{"id":21520,"date":"2018-08-23T17:41:33","date_gmt":"2018-08-23T16:41:33","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.secretintelligenceservice.org\/?page_id=21520"},"modified":"2020-09-30T17:23:36","modified_gmt":"2020-09-30T16:23:36","slug":"c-ic-iiic-ivc-v","status":"publish","type":"page","link":"https:\/\/www.secretintelligenceservice.org\/?page_id=21520","title":{"rendered":"(C-I)(C-III)(C-IV)(C-V)"},"content":{"rendered":"

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Secret Intelligence Service<\/span><\/p>\n

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Unit<\/span><\/p>\n

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Seminars. Harrogate <\/span><\/p>\n

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updated : 30 09 2020<\/span><\/p>\n

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Counterinsurgency<\/span><\/p>\n

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COUNTERINSURGENCY (I) DEFINITION<\/span><\/p>\n

Counterinsurgency : The military, paramilitary, political, economic, psychological, and civic actions taken by government to defeat insurgency<\/span>
\nCounterinsurgency is an offensive approach involving all elements of national power, it can take place across the range of operations and spectrum of conflict.<\/span><\/p>\n

Counterinsurgency includes :<\/span><\/p>\n

strategic and operational planning<\/span>
\nintelligence development and analysis<\/span>
\ntraining<\/span>
\nmaterial<\/span>
\ntechnical organisational assistance<\/span>
\nadvice<\/span>
\ninfrastructure development<\/span>
\ntactical-level operations<\/span>
\nmany elements of Psyop<\/span><\/p>\n

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Counter-state – a\u00a0 movement that explicitly aims to destroy nation-state boundaries<\/span><\/span><\/span><\/span><\/span><\/p>\n

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INSURGENCY<\/span><\/p>\n

Insurgency – an occasion when a group of people attempt to take control of their country by force<\/span><\/p>\n

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Secret Intelligence Service<\/span>
\n(C-I) UNIT. London<\/span>
\nSeminar 03 08 2018. Harrogate<\/span><\/p>\n

Topic : On the Dynamics of\u00a0 INSURGENCY
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Note : As stated, this will be a long series and is intended to coincide with what we have gone through prior, regarding clandestine hybrid war – 4th generation war. <\/span><\/p>\n

** In addition and obvious but will state it; the series involves our examination of insurgency and requisite counterinsurgency.<\/span><\/p>\n

There are at least seven dynamics common to most insurgencies.<\/span><\/p>\n

The following dynamics provide a framework for our analysis that can reveal the insurgency\u2019s strengths and also weaknesses. Although we can examine the following separately, we must study their interaction to fully understand any insurgency.<\/span><\/p>\n

The seven identifiable dynamics are :<\/span><\/p>\n

Leadership (below)<\/span><\/p>\n

Ideology<\/span><\/p>\n

Objectives<\/span><\/p>\n

Environment and geography<\/span><\/p>\n

External support<\/span><\/p>\n

Phasing and timing<\/span>
\n.<\/span><\/p>\n

Leadership :<\/span><\/p>\n

Note > Leadership is critical to any insurgency. <<\/span>
\nInsurgency is not simply random political violence. It is directed and focused political violence. It requires leadership to provide vision, direction so to establish and set the long-term way ahead, short-term guidance, coordination, and organisational coherence.<\/span><\/p>\n

Insurgent leaders make their cause known to the people and gain popular support. Although, theoretically, the insurgent leader desires to gain popular support for the cause, that desire is often accompanied by a terror campaign against those who do not support the insurgents\u2019 goals. Their key tasks are to break and supplant the ties between the people and the government, and to establish legitimacy for their movement. Their education, family, social and religious connections, and positions may contribute to their ability to think clearly, communicate, organise, and lead an insurgency; or their lack of education and connections may delay or impair their access to positions where they are able to exercise leadership.<\/span><\/p>\n

Insurgencies are dynamic political movements, resulting from real or perceived grievance or neglect that leads to alienation from an established government. Alienated elite members advance alternatives to existing conditions. (Culture defines elites; example, in most countries, educators and teachers\/mentors are members of the elite.<\/span><\/p>\n

In Islamic and many Catholic countries, religious leaders are elite members.) As their movement grows, leaders decide which body of doctrine to adopt. In the ‘mass mobilisation approach’ *can regard it that way), leaders recruit, indoctrinate and deploy the corps\/teams\/factions required to carry out the actions of the movement.<\/span><\/p>\n

In the armed action approach, there is often a much more decentralised mode of operations, but this is usually guided by a central organisation. Extreme decentralisation results in a movement that rarely functions as a coherent body but is nevertheless capable of inflicting substantial casualties and damage.<\/span><\/p>\n

The power base of some insurgencies is collective and does not depend upon specific leaders or personalities to be effective. Such insurgencies are easier to penetrate but recover rapidly when they lose key figures\/personnel. Other organisations depend on a charismatic personality to provide cohesion, motivation, and a focal point for the movement. Organisations led in this manner can make decisions and initiate new actions rapidly, but they are vulnerable to disruptions if key personalities are removed, or re- designated.<\/span><\/p>\n

Objectives :<\/span><\/p>\n

Effective analysis of an insurgency requires interpreting strategic, operational, and tactical objectives. Understanding the root causes of the insurgency is essential to analysing the insurgents\u2019 objectives.<\/span><\/p>\n

The ‘strategic objective’ is the insurgents\u2019 desired end state :<\/span>
\nthe seizure of political power and the overthrow of an existing government.<\/span><\/p>\n

‘Operational objectives’ refer to the decisive points (military, political, and ideological) along lines of operation toward the strategic objective, and these are the means to link tactical goals with strategic end-states.<\/span><\/p>\n

One of the political decisive points is the total destruction of government legitimacy.<\/span><\/p>\n

Tactical Objectives next \u2013 to be continued <\/span><\/p>\n

Secret Intelligence Service<\/span>
\n(C-I) UNIT. London<\/span>
\nSeminar 03 08 2018. Harrogate<\/span><\/p>\n

Topic : On the Dynamics of Insurgency<\/span><\/p>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\n

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Secret Intelligence Service<\/span>
\n(C-I) UNIT<\/span>
\nNotes for Seminar. 08 08 2018. Harrogate.<\/span><\/p>\n

ORIGINS OF INSURGENCY \u2013 NOTES PARTIAL
\n(From remit on Hybrid 4th Generation Clandestine War)<\/span><\/span><\/p>\n

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Rising up against constituted authority has been present throughout history. The causes for such uprisings have been as numerous as human conditions. Uprisings against indigenous regimes have normally been termed rebellions. Uprisings against an external occupying power have normally been termed resistance movements. Historical particulars can at times combine the two.<\/span><\/p>\n

Rebellions and resistance movements are transformed into an insurgency by their incorporation into an armed political campaign. A popular desire to resist is used by an insurgent movement to accomplish the insurgents\u2019 political goal. The insurgency thus mounts a political challenge to the state through the formation of, or desire to, create a counter-state.<\/span><\/p>\n

