific tools for psychological warfare.

Networks are the most important aspect of the technological battle. Network psychological warfare is a topic in psychological warfare defence, but networks are the main psychological warfare battlefield both now and in the future.

Global networks provide more space in which to engage in propaganda. Network data can be put online in secrecy by almost anyone, it is difficult to verify who the providers of network data are and access to information is not subject to restrictions of time or place. Network attacks can throw a nation’s social, political and economic life into chaos, producing a shock effect on people’s minds and leading to political instability. In order to develop network defense, China has developed a ‘network sovereignty’, establishing laws for network activities and established information protection forces. Creating competent forces for information war and psychological warfare will thereby ensure China’s information security and psychological security.

Regarding the impact of information technology, one can list several futuristic (?) ideas for psychological warfare equipment. An intelligent / smart component was recently added to psychological warfare equipment. The intelligent / smart component includes computers used to guide the operating and sensing systems of UAVs. UAVs which can recognise targets, broadcast propaganda and ‘scatter leaflets’ before returning to their base. Such leaflets by the way combine visual, audio and speech elements.There has been developed a method of projecting holographic images high into the clouds. The projections produce a type of illusory psychological warfare by portraying for example, Islamic martyrs, who appear to speak to soldiers from the clouds.

In contemporary wars, the first targets to be attacked are targets with psychological value, such as television, broadcasting and all other communications venues. Destruction of these targets helps cause psychological passivity, panic and eventually, defeat. A good example; Russia underestimated the power of communications during its first war with Chechnya from 1994 – 96. The Chechens were able to exert a major psychological influence on the course and the outcome of the war by utilising the impact of instantaneous field reporting to TV stations. That reporting greatly affected public opinion.

Threats

The threats facing China, can be labeled as hard warfare(high-tech warfare) and soft warfare (psychological warfare designed to westernise or split the country). While the former is the most difficult, the latter could be accomplished in the context of a grand strategy in which psychological warfare plays an increasingly important role in safeguarding national security and in winning high-tech wars.Because psychological war can achieve the greatest number of political benefits and the greatest psychological influence while taking almost no risks, China believes that the U.S. is using a psychological warfare strategy, that of peaceful evolution to enhance the disintegration of socialist countries. As part of that strategy, the U.S. has developed a military force that possesses advanced weapons, and that the U.S. has carried out violent psychological threats toward socialist nations. According to the Chinese, the U.S. has used economics and trade to infiltrate socialist nations and has used personnel exchanges to carry out ideological and cultural psychological infiltration, thereby fostering an anti-socialist force.

According to the Chinese, U.S. psychological warfare undermined the USSR, and they see evidence of a similar threat to China – administrations having a clear strategic goal of containing China.

China is convinced that he U.S. is using religion to weaken the ideology of Marxism. Of course, the greatest psychological warfare threat is the threat of taking control of morale, the foundation stone for vic-tory. Thereare five tactics one can describe for China’s controlling morale:

With a powerful opponent, wait them out;

With an arrogant opponent, show them respect for a long time

With a firm opponent, entice and then seize them

With an evasive opponent, get close to them in front, make noise on his flanks, dig deep ditches and put up high ramparts, and make it hard for them to get provisions

With a weak opponent, make noise to frighten them, jolt them by breaking through, and if they come at you, then attack them, otherwise, fall back

The theory of psychological warfare has tremendous significance and value to China. Chinese theorists are  developing (have developed) an updated ideology and strategy of psychological warfare, one that does focus on intimidation and on exploiting the differences between Eastern and Western mentalities. This more than implies that China has established a command structure for psychological warfare, as well as the creation special units that are attempting and succeeding in overcoming past Chinese inferiority in high-tech weapons.

 Chinese theorists believe that because modern psychological warfare can help ensure stability and shape national security thinking, it is more applicable in peace than in war.

Chinese leaders have developed a psychological warfare system that integrates specialised and non-specialised personnel, and that emphasises China’s special characteristics.

China has established a psychological warfare coordination agency at the national level which provides guidance and coordination for national psychological warfare actions.

China has established a psychological warfare command agency, under the unified leadership of the Central Military Commission and the party committee.

China has established psychological warfare scientific research agencies of all kinds so to guide the work nationally and in the military.

China has established a specialised psychological warfare corps very effectively forming a consolidated and effective psychological attack force.

China has developed an ultra modernised basis for psychological-warfare material and technical equipment.

China has formed a people’s psychological warfare mentality by developing psychological-warfare education for the masses and for all commanders in the military.

Whatever China’s weaknesses were in the past,  for example; in regard to equipment, materials and technical content, it has now develop an ultra-force that combines its mass-action strength with a specialised structure for psychological warfare.

China sees the U.S as its major psychological warfare threat, that the U.S. objective is to gain benefits from the Chinese consumer market and to maintain long-term politica and psychological pressure on China. The U.S. will accomplish that objective by attacking China’s national self-respect and by compelling China to do what the U.S.asks.

Chinese psychological acceptance of socialism depends on China’s comprehensive national strength and on the level of progress that the social system achieves in economic development and in socialist awakening.  One cannot believe that the foreign moon is rounder than that of China, for this is defeatist psychology. Conviction in the correctness of one’s own system is what works, and that is what is required.

China is unlikely to  waver from the main characteristics of its psychological-warfare doctrine, which is a strong

reliance on the use of war experience, deep cultural roots, the influence of Marxist materialist dialectics and the role of strategic deception.

China will continue using power projection as a means of achieving success in influencing the activities of foreign nations. The centralised leadership system will continue to exert control over the news, propaganda and public opinion.

Importantly, and it is contentious, Chinese theorists think strategically in a way that few foreigners do.

We must learn to predict Chinese psychological warfare strategy during the coming years.

(C-III)

Secret Intelligence Service

.

Secret Intelligence Service

(C-I) UNIT. 12 09 2018. Harrogate

Seminar Topic (No. II) :

.

UNDERSTANDING CHINESE APPROACHES IN PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE

(II)