Secret Intelligence Service


Preparation of Clandestine Operational Groups of the MGB (Stasi) of the GDR

Die Unsichtbare Front. Vorbereitung Geheimer Einsatzgruppen der MGB-Stasi der DDR





updated 09 04 2018


The Invisible Front


The multi-vector attacks (asymmetric methods and those of conventional warfare) of clandestine operational groups of the MGB Stasi in the operational field. Though primarily focused on, but not restricted to the Federal Republic.

As a Unit, what is there that we can learn?

All intelligence agencies work on the invisible front and engage ‘clandestine operational activities’.

The purpose of the seminar is not to focus on the latter, but to ask questions pertaining to the unique character of the shared values and perceptions of the MGB Stasi clandestine operational units.

This was a long lasting campaign and the most perfected ever, such that in the case of periods of tension and military conflict and during peacetime, would be left behind a terrible trace of blood and destruction – in fact, mental and physical destruction of the Federal Republic, first and foremost. Not limited to obtaining intelligence information, of archetypal ruthless ferocity was; sabotage, terror, kidnapping, torture and assassination (‘liquidation’) on a grand scale. At the same time the operatives were not required to protect their own lives.

The aggressive plans of the MGB against West Germany persisted until l989. Neither the policy of detente nor the new military doctrine of the Warsaw Pact, adopted since the mid-1980s, changed anything in these plans.

Here are discussed the main principles in detail and show the work of the MGB in the West, in planning and execution. In the relevant documents of the MGB, the concepts of ‘liquidation’ and ‘destruction’ have been used repeatedly.

For example; agents of department IV, ‘Unofficial Staff’ (NA), were a kind of eyes and ears and provided RGM / C with a foundation for aggressive subversive plans against West Germany. The size of the IV network in the Federal Republic of Germany, other Western countries and in the GDR itself can still only be based on assumptions in view of the circumstances and this is also interesting because one has to ask questions regarding where the determination and capability, not to forget sophisticated weaponry (including biological, chemical and the wherewithal for crude nuclear devices) has found its way into the present time. The study illustrates the argument that what has been perfected and shared among like minds in the global arena does not merely die when a circumstance changes, or is forced to adapt to the very circumstance that caused its creation and reinforcement in the first place. The point being that events occurring in the present moment do not occur in isolation, nothing does, and it is that the residue of interwoven relationships, whoever they are or might be and wherever they are, and in the case herein, reaching back not that long in time, is always a fruitful course to consider.




The Ministry of State Security of the German Democratic Republic (GDR) had a special unit whose task was to use terrorist methods against terrorist targets and important functionaries of the FRG, if necessary. On secret training bases were discovered almost thirty tapes; ‘Chekist Operational Groups’ systematically trained for ‘conducting special combat operations’. The agent network set up for this purpose carried out reconnaissance of the ‘operational area’ (operational zone) from Kiel to Kempten, where in the event of war local patriotic forces had to begin acting in support of the East German commandos. Judging by the relevant secret orders of the Minister of State Security Erich Milke, the range of planned actions stretched from blasting objects to capturing hostages, and from poisoning sources of drinking water to targeted killings.
This study shows that these plans were included in the global concept of advancing Soviet interests in confronting the West. The activity of the MGB that continued until 1989 on the ‘invisible front is confirmed by numerous, first sources.


In early February 1963, a group of officers from the Ministry of State Security met at the MGB High School of Law in Aich near Potsdam for a secret workshop.
It was attended not only by the well-deserved personnel of Division IV, but also by a number of “newcomers” in the service of the MGB. They were former instructors and teachers in the saboteurs’ schools of the dismissed Fifteenth Directorate of the National People’s Army, which the MGB took over in 1962.