The desire to form a counter-state grows from the same causes that galvanise any political campaign.These causes can range from the desire for greater equity in the distribution of resources (poverty alone is rarely, if ever, sufficient to sustain an insurgency) to a demand that foreign occupation end. Increasingly, religious ideology has become a catalyst for insurgent movements.<\/span><\/p>\n

The support of the people, then, is the centre of gravity. It must be gained in whatever proportion is necessary to sustain the insurgent movement (or, contrariwise, to defeat it). As in any political campaign, all levels of support are relative. The goal is mobilisation such that the enemy may be defeated. This necessarily will depend as much upon the campaign approach (that is, operational art) and tactics adopted as upon more strategic concerns of support.<\/span><\/p>\n

Operational and tactical use of violence as an insurgent strategy has become increasingly commonplace.<\/span><\/p>\n

Objects of violence can be anything the insurgents deem to be obstructions to their cause.<\/span><\/p>\n

Violence is the most potent weapon available to insurgents. Nonetheless, violence can alienate when not linked to a vision of a better life. Violence is often accompanied by a variety of nonviolent means that act as a powerful weapon in an external propaganda war and assist recruiting. Historically, astute movements have recognised the efficacy of both means to the extent they have fielded discrete units charged with nonviolent action (for example, strikes in the transport and\/or energy sector) to supplement violent action.<\/span><\/p>\n

Secret Intelligence Service<\/span>
\n(C-I) UNIT<\/span>
\nNotes for Seminar. 08 08 2018. Harrogate.<\/span><\/p>\n

ORIGINS OF INSURGENCY \u2013 NOTES PARTIAL<\/span>
\n(From remit on Hybrid 4th Generation Clandestine War)<\/span>
\n(C-I)<\/span><\/p>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\n

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Secret Intelligence Service<\/span><\/div>\n<\/div>\n
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(C-I) UNIT<\/span><\/div>\n<\/div>\n
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My notes from Seminar : 12 08 2018. Harrogate.<\/span><\/div>\n<\/div>\n
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ORIGINS OF INSURGENCY (II) \u2013 NOTES PARTIAL<\/span><\/div>\n<\/div>\n
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(From remit on Hybrid 4th Generation Clandestine War)<\/span><\/div>\n
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It is the combatants who do the actual fighting and are often mistaken for the insurgency movement itself. This they are not. They exist only to carry out the same functions as the police and armed forces of the state.<\/span><\/div>\n<\/div>\n
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They only constitute part of the movement, along with the planners and idea people.<\/span><\/div>\n<\/div>\n
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In many insurgencies the combatants maintain local control, as well as protect and expand the counter-state.<\/span><\/div>\n<\/div>\n
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Combatants who secure local areas are the local forces.<\/span><\/div>\n
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The local forces use terror initially to intimidate and establish local control and later to enforce the will of the leadership. They conduct limited ambushes of government forces and police, in addition.<\/span><\/div>\n
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Insurgent Factions \/ Units<\/span><\/div>\n
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The insurgent factions \/ units are the political activists and local political leaders of the insurgency.<\/span><\/div>\n<\/div>\n
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Refer to these as militants since they are actively engaged in struggling to accomplish insurgent goals.<\/span><\/div>\n<\/div>\n
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The insurgent movement provides guidance and procedures to the faction, and the faction uses these to assess the grievances in local areas and carry out activities that satisfy those grievances. They then attribute the solutions they have provided to the insurgent movement itself.<\/span><\/div>\n
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Actions are the key to making insurgent slogans meaningful to the population. Larger societal issues, such as foreign presence, facilitate such action, because these larger, looming issues may be blamed for life\u2019s smaller problems. Insurgents, however, may have no regard for popular dissent or local grievances. The insurgents play by no rule book whatsoever, and they will use terror as a means to intimidate the populace. <\/span><\/div>\n<\/div>\n
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The Base<\/span><\/div>\n
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The base consists of the followers of the insurgent movement that are the population of the counter-state. Base members are recruited and indoctrinated by the factions, who implement instructions and procedures provided by the insurgent leadership. Though they do not actively fight for the insurgency, base members provide intelligence and supplies. <\/span><\/div>\n
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Base members may continue in their normal positions in society, but many will either lead second, clandestine lives for the insurgent movement, or even pursue new, full-time positions within the insurgency. Combatants normally begin as members of the base before becoming armed manpower. <\/span><\/div>\n<\/div>\n
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The insurgent leadership thus provides organisational and managerial skills to transform regions into an effective base for armed political action, while the faction\/unit accomplishes this same transformation at the community and mobilised individual level. What results, as in any armed conflict, is a contest of resource mobilisation and force deployment. A state is challenged by a counter-state. No objective force level guarantees victory for either side.<\/span><\/div>\n
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It is frequently stated that a 10 to 1 or 20 to 1 ratio of counter-insurgents to insurgents is necessary for counterinsurgency victory. In reality, research has demonstrated there are no valid ratios that, when met, guarantees a victory. As in conventional war, correlation of forces in an insurgency depends upon the situation. Though objective and valid force correlation ratios do not exist, counterinsurgency has been historically manpower intensive.<\/span><\/div>\n
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Time, which often works on the side of the insurgent, just as often places serious constraints upon counter-insurgent courses of action.<\/span><\/div>\n
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Secret Intelligence Service<\/span><\/div>\n<\/div>\n
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(C-I) UNIT<\/span><\/div>\n<\/div>\n
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My notes from Seminar : 12 08 2018. Harrogate.<\/span><\/div>\n<\/div>\n
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ORIGINS OF INSURGENCY (II) \u2013 NOTES PARTIAL<\/span><\/div>\n<\/div>\n
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(From remit on Hybrid 4th Generation Clandestine War)<\/span><\/div>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\n
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22 08 2018 Harrogate. Unit<\/span><\/div>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\n
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Violence is the most powerful weapon available to insurgents. However as we’ve discussed, violence can alienate when not linked to a vision of a ‘better life’. Violence is often accompanied by a variety of non-violent means that act as a powerful weapon in an external propaganda war and assist recruiting. Historically, astute movements have recognised the usefulness of both means to the extent they have fielded discrete units charged with non-violent action to supplement violent action.<\/span><\/p>\n

Insurgent movements begin as compulsion Insurgent leaders commit themselves to building a new world. They construct the organisation to carry through this desire. Generally, popular grievances become insurgent causes when interpreted and shaped by the insurgent leadership. The insurgency grows if the faction that is local insurgent leaders and representatives can establish a link between the insurgent movement and the desire for solutions to grievances sought by the local population. This link does not always exist. Self-serving insurgent leaders with no regard for local conditions may launch an insurgency, even if the population has few grievances. This can occur when the government is weak or even non-existent because of other factors.<\/span><\/p>\n

If the faction is able to indoctrinate and control the mobilised local manpower, often by creating a climate of fear, and the faction respond to higher commands with independent tactical action, the insurgency will be operationally and strategically unified. If the opposite is true, the insurgency will remain uncoordinated and decentralised.<\/span><\/p>\n

Insurgent leaders will exploit opportunities created by government security force actions. The behaviour of security forces is critical. Lack of security force discipline leads to alienation, and security force abuse of the populace is a very effective insurgent recruiting tool. Consequently, specific insurgent tactical actions are often planned to frequently elicit overreaction from security force individuals and units.<\/span><\/p>\n

Overreaction can result from operational planning that encourages brutalising a disobedient population.\u00a0 Such can create a perception of foreign military forces as oppressors rather than as liberators.<\/span><\/p>\n

INSURGENT DOCTRINE<\/span><\/p>\n

Insurgent doctrine determines how insurgents actually implement the two types of insurgency. A defensive insurgency has much in common with a resistance movement, since the counter-state already exists and will normally adopt overt techniques necessary for self-defense. An offensive insurgency, on the other hand, is faced with the task of creating the counter-state from scratch.<\/span><\/p>\n

To do this, there are two basic approaches.<\/span><\/p>\n

Mass mobilisation<\/span><\/p>\n

A first approach is to emphasise mobilisation of the masses. This course places a premium upon political action by the faction in local areas, with strategic and operational directives coming from above. Emphasising mass mobilisation results in a hierarchical, tightly controlled, coordinated movement. The insurgent movement that results will resemble a pyramidal structure in its manpower distribution, with the combatants the smallest part of the movement at the top.<\/span><\/p>\n

Armed action<\/span><\/p>\n

A second approach emphasises armed action. This course favours violence as opposed to mass mobilisation and normally results in an ‘inverted pyramidal structure’, with the combatants themselves the bulk of the movement.<\/span><\/p>\n

MOBILISATION<\/span><\/p>\n

The base sustains the first approach. The second approach has a much smaller support base. The support base will not have the numbers of the\u00a0 base generated by the mobilisation approach.<\/span><\/p>\n

If emphasis is upon mass mobilisation, the combatants exist to facilitate the accomplishment of the political goals of the insurgent movement. In local areas, terror and guerrilla action are used to eliminate resistance, either from individuals who are opposed to the movement or from the local armed representatives of the state, initially the police and militia, but later the armed forces. Main force units, which are guerrilla units – rough copies of government units are usually more mobile and lightly armed, are used to deal with the state\u2019s inevitable deployment of the military. The purpose of main forces is to engage in mobile warfare. The intent is force upon force action to destroy government main force units. Tactics may include major battles as well as ambushes and small-scale engagements.<\/span><\/p>\n

These battles and engagements result in the securing and expansion of the counter-state \u00a0(which\u00a0 may be clandestine in all or part), but are not designed to seize and hold positions as in conventional warfare.<\/span><\/p>\n

This occurs only in positional warfare.<\/span><\/p>\n<\/div>\n

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ARMED ACTION<\/span><\/p>\n

If emphasis is on the second approach, armed action, the political goal is to be accomplished primarily by violence rather than mass mobilisation. The insurgents attempt to inflict such a level of casualties and destruction the state is incapable or unwilling to continue counterinsurgency actions.<\/span><\/p>\n

Both approaches emphasise inflicting casualties. The distinction is whether mobilization or armed insurrection is the initial emphasis. Insurgents may also employ terrorist tactics if they lack a mass base, do not have the time needed to create such a base, or have objectives that do not require such a base. In this approach, the combatant force rarely moves beyond terrorist and guerrilla actions. Units are small and specialised, frequently no more than squad or platoon sized. Sympathisers provide recruits for the support base, but these sympathisers are actively involved only occasionally, though they are often central to the information warfare component of the insurgent campaign.<\/span><\/p>\n

>> Effective analysis of an insurgency requires interpreting strategic, operational, and tactical objectives. Understanding the root causes of the insurgency is essential to analysing the insurgents\u2019 objectives. <<<\/span><\/p>\n

The strategic objective is the insurgents\u2019 desired end state – the seizure of political power and the overthrow of an existing government.<\/span><\/p>\n

Operational objectives are the decisive points (military, political, and ideological) along lines of operation toward the strategic objective, and they are the means to link tactical goals with strategic end states.<\/span><\/p>\n

One of the political decisive points is the total destruction of government legitimacy.<\/span><\/p>\n

Tactical Objectives \u2013 to be continued<\/span><\/p>\n

Tactical objectives are the immediate aims of insurgent acts.<\/span><\/p>\n

Tactical objectives can be psychological and physical in nature. Some examples include the dissemination of Psyop \/ information warfare materials, intimidation (a psychological intervention), and the attack and seizure of a key facility (a physical intervention).<\/span><\/p>\n

IDEOLOGY<\/span><\/p>\n

In its ideology an insurgency sets forth a political alternative to the existing state. Both theoretically and actually, it offers a vision of an alternative \/ counterstate.<\/span><\/p>\n

The most powerful ideologies tap latent, emotive concerns of the populace, such as the desire for justice,the creation of an idealised religious state, or liberation from foreign occupation. Ideology influences the insurgents\u2019 perception of the environment by providing the prism, to include vocabulary and analytical categories, through which the situation is assessed. The result is that ideology shapes the movement\u2019s organisation and operational methods.<\/span><\/p>\n