Although they were new to the MGB, but in terms of the topic of the workshop, they were as knowledgeable specialists as their current colleagues from Division IV. As the latter, they were on the most advanced line of the ‘invisible front’ of the Cold War. Now the freshly baked and well-deserved chekists exchanged their combat experience at a secret meeting. In the discussion, it was first about the general image of the enemy. The following subjects were discussed in detail; ‘The role of imperialist secret services in the system of state-monopoly capitalism’ and ‘West German counter-intelligence bodies’. The following topics were discussed; ‘The main tasks of the MGB for operational work, the system of communication of special services, the legend and secret work, work with the National Assembly, the behaviour of the National Assembly in front of enemy counter-intelligence bodies, and tracology.’ Many of the newcomers later held high positions in RSM / C. One of them, Sigfrid Zieger, the future the head of the analytical and control group RGM / S, in 1982 recalled the results of that 1963 workshop. In a handwritten manuscript prepared as a draft of the chronicle of the unit, he told about what was discussed twenty years hitherto; then the participants of the workshop came to a common decision that the system of the most realistic training for special specialists should be created in the MGB. They had to act on the orders of the ‘minister of the minister’ in the operational field as single soldiers or in small groups against important ‘enemy targets’. It was decided to work out ‘an appropriate training directive containing differentiated training for single combatants and for leading employees’. According to the results of the workshop, the RMG until April 1963 compiled Milke’s personally signed Top Secret Document for Command. He had an innocuous headline; ‘Principles for carrying out special measures to upgrade the skills for parts of the Ministry of State Security.’ In the document, it is somewhat confused :

“Further comprehensive increase of the strike force and combat readiness of the bodies of the Ministry of State Security requires the carrying out of activities – the preparation and creation of the conditions that are required to both, under normal conditions and in the event of an armed conflict, be ready to successfully conduct active actions against the enemy and his rear for the purposes protection of the German Democratic Republic. To fulfill these requirements, special measures must be taken to upgrade the skills of certain operational staff of the Ministry of State Security.”

The shares were to be directed against political centres, military facilities, military industry facilities, communications, electricity, transport and against gas and water supply. Such targets, it is stated further in the top secret document, are required to be reconnoitered and, in case of war, destroyed, disrupted or captured using active combat operations. For these assignments, there should be trained cadres and single soldiers as scouts (scouts), specialists in sabotage (preparation for the execution of explosions and fires), special radio operators, paratroopers, combat swimmers and fighters with knowledge of foreign languages ​​(English and French). The necessary refresher courses should be created ‘exclusively in the sphere of responsibility of the IV line of the MGB under the direct supervision of the working group of the minister’. As ‘further measures’ the following steps were envisaged :

“After the approval of these principles, it is necessary to develop; differentiated curricula taking into account special areas, material support plans and the creation of a broad educational base, principles for working with cadres in the framework of special measures for raising the qualification, all necessary training documents and training materials, basic provisions for organisational confirmation regarding the trained personnel and their special knowledge. To conduct training courses on conspiratorial facilities, the teaching staff used must be properly trained and qualified.”

As an appendix to the top secret document, ‘Abstracts for the Development of Common Programmes for Conducting Training Courses on Conspiratorial Objects’ were provided. These ‘theses’ already contain very precise definitions of the content, form and purpose of training saboteurs in the MGB.

To implement these tasks, it took almost a whole year of hard work. At that time, the necessary ‘conspiratorial objects’ were expanded and reconstructed to serve as training bases. The MGB accepted several such objects from the dismissed Fifteenth Administration of the NNA. Three of them were also to be used in the future as secret training bases for saboteurs of the MGB. These were the objects of the ‘Valley’ in the Vartin, the Angermund district, the ‘Elsa’ in Bizental and the ‘Maria’ in Strupenberg near Görzk. Now, they were equipped with new shooting ranges, obstacle courses, training grounds for subversion, training rooms, weapons chambers and weapons stores. At the ‘Elsa’ in Bizental in the so-called. ‘The White House’ was created a laboratory of military means.

On January 21, 1964, Erich Milke, with his secret order 107/64, decided to begin training the personnel of the MGB in order that ‘in any conditions they were ready for … successful conduct of active measures against the enemy and his deep rear.’ In the same place he also pointed out :

The organisation and conduct of all training should take place strictly in accordance with certain basic documents of 20.04.1963 and approved by me activities….For the choice, definition and appointment of personnel for participation in the training course, the heads of the service departments personally answer. They should offer only necessarily reliable employees with a perspective that have the appropriate prerequisites and suitability for performing such tasks. At selection it is necessary to act strictly, consistently and extremely conscientiously. Heads of the service departments must give their written opinion about each chosen cadre worker.

The first period of instruction – course for twenty employees from seven different units began on February 1, 1964. Concurrently, the same training course was conducted for 26 NSs of the Main Division of the First Border Troops of the NNA. As for the preparation of the National Assembly, Milke wrote in his order; “The curriculum for this training course needs to be coordinated in such a way that no connections with the Ministry of State Security could become visible.” Then all the students of the courses were released to their respective units, from where they had to be seconded for special assignments in the operational field, if necessary. In conclusion, the Minister decided that the heads of the participating units for reasons of secrecy should be instructed on the relevant sections of this order only verbally. Responsible person for the implementation of his orders Milke appointed the head of the RSM Alfred Scholz.

Milke’s order was printed only in two copies. One of them was received by an officer of the MGB named Heinz Stöcker. Born in 1929, Stoker before 1957 served in the NNA as a teacher of infantry tactics. After his transfer to the MGB in 1957, as the head of the essay, he became responsible for military training first in the Main Personnel and Training Department (HA KuSch), and then at the RSM. Chiefs of the Stöcker already in 1962 praised him for having developed many new forms of combat training and thus contributed to the education of firmness, courage and combat readiness. The Shtoker appeared to be the most suitable person to implement Milk’s order 107/64. Therefore, in February 1964, he was appointed head of the ‘special issues’ (Arbeitsgebiet für Sonderfragen, AGS) direction within the framework of the RSM. His tasks also included the direction and control of the IV / 2 department, in the future responsible for the preparation of saboteurs.

According to the plan of 1963, approximately one hundred employees of the MGB annually, beginning in 1964, had to undergo training for shares in the operational field. More accurate information about the state of affairs in this area in the sixties has not been found, so far.

The number of trained unofficial employees of the Main Division I in the border troops also remained unknown until today. But on the basis of the forced expansion and increase of secret training bases, nevertheless, it is already possible for the last third of the sixties to proceed from a significant increase in the annual number of cadets. Thus, the department IV / 2 undertook, for example, in 1967 to increase the educational capacity by 70%.
In May 1967, the chief of the RSM, Alfred Scholz, decided that the right moment had come to show the ‘comrade minister’ the successful execution of his order 107/64. The fiftieth anniversary of the Great October Socialist Revolution and the fiftieth anniversary of the formation of the Bolshevik Cheka, the greatest example for all communist state security services, were a welcome occasion. In preparation for these jubilees, Scholz drafted a ‘plan for political-operational measures’ under the poetic motto; ‘Following the Tracks of Red October.’ Before the leading comrades from the MGB, it was necessary to demonstrate the achieved level of preparation of the IV / 2 line at the training demonstration. Among other things, it was planned to review the achievements of the so-called special forces of the MGB with ‘elements of combat firing, hand-to-hand combat, overcoming the obstacle course, practical mine explosive exercises and jumping using a parachute’. In one report for January 1968, Scholz noted with satisfaction that the exercises were ‘one of the remarkable results in the struggle to fulfill the commitments to the fiftieth anniversary.’ Such teachings should now be arranged more often.