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Secret Intelligence Service<\/span><\/div>\n<\/div>\n
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(C-I) UNIT<\/span><\/div>\n<\/div>\n
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From Seminar. Notes. 01 09 2018. Harrogate<\/span><\/div>\n<\/div>\n
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ORIGINS OF INSURGENCY. MAO. (IV)<\/span><\/div>\n<\/div>\n
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Note that environmental, geographical, cultural and demographic factors affect all participants in a conflict. <\/span><\/div>\n<\/div>\n
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The manner in which insurgents and counter-insurgents adapt to this reality creates both advantages and disadvantages for each. The effects of these factors are immediately visible at the tactical level, where they are may be the predominant influence on decisions regarding force structure, and doctrine.<\/span><\/div>\n<\/div>\n
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Insurgency in an urban environment does often present a different set of planning considerations than in rural environments. <\/span><\/div>\n<\/div>\n
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The requirement for access to external resources and havens has been a factor throughout the history of insurgencies. Rarely has there been an insurgent force able to obtain arms and equipment needed for decisive action from within the battle area. External support provides political, psychological, and material resources that might ordinarily be limited or indeed, unavailable.<\/span> <\/span><\/div>\n<\/div>\n
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> A recent trend has been the advent of internal safe havens. These may be large cities where external military forces are not sufficiently strong to counter the insurgents. Safe havens may be in the form of religious structures too.<\/span><\/div>\n<\/div>\n
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Insurgencies do often move through common phases of development.<\/span><\/div>\n<\/div>\n
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The concept generally followed by insurgents is drawn from what was in fact postulated by Chinese leader Mao Zedong. <\/span><\/div>\n<\/div>\n
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Regardless of its derivation, movements as diverse as communist or as Islamic insurgencies have used the Maoist concept because it is based upon the > mass mobilisation emphasis.<\/span><\/div>\n<\/div>\n
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Maoist doctrine states that insurgents :<\/span><\/div>\n<\/div>\n
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> are on the strategic defensive (Phase I),<\/span><\/div>\n<\/div>\n
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> shift to stalemate (Phase II), <\/span><\/div>\n<\/div>\n
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> move to the offensive (Phase III). <\/span><\/div>\n<\/div>\n
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Strategic movements shift from one phase to another incorporating the operational and tactical activity typical of earlier phases. It does not end them. <\/span><\/div>\n<\/div>\n
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Not all insurgencies experience each phase, and progression through all phases is not a requirement for successful outcome. <\/span><\/div>\n<\/div>\n
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The same insurgent movement may be in different phases in different regions of a country. Successful insurgencies can also lapse into an earlier phase while under pressure, resuming development when favourable conditions return.<\/span> <\/span><\/div>\n<\/div>\n
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Political organisation occurs throughout all phases. While on the defensive, however, in Phase I, vis a vis Mao, a movement will necessarily fight the war of the weak, emphasising terror and guerrilla action. These will be used to eliminate resistance from individuals and local government presence, especially the police. Invariably, the government must commit its main force units (army) to reclaim what it has lost. Knowing this, insurgents form their own main force units. These are used to defeat government forces in detail as the latter disperse to engage in area domination. It is through such action that stalemate, Phase II, is achieved. The government\u2019s forces in the contest of armed power <\/span><\/div>\n<\/div>\n
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are systematically neutralised through mobile force-on-force warfare. <\/span><\/div>\n<\/div>\n
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Only in Phase III does a transition to the holding of position occur.<\/span> <\/span><\/div>\n<\/div>\n
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If the insurgents adopt the armed action approach, these phases do not necessarily apply. Inflicting an unsustainable level of pain or external military forces may eliminate <\/span><\/div>\n<\/div>\n
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the need to form main force units. Pressure from within or country providing the forces may lead to surrender or to withdrawal. <\/span><\/div>\n<\/div>\n
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In attacking democratic societies, insurgents using this approach attempt to tap the purported aversion of democratic societies to prolonged, costly conflicts that appear without end in sight. <\/span><\/div>\n<\/div>\n
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They seek to destroy the will of the state to continue on in the struggle.<\/span><\/div>\n<\/div>\n
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Secret Intelligence Service<\/span><\/div>\n<\/div>\n
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(C-I) UNIT<\/span><\/div>\n<\/div>\n
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\u00a0<\/span><\/div>\n<\/div>\n
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From Seminar. Notes. 01 09 2018. Harrogate<\/span><\/div>\n<\/div>\n
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ORIGINS OF INSURGENCY. MAO. (IV)<\/span><\/div>\n
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Secret Intelligence Service<\/span>
\n(C-I) UNIT <\/span>
\nSeminar (i) Origins of Insurgency (III) and (ii) To discuss the methodology for the Future State Project. 2030.<\/span>
\nHarrogate. 25 08 2018<\/span><\/p>\n

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(i) Origins of Insurgency (No. III)<\/span>
\nNOTES<\/span><\/p>\n

Tactical objectives :<\/span><\/p>\n

These are the immediate aims of insurgent acts. <\/span>
\nTactical objectives can be and are usually both psychological and physical in nature concurrent. <\/span>
\nSome examples include; disseminating psyop materials, intimidation and the attack and seizing of a key facility (the latter obviously a physical objective).<\/span><\/p>\n

Ideology :<\/span><\/p>\n

In its ideology, an insurgency puts out a political alternative to the existing state, offering a vision of an alternative \/ counterstate.<\/span><\/p>\n

The most powerful ideologies tap into latent, emotive concerns of the population concerned, for example; a desire for ‘justice’, the creation of an idealised religious state, or the liberation from foreign occupation.<\/span>
\nIdeology influences the insurgents\u2019 perception of the world by <\/span>
\nincluding vocabulary and analytical categories \/ types, through which the situation can be assessed.<\/span><\/p>\n

The result is that ideology shapes the movement\u2019s organisation and its operational methods.<\/span><\/p>\n

NOTES :<\/span><\/p>\n

(ii) Methodology for the Future State Project – Transformational Change<\/span><\/p>\n

THE FUTURE STATE project will engage the Unit off and on until year 2030. Yes! Quite something. Thereby it presents us with extremely complex \/ multifarious \/ systemic and dynamic issues – throughout what is the evolution into (morphing toward) the future state (the United Kingdom). It is no less than a fascinating challenge, given the duration.<\/span><\/p>\n

Consider :<\/span><\/p>\n

The ongoing application of computer-aided, question-assisted brainstorming.<\/span><\/p>\n

Interconnectedness \u2013 identifying the influences that hold together structures, and so on.<\/span><\/p>\n

This provides a rich picture of where we are at a given time.<\/span><\/p>\n

If we discuss (though not confined to); the implications for law and order, defence \/ military \/ intelligence – the means of protecting the most important economic, political and other public relations \u2013 if we briefly consider these as they present during the present time, > how will these change given the form of a completely different future state – the United Kingdom. 2030? <<\/span><\/p>\n

The point being that as we move ahead, where we are at will have to change so to accommodate the emergence and application of the completely new. The methodology will assist us in incorporating the emerging tech (e.g., the Internet of Things), the novel architectural forms, the social systems (people change when things around them change) and so on…. (C-I)<\/span><\/p>\n

Secret Intelligence Service<\/span>
\n(C-I) UNIT <\/span>
\nSeminar (i) Origins of Insurgency (III) and (ii) To discuss the methodology for the Future State Project. 2030.<\/span>
\nHarrogate. 25 08 2018<\/span><\/p>\n

.<\/p>\n

\n
Secret Intelligence Service<\/span><\/div>\n<\/div>\n
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(C-I) UNIT<\/span><\/div>\n<\/div>\n
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My notes from Seminar : 12 08 2018. Harrogate.<\/span><\/div>\n<\/div>\n
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\u00a0<\/span><\/div>\n<\/div>\n
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ORIGINS OF INSURGENCY (II) \u2013 NOTES PARTIAL<\/span><\/div>\n<\/div>\n
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(From remit on Hybrid 4th Generation Clandestine War)<\/span><\/div>\n<\/div>\n
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\u00a0<\/span><\/div>\n<\/div>\n
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It is the combatants who do the actual fighting and are often mistaken for the insurgency movement itself. This they are not. They exist only to carry out the same functions as the police and armed forces of the state.<\/span><\/div>\n<\/div>\n
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They only constitute part of the movement, along with the planners and idea people.<\/span><\/div>\n<\/div>\n
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In many insurgencies the combatants maintain local control, as well as protect and expand the counterstate.<\/span><\/div>\n<\/div>\n
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Combatants who secure local areas are the local forces.<\/span><\/div>\n<\/div>\n
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The local forces use terror initially to intimidate and establish local control and later to enforce the will of the leadership. They conduct limited ambushes of government forces and police, also.<\/span><\/div>\n<\/div>\n
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\u00a0<\/span><\/div>\n<\/div>\n
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Insurgent Factions \/ Units<\/span><\/div>\n<\/div>\n
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\u00a0<\/span><\/div>\n<\/div>\n
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The insurgent factions \/ units are the political activists and local political leaders of the insurgency.<\/span><\/div>\n<\/div>\n
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Refer to these as militants since they are actively engaged in struggling to accomplish insurgent goals.<\/span><\/div>\n<\/div>\n
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The insurgent movement provides guidance and procedures to the faction, and the faction uses these to assess the grievances in local areas and carry out activities that satisfy <\/span><\/div>\n<\/div>\n
\n
those grievances. They then attribute the solutions they have provided to the insurgent movement itself.<\/span><\/div>\n<\/div>\n
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\u00a0<\/span><\/div>\n<\/div>\n
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Actions are the key to making insurgent slogans meaningful to the population. Larger societal issues, such as foreign presence, facilitate such action, because these larger, looming issues may be blamed for life\u2019s smaller problems. Insurgents, however, may have no regard for popular dissent or local grievances. The insurgents play by no rule book whatsoever, and they will use terror as a means to intimidate the populace. <\/span><\/div>\n<\/div>\n
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<\/div>\n<\/div>\n
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The Base<\/span><\/div>\n<\/div>\n
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\u00a0<\/span><\/div>\n<\/div>\n
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The base consists of the followers of the insurgent movement that are the population of the counterstate. Base members are recruited and indoctrinated by the factions, who implement instructions and procedures provided by the insurgent leadership. Though they do not actively fight for the insurgency, base members provide intelligence and supplies. <\/span><\/div>\n<\/div>\n
\n
Base members may continue in their normal positions in society, but many will either lead second, clandestine lives for the insurgent movement, or even pursue new, full-time positions within the insurgency. Combatants normally begin as members of the base before becoming armed manpower. <\/span><\/div>\n<\/div>\n
\n
The insurgent leadership thus provides organisational and managerial skills to transform regions into an effective base for armed political action, while the faction\/unit accomplishes this same transformation at the community and mobilised individual level. What results, as in any armed conflict, is a contest of resource mobilisation and force deployment. A state is challenged by a counterstate. No objective force level guarantees victory for either side.<\/span><\/div>\n<\/div>\n
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\u00a0<\/span><\/div>\n<\/div>\n
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It is frequently stated that a 10 to 1 or 20 to 1 ratio of counterinsurgents to insurgents is necessary for counterinsurgency victory. In reality, research has demonstrated there are no valid ratios that, when met, guarantees a victory. As in conventional war, correlation of forces in an insurgency depends upon the situation. Though objective and valid force correlation ratios do not exist, counterinsurgency has been historically manpower intensive.<\/span><\/div>\n<\/div>\n
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Time, which often works on the side of the insurgent, just as often places serious constraints upon counterinsurgent courses of action.<\/span><\/div>\n
.<\/span><\/div>\n
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Secret Intelligence Service<\/span><\/div>\n<\/div>\n
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(C-I) UNIT<\/span><\/div>\n<\/div>\n
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Notes for Seminar. 08 08 2018. Harrogate. <\/span><\/div>\n<\/div>\n
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\u00a0<\/span><\/div>\n<\/div>\n
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ORIGINS OF INSURGENCY \u2013 NOTES PARTIAL<\/span><\/div>\n<\/div>\n
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(From remit on Hybrid 4th Generation Clandestine War)<\/span><\/div>\n<\/div>\n
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<\/div>\n<\/div>\n
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Rising up against constituted authority has been present throughout history. The causes for such uprisings have been as numerous as human conditions. Uprisings against indigenous regimes have normally been termed rebellions. Uprisings against an external occupying power have normally been termed resistance movements. Historical particulars can at times combine the two. <\/span><\/div>\n<\/div>\n
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\u00a0<\/span><\/div>\n<\/div>\n
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Rebellions and resistance movements are transformed into an insurgency by their incorporation into an armed political campaign. A popular desire to resist is used by an insurgent movement to accomplish the insurgents\u2019 political goal. The insurgency thus mounts a political challenge to the state through the formation of, or desire to, create a counterstate. <\/span><\/div>\n<\/div>\n
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\u00a0<\/span><\/div>\n<\/div>\n
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The desire to form a counterstate grows from the same causes that galvanise any political campaign.These causes can range from the desire for greater equity in the distribution of resources (poverty alone is rarely, if ever, sufficient to sustain an insurgency) to a demand that foreign occupation end. Increasingly, religious ideology has become a catalyst for insurgent movements.<\/span><\/div>\n<\/div>\n
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\u00a0<\/span><\/div>\n<\/div>\n
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The support of the people, then, is the centre of gravity. It must be gained in whatever proportion is necessary to sustain the insurgent movement (or, contrariwise, to defeat it). As in any political campaign, all levels of support are relative. The goal is mobilisation such that the enemy may be defeated. This necessarily will depend as much upon the campaign approach (that is, operational art) and tactics adopted as upon more strategic concerns of support.<\/span><\/div>\n<\/div>\n
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\u00a0<\/span><\/div>\n<\/div>\n
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Operational and tactical use of violence as an insurgent strategy has become increasingly commonplace.<\/span><\/div>\n<\/div>\n
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<\/div>\n<\/div>\n
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Objects of violence can be anything the insurgents deem to be obstructions to their cause.<\/span><\/div>\n<\/div>\n
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\u00a0<\/span><\/div>\n<\/div>\n
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Violence is the most potent weapon available to insurgents. Nonetheless, violence can alienate when not linked to a vision of a better life. Violence is often accompanied by a variety of nonviolent means that act as a powerful weapon in an external propaganda war and assist recruiting. Historically, astute movements have recognised the efficacy of both means to the extent they have fielded discrete units charged with nonviolent action (for example, strikes in the transport and\/or energy sector) to supplement violent action.<\/span><\/div>\n<\/div>\n
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\u00a0<\/span><\/div>\n<\/div>\n
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Note there is too much to write here so continued on website<\/span><\/span><\/div>\n<\/div>\n
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\u00a0<\/span><\/div>\n<\/div>\n
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Secret Intelligence Service<\/span><\/div>\n<\/div>\n
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(C-I) UNIT<\/span><\/div>\n<\/div>\n
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Notes for Seminar. 08 08 2018. Harrogate. <\/span><\/div>\n<\/div>\n
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\u00a0<\/span><\/div>\n<\/div>\n
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ORIGINS OF INSURGENCY \u2013 NOTES PARTIAL<\/span><\/div>\n<\/div>\n
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(From remit on Hybrid 4th Generation Clandestine War)<\/span><\/div>\n<\/div>\n
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(C-I)<\/span><\/div>\n<\/div>\n
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\u00a0<\/span><\/div>\n<\/div>\n
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Adversitate. Custodi. Per Verum<\/span><\/div>\n
.<\/span><\/div>\n
.<\/span><\/div>\n
Addendum I<\/span><\/div>\n
\n

Secret Intelligence Service<\/span>
\n(C-I). Unit. London<\/span><\/p>\n

from the SIS archive. History relating to foreign intelligence services. KGB – USSR.<\/span><\/p>\n