How much trouble this required, shows the message of one member of the department about the training show in 1969 in connection with the twentieth anniversary of the formation of the GDR. Already a few months earlier, the participating comrades were instructed to find a technical solution for the following problem; ‘The Wartburg passenger car had to start independently, gain a speed of about 20 km / h and explode under the effect of electrical contact.’ After that, various proposals were developed, tested, rejected and perfected until a better solution was found. After numerous attempts and extensive technical changes to the machine, it was decided that the detonation had to simulate a charge of napalm. None other than Minister Milke himself was to personally test the result of a painstaking, months-long work on the day of the training show. Further in the message it is told :

“For the show, a tribune was built, from where the Comrade Minister was to launch the Wartburg. For this purpose, an ignition system similar to the instrument panel was installed on the tribune. The starting batteries stood under the platform. It should also be noted that for the sake of reliability, if the engine did not start working on its last trip, the starter automatically shorted during the start-up process. As a result, the starter would have stretched the car to the point of detonation, although, of course, not at the desired speed. On the day of the demonstration, we could not get rid of a certain nervousness. All participating comrades asked themselves: “Will it work out or not?” But when the Comrade Minister switched on the system, the Wartburg set in motion and a few seconds later caught fire, we had tears of joy in front of our eyes, as our works were crowned with success.”

For the fact that Division IV developed into a combat-ready unit by 1969, in addition to the diligent Stöcker, it was necessary to thank in particular the chef of the RSM Scholz. His special interest in this work, perhaps, was partly based on his biography. Scholz was a soldier of the Wehrmacht and in 1942 was taken prisoner by the Soviet Union. There he soon turned into a Marxist-Leninist. From 1943 to 1945, he as a Soviet partisan fought in the rear of the German front. In addition to compulsory cooperation between the KGB and the MGB, this experience, in particular, could prompt Scholz to seek advice from Soviet comrades. Already in April 1967, he conducted consultations in Moscow with representatives of the KGB. It was then about ‘principal questions regarding the future, training, training, equipping and planning the use of special forces in a special period.’

Under the ‘special period’ Soviet comrades then understood both the initial stage of the nuclear missile war and locally limited conflicts with the use of conventional weapons. Nevertheless, in any case, representatives of the KGB considered it expedient to organise ‘political work in the enemy’s rear in advance and conduct or support the deployment of partisan movements in enemy territory and carry out armed intelligence activity.’ Summarising, Scholtz noted in his report on consultations in Moscow; “At the end of his speech, a representative of the USSR State Security Committee announced his readiness at a subsequent meeting to also consider specific issues related to the main problems touched upon.”

Time for this came in December 1969. Acting in the spirit of the concept approved by Milke, Scholz thoroughly prepared himself for negotiations with the Soviet Chekists;

With the State Security Committee of the USSR, consultations should be held with the aim of obtaining the latest information and initiatives on: 1. the fundamental problems of specific informal work in the proposed operational area-West Germany and West Berlin-to create skilled human and material prerequisites and conditions that will enable in a special period to conduct successful actions against the main political, military and economic objects of the enemy using single combatants and operational groups (line IV / 1); 2. The principles and conditions for the selection and training of operational forces in their own country and their comprehensive training to be able to successfully solve special tasks in a special period in the deep rear of the enemy with their help and in conjunction with the informal forces present in the operational field (line IV / 2) “.

Along with this, Scholz expected new scientific information regarding special means and methods of struggle.
To these three sets of topics, he prepared a vast questionnaire, which was to be given to Soviet comrades. Negotiations took place from December 9 to December 12 at the KGB headquarters in Moscow. Along with Scholz from the Soviet side, the deputy chief of the First Main Directorate of the KGB (external intelligence), the head of the subordinate department ‘B’, and two other colonels took part in them. As early as December 16, 1969, Scholtz wrote for Milke a report on the results of consultations in Moscow. Its content was so explosive that some important places fit into the typed text from hand to hide the whole truth even from the typists of the MGB. Soviet colleagues told Scholz the following; The KGB had a ‘B’ department, which was a so-called special service, and its mission was ‘to foment or support resistance movements (also guerrilla warfare) in the enemy’s rear in the event of war or conduct physical actions’ .