\n

In the years during which the cold war was in progress, any means were used for the application. Sports victories were a pride for the country. Sport was given special attention. In the arenas there were different games, politics was very closely intertwined with the sport. Passions were boiling during competitions.<\/span><\/p>\n

There are many accounts regarding celebrities who did reach Olympic heights in Soviet sports. The public adored their idols, but sports fans remained unaware that Olympic venues, medals and records – all this was a political means for a vision of espionage. Athletes were recruited by special services so to perform tasks of absolute secrecy. Many were forced to lead a double life, so as not to advertise their work in the KGB.<\/span><\/p>\n

Secret Intelligence Service<\/span>
\n(C-I). Unit. London<\/span><\/p>\n

from the SIS archive. History relating to foreign intelligence services. KGB<\/span><\/p>\n

.<\/span><\/p>\n

Addendum II<\/span><\/p>\n

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Secret Intelligence Service<\/span><\/div>\n<\/div>\n
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(C-I) Unit. London<\/span><\/div>\n<\/div>\n
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\u00a0<\/span><\/div>\n<\/div>\n
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from the SIS archive – ‘OPERATION CANNED\u2018 August 31, 1939.<\/span><\/div>\n<\/div>\n
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\u00a0<\/span><\/div>\n<\/div>\n
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August 31, 1939 in Glyavytsi (now Gliwice) the SS carried out OPERATION CANNED (Conserves), which served as one of the reasons for Germany’s attack on Poland, on September 1, 1939, which became the beginning of the Second World War.<\/span><\/div>\n<\/div>\n
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\u00a0<\/span><\/div>\n<\/div>\n
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The idea of Operation Canned was born to Reinhard Heydrich, the head of the Main Directorate of Reich Security, as early as 1938, during the Sudeten crisis, but then he did not find any use for the idea, since Britain and France had made concessions by signing the Munich agreement. In connection with the planned attack on Poland, a need for a plausible reason arose. And here it was a useful idea to stage an attack.<\/span><\/div>\n<\/div>\n
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\u00a0<\/span><\/div>\n<\/div>\n
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According to Heydrich’s plan, SS officers dressed in Polish uniforms were to attack a radio station in the German city of Glyavytsi, Poland, and broadcast an anti-German appeal in Polish; to attack the forestry in Pinchen, to the north of Kreuzburg (now Klyuchbork, Poland); in Hohlinden, on the stretch of the border between Glywitzi and Ratibor (now Raciborz, Poland) to destroy the customs station. The role of the ‘victims during the attack’ was intended for prisoners of concentration camps, who were killed by poison injections and then delivered to the scene of events. In the SS slang they were called ‘canned goods’; hence the name of the operation.<\/span><\/div>\n<\/div>\n
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\u00a0<\/span><\/div>\n<\/div>\n
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Alfred Naujoks, Sturmbannfuhrer SS, was appointed responsible for the attack on the radio station. At 20:00 Naujoks and subordinates rushed into the radio station. Seeing the worker of Voitcik, he pointed a gun and shouted, “Hands up!” He signaled, and the attackers opened fire, a random shooting. The radio station workers were tied up and locked in the basement. The search for a microphone took a long time, according to which radio listeners were warned about the approach of a thunderstorm. Soon the listeners of the radio heard a \u2018fiery appeal\u2019 delivered in Polish on the background of shots. The whole operation took no more than 4 minutes. As he was leaving, Naujoks noticed corpses in the Polish form carefully disguised by the people of Henry Muller. The same happened in other places of the action. The next day Hitler addressed the German people, saying that Poland had carried out an attack on German territory and that from that moment Germany was at war with Poland. The largest and most bloody war in the history of mankind began.<\/span><\/div>\n<\/div>\n
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\u00a0<\/span><\/div>\n<\/div>\n
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** Incidentally and regarding the incident at Glyayvitsi studio DEFA (GDR) in 1961 was filmed;\u2019Incident in Glyayvitsa\u2019 \/ Der Fall Gleiwitz. The role of Alfred Naujoks was performed by Hanno Hasse, the film also featured Christophe Beirtt, Wolfgang Calwayt, Georg Leopold, Hervart Grosse (in the role of Mueller), Rolf Ripperger and others……..Who, one might well ask, but there you are….<\/span><\/div>\n<\/div>\n
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\u00a0<\/span><\/div>\n<\/div>\n
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Secret Intelligence Service<\/span><\/div>\n<\/div>\n
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(C-I) Unit. London<\/span><\/div>\n<\/div>\n
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\u00a0<\/span><\/div>\n<\/div>\n
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from the SIS archive – ‘Operation Canned. August 31, 1939.’<\/span><\/div>\n
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from Information Operations (Unit) :<\/span><\/div>\n
Secret Intelligene Service<\/span><\/div>\n
Presenter (C-IV) Unit<\/span><\/div>\n
Seminar. Brodsworth. 30 10 2018<\/span><\/div>\n
.<\/span><\/div>\n
<\/div>\n
Notes from Seminar : ‘Deception must be integral to any major operation or campaign’<\/span><\/div>\n
.<\/span><\/div>\n
Planners rely on intelligence to construct a plausible story aimed at the fears of enemy commanders and preconceptions of the opposing forces and situation. The theatre must be seen through their eyes so the deception can be based on their concept of what friendly forces will do.<\/span><\/div>\n<\/div>\n
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Intelligence continues to be used to identify the parts of an enemy collection and evaluation structure the deception will target. After parts of the story are leaked, intelligence must assess their effect. Critical is predicting how the opposing commander will react. Planners then use intelligence to adjust both the deception and operation. The process requires continuous feedback from the targets about what an enemy does or doesn\u2019t know.<\/span><\/div>\n
<\/div>\n
Operational intelligence relies more on HUMINT and\u00a0 SIGINT than on other sources in assessing enemy situations and intentions. Feeding certain signals to HUMINT and SIGINT collectors prepares the deception story for <\/span>enemy consumption, while hiding the indicators of one\u2019s own disposition and strength conceals<\/span><\/div>\n
one\u2019s true intentions.<\/span><\/div>\n
.<\/span><\/div>\n
Success also requires understanding an enemy intelligence-gathering processes and decision cycle as well as the soundness of its operational and tactical doctrine. Because deception plans use hostile intelligence collection systems, they must identify their modes of collection, timeliness of reporting, relative weight of data received through each channel, and how that data enters the decision cycle to ensure that proper information is provided <\/span>by appropriate means at the right time.<\/span><\/div>\n
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<\/div>\n
Deception is applied through passive and active methods. The passive mode is primarily based on secrecy and camouflage, concealing one\u2019s intentions and capabilities. Active deception normally involves a calculated attempt at disclosing half-truths supported by appropriate proofs, signals, or other material evidence. Enemy intelligence must discover planted evidence and become convinced of its authenticity and significance. Active deception normally depends on the success of passive deception.<\/span><\/div>\n
<\/div>\n
The larger the objective, the more diverse and complex the methods used. In tactical deception, ruses or feints could be sufficient, while on the operational level, both military and nonmilitary measures may be needed. Methods range from spreading rumours and feeding false information to combat actions. On the highest level, diplomatic, political, economic, and informational instruments of national power are used to achieve strategic deception. Information plants and controlled enemy agents are often employed. Ruses, feints, demonstrations, and displays can tie down enemy forces in certain areas to ease resistance in the main sector.<\/span><\/div>\n
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<\/div>\n
The most common method of deception is misrepresenting one\u2019s intentions or capabilities through operational secrecy or more elaborate active deception that diverts attention. This approach was successful in the European theatre in World War II because the Allies broke the German codes and played on Axis fears and preconceptions of Allied intentions. The key contribution of intelligence was creating a false order of battle for the deception plan. Otherwise we could not have caused the Germans to react operationally because no actual forces were available for such purposes.<\/span><\/div>\n
<\/div>\n
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Strength can be misrepresented by concealing the location and type of one\u2019s forces, headquarters, and logistic elements. Such deception could create either an exaggerated or reduced evaluation of friendly capabilities. The perception of inflated strength can be reinforced through a mix of real and fictitious forces or by <\/span>inventing a completely notional order of battle in a locale an enemy considers critical, to include bogus headquarters and forces, communications networks and radio traffic, supply depots and other logistic elements, water facilities, pipelines, telephone and telegraph lines, and railroads and railheads. Dummy guns, tanks, trucks, and heavy engineering equipment can be concentrated, and practice target ranges and tank maneuver areas can be built. Troops or naval and air forces can be moved into attacking positions under the pretext of large-scale maneuvers. Operational security can be enhanced by denying information on the true purposes of such movements even to friendly forces.<\/span><\/p>\n

.<\/span><\/p>\n

On the strategic level, it is difficult to deceive an enemy as to real strength at the outbreak of hostilities because both sides have an accurate picture of the other\u2019s overall strength. It becomes easier as the war progresses. We succeeded in creating notional forces during preparation for the Normandy landing and in many Mediterranean operations because the Germans had little ability to obtain or confirm an accurate picture. Excessive exaggeration of strength in individual theaters, however, may tip an enemy off. <\/span><\/div>\n
<\/div>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\n
Attackers can achieve surprise if their sectors of main effort are concealed by carrying out massive air strikes against secondary sectors, then suddenly shifting them to forces deployed in front of the main sector. The successful German offensive in the west in May 1940 was due in large measure to an elaborate deception plan. The Germans concealed their sector of main attack by employing their feared bombers and Stukas against targets in Belgium.<\/span><\/div>\n
<\/div>\n
Deception measures can conceal one\u2019s real center of gravity. In a major operation in May 1942, General Erich von Manstein, commander of 11 th Army, used extensive measures to deceive his Soviet counterpart\u00a0 regarding where his most capable forces were deployed. The German attack unexpectedly came from the south. Von Manstein recaptured the Kerch Peninsula. The Crimean Front lost 176,000 men while only 120,000 escaped the trap.<\/span><\/div>\n
<\/div>\n
Another ploy is creating the impression of routine activities by conditioning an enemy to a pattern. The Germans used this method in preparing operational redeployment of two battle cruisers and one heavy cruiser from Brest through the English Channel in February 1942 during Operation Cerberus. They increased the intensity of their radar jamming over time. We became so acclimatised to the jamming that they did not realise their radar had become almost useless.<\/span><\/div>\n
<\/div>\n
Secret channels are one of the most effective factors in any deception or cover plan. The channels must thus always be under the close control of the officer responsible for theatre deception. In all physical deception, actions must appear normal to enemy intelligence agencies, including radio intercept and monitoring, ground and air reconnaissance, and especially secret agents.<\/span><\/div>\n
<\/div>\n
Electronic manipulation and simulation are highly effective. Manipulation involves altering one\u2019s own electronic order of battle or creating false levels of traffic or controlled security breaches. Electronic manipulation contributes to security. Simulation, in contrast, paints a fictional order of battle or inaccurate location of a genuine order.<\/span><\/div>\n
<\/div>\n
Rumours can support the deception story, falsely indicating force movements or one\u2019s strength in a locale. Rumours are usually rampant before a major operation or campaign. They must be used with care since they can baffle friend and enemy alike; but their deliberate planting can create confusion over one\u2019s cover objective and timing. They should not be initiated except in accordance with an approved plan.<\/span><\/div>\n
<\/div>\n
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PSYOP can aid operational deceptions even though their objectives are fundamentally at odds. PSYOP can promote the acceptance of a deceptive message by communicating only what one wants an enemy to hear, real or false, and then replacing it with something else.<\/span><\/div>\n
<\/div>\n
The now massive power\/capacity of global network connectivity has created an enormous capacity to process and distribute information. That, in turn, has increased the effectiveness and diversity of deception methods on all levels. The growth in the volume of information could saturate enemy processing and evaluation capabilities. It also drastically reduces the time the intelligence apparatus has to process, analyse, and disseminate its findings. Since the deceiver can saturate the target with useless data, a direct information attack need not rely exclusively on enemy ability to perceive or interpret it. Such an attack can aim at planting spurious information in a database, such as a false order of battle. The key is determining what fictions are desired. The attacker can also use logic bombs to incapacitate the opposing information system. These can lie dormant until activated by a date or random number and then damage the information system.<\/span><\/div>\n
<\/div>\n
Another method is conventional attack against an information system such as computer network server farms or telephone switching facilities. The array of targets is enormous, and the more an enemy relies on information technology the greater its vulnerability. Hence the weaker side can also plan and execute deception because s<\/span>ophisticated technology is inherently vulnerable to even the most basic camouflage and concealment. Simple deceptions can be effective against some types of information attack while more advanced methods are needed to counter sophisticated efforts.<\/span><\/div>\n
<\/div>\n
Deception is always a supporting plan; an operational plan should never depend on it exclusively. A deception plan introduces a risk to the basic plan. Operational commanders and their staffs should evaluate that risk during plan<\/span>ning, considering not only how the operation or campaign achieves the operational or strategic<\/span><\/div>\n
\n

objective, but how deception fits into the overall military, political, and diplomatic scheme. When both a primary and alternate plan are considered, they must be separated geographically to increase plausibility and decrease susceptibility to counterdeception. Allied strategic deception plan Fortitude encompassed two theatres, actions must appear normal to enemy intelligence agencies northern and western Europe. Likewise, the operational deception plan for the invasion of Sicily in July 1943 involved the central and western Mediterranean. In contrast, the plan for the Normandy landing encompassed only the sea and coastal area from Pas de Calais in the north to Brest in the south. Time must be available not only for planning but for evidence to be manufactured and received, <\/span>processed, and evaluated by the target and for a hostile operational commander to make a decision and take the desired actions, especially when a deception envisage enemy forces changing location. Measures that cannot be concealed should be sequenced to generate an estimate of friendly capabilities and intentions that coincide <\/span>with those in the deception plan. <\/span><\/p>\n

<\/div>\n
Timing of the deception story should allow for desired actions to be initiated, transmitted to hostile intelligence, and analyzed by it before an enemy reacts.<\/span><\/div>\n
<\/div>\n
Plausibility, security, and coordination are the key components. <\/span><\/div>\n
<\/div>\n
Plausibility is the most important. A plan cannot succeed if the target does not believe the story and consider it a logical course of action. Plausibility helps preserve the integrity of the operation despite possible security breaches. Planners must ensure that each element of the scheme fits logically into the overall operational or strategic scenario. The deception story, often the best alternative course of action in the opposing commander\u2019s estimate should focus on enemy expectations, preconceptions, and fears. This is difficult on the operational level because of the sheer size of the forces and area involved.<\/span><\/div>\n
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<\/div>\n
Plausibility depends on many factors. The enemy commander may not accept deception quickly; many signals might be required over time to convince that the first impressions were wrong. Enemy commander is more likely to accept a story that conforms to preconceptions and biases. Moreover, the story must correspond with operational and strategic realities. It is generally easier to maintain an existing belief than to change it. This makes it more critical to have a detailed and accurate knowledge of enemy perceptions, actions, doctrine, tactics, techniques, and procedures. The most effective deception stories are often those that do not cause an enemy to change anything.<\/span><\/div>\n
<\/div>\n
Operations security uses passive measures to conceal a deception and its elements. It is the defensive side of operational deception.<\/span><\/div>\n
<\/div>\n
Generally, the larger the deception, the more complex its plan and the longer its duration. The operational commander must thus balance time and space because the supporting plan must be maintained for weeks or months. The risk of discovery grows with time and the consequences can be devastating. The Japanese experienced a compromised plan in their Operation MI, which led to the Battle of Midway, when American cryptographers decoded the real purpose of their feint toward the Aleutians.<\/span><\/div>\n
<\/div>\n
False information, selected leaks, half-truths, and misinterpretation help keep one\u2019s plan secure. The greatest problem for an enemy is generally deliberate leaks that might be insignificant individually but whose collective importance develops over time. Intentional and sometimes unintentional breaches of one\u2019s security can increase<\/span><\/div>\n
ambiguity for an enemy. A dozen German security breaches revealed Hitler\u2019s intentions in the weeks preceding the invasion of Soviet Russia in June 1941. Yet Stalin remained convinced that the massive German deployment in the east was a cover for the invasion of Britain.<\/span><\/div>\n
<\/div>\n
A way to enhance operational security is to limit the personnel involved by creating a small, specialised planning section within a large headquarters and combining that with centralised direction and execution. Field Marshal Erwin Rommel, commander of Africa Corps and Axis forces in North Africa, knew the need for operational security. He informed neither his staff nor the supreme command of his intentions. He especially distrusted the Italians because they were loose with security. Likewise, in their great surprise counteroffensive in the Ardennes in December 1944, the Germans limited the number of commanders who knew of the plan. Chiefs of staff of two participating army groups signed a pledge of secrecy and were under penalty of death if they leaked information.<\/span><\/div>\n
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<\/div>\n
The Ring of Truth Deception security is often enhanced by misleading one\u2019s high commanders and their subordinates. Not informing one\u2019s forces enhances prospects for the entire plan because the troops<\/span><\/div>\n
are better motivated for the coming action if convinced that their efforts are real. In the Ardennes<\/span><\/div>\n
counter-offensive, German front commanders were convinced that massing supplies and with-drawing front line divisions were necessary to provide fresh troops for defending the Ruhr and the Palatinate. One way of enhancing a plan\u2019s security is by surrounding it with truth.<\/span><\/div>\n
<\/div>\n
Excessive security hinders coordination; thus there should be a balance between protection and effectiveness. An enemy is always alert for indications and warnings, hence perfect security does not exist. Commanders, knowing that their deception plans could be compromised, should use any security breaches to their advantage.<\/span><\/div>\n
Operational commanders should reconcile differences between deception objectives and the methods their staffs recommend. This is ensured by coordination throughout the chain of command. Because planning is conducted concurrently and in various staff sections, inconsistencies must be resolved. An operational deception <\/span>plan never stands alone but supports the campaign or major operation plan, therefore the plans must be coordinated. Commanders must ensure that plans prepared by their superiors and subordinates do not conflict with their own. A strategic deception plan can involve assets assigned to an operational commander who is not aware of the plan. Operational and tactical deception must also be synchronised. In addition, operational deception plans should be integrated into a strategic deception plan. Diplomatic, political, economic, and media elements must be coordinated on the strategic and operational levels.<\/span><\/div>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\n
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Deception plans may use not only notional forces, but real forces, which might endanger the real plan if those forces interfere with the sector of main effort or accidentally reveal the true objective. Thus it is necessary to disentangle the deception from the real scheme during planning. These efforts should continue throughout a major operation or campaign.<\/span><\/div>\n
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Operational deception often requires moving large and diverse forces. Because it is unlikely that there will be separate forces for both the real and the deception plans, both should be executed simultaneously with the same forces. Congruence is ensured through coordinated planning. The operational commander should also be able to modify or cancel the entire deception.<\/span><\/div>\n
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A large-scale deception cannot be limited to individual elements. Military, political, economic, and informational activities may be needed. All must be harmonised with the overall scenario to mislead an enemy. Operational deception therefore depends on sequenced and synchronised employment of large and diverse forces and assets controlled by the operational commander in terms of time, space, forces, and objective.<\/span><\/div>\n
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Deception is a critical part of campaign planning. Operational commanders and their staffs understand and apply its principles. New information technologies and techniques increase rather than reduce opportunities for deception, allowing both attackers and defenders greater choice of methods. Technology, no matter how sophisticated and available, cannot erase the need for wider awareness of the usefulness of deception on all<\/span><\/div>\n
levels of military activity. Deception must be integral to any major operation or campaign.<\/span><\/div>\n<\/div>\n
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from Information Operations (Unit) : DECEPTION
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Seminar. Brodsworth. 30 10 2018<\/span><\/div>\n<\/div>\n
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Not complete – Note that much of the content cannot be put on here but the title of each seminar can be
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Seminars – Counterinsurgency
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. Secret Intelligence Service . Unit . Seminars. Harrogate . updated : 30 09 2020 . Counterinsurgency . . . COUNTERINSURGENCY (I) DEFINITION Counterinsurgency : The military, paramilitary, political, economic, psychological, and civic actions taken by government to defeat insurgency Counterinsurgency is an offensive approach involving all elements of national power, it can take place […]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"parent":0,"menu_order":0,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","template":"","meta":{"_pvb_checkbox_block_on_post":false,"footnotes":""},"class_list":["post-21520","page","type-page","status-publish","hentry"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.secretintelligenceservice.org\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/pages\/21520","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.secretintelligenceservice.org\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/pages"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.secretintelligenceservice.org\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/types\/page"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.secretintelligenceservice.org\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.secretintelligenceservice.org\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fcomments&post=21520"}],"version-history":[{"count":34,"href":"https:\/\/www.secretintelligenceservice.org\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/pages\/21520\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":25680,"href":"https:\/\/www.secretintelligenceservice.org\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/pages\/21520\/revisions\/25680"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.secretintelligenceservice.org\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fmedia&parent=21520"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}