The next task was to carry out ‘active measures’ also during peacetime :

But in this case, however, under the appropriate national flag or from the third hand, with the consistent concealment of their own participation. In this case, in principle, only material means and equipment of the enemy are used, which can withstand any check for their origin. […] As active activities are considered mainly the following actions: sabotage, kidnapping, liquidation, acquisition from the enemy of technical exhibits of a special kind by special methods, support of national uprisings and guerrilla movements, assistance and support to corresponding insurrections (with consistent concealment of participation or in that case if, as in the case of revolts at the national level, the ‘hand’ should not be known), the preparation of volunteers to support the anti-imperialist struggle. “

With assistance and guidance of the First Main Directorate, the ‘B’ department had to study the ‘conditions of the regime’ in the alleged operational areas and to reconnoiter and document objects and territories to attack them. In addition was also responsible for the management and training of agents (NA) in operational areas, as well as training of operational forces on his own territory. To do this, department ‘B’ was to prepare and provide the necessary armament, equipment, equipment and facilities. Finally, the tasks included ‘the constant study of the corresponding zones of conflict in other countries, in order to promote the implementation there of the interests of their own party and state leadership.’ The ‘target objects’ of the special service in the event of a conflict were, among other things, neuralgic transport hubs, important nodes of communication systems, economic and military infrastructure in the enemy’s rear.

Nevertheless, the main attention was focused om another problem :

On the basis of the existing balance of forces, primarily in the military field, unlike the situation before, during and immediately after the Second World War, at present special major service plans do not include major military and economic objects of the enemy as main priorities, but mainly ‘political-moral’ objects of the enemy.”

The Soviet comrades understand the objects of state leadership, political organizations and secret enemy organizations (politico-ideological centers) as ‘political-moral’ objects. “

The method of action of the special service was as follows :

Accounting, processing and full exploration of individuals from the areas of these facilities, which in a particular period should be disabled by means of active measures, since it is assumed that they have extensive knowledge that is extremely important for their own planning….It was pointed out in principle that the development of the facility should be strictly aimed at neuralgic points in order to be able to conduct physical actions with insignificant costs and high economic effect, to achieve disorganisation and panic and in a timely manner to disable the governing institutions and individuals from number of leaders “.

In the further course of the negotiations in Moscow, Scholtz learned the details of the organisation and activities of the agent network of the B department abroad, the training of operational forces in his own country, the strategy and tactics of the planned operations, combat assets and armaments.

From the final report of the head of the RGM, it becomes clearly evident that the method of work and the structure of the department of the Fourth MGB of the GDR and the department ‘B’ of the KGB of the USSR coincide in significant moments. This, in the last instance, also concerned a certain conspiracy; “The setting of goals and planning for the activities of department” B “should be kept in the strictest secrecy with respect to other units of the state security agencies.” Consequently, Scholz did not recognise everything either. For example, in Moscow he was told nothing about the numbers and the countries using the agent network, as well as the operational groups of the department ‘B’. Still, Scholz at the end of his report could note with some pride; “In conclusion, Comrade Colonel-General Sakharovsky noted that the MGB of the GDR is still the only ministry of all the socialist countries with which consultations were held in this particular area.” The experience gained at the talks in Moscow determined the work of Department IV for subsequent years.

In the early seventies, a political relaxation began between the two German states, which resulted in the signing in 1972 of the Treaty on the Principles of Relations between the Federal Republic of Germany and the GDR. Scholtz, in view of this situation, at the beginning of 1972, during a working visit to Division IV / 2, considered it necessary to comment on the image of the enemy and the combat mission; “Our task is to fight against West German imperialism, for peaceful coexistence as a special form of class struggle. You can not just talk about the dangers of imperialism, it needs to be analyzed, evaluated and processed. We ourselves must master all forms of class struggle. Our department is given offensive, special, political and operational tasks. ” Further statements by the head of the RSM on ‘peaceful coexistence as a special form of the class struggle’ did not leave much to be desired for their clarity. Contrary to or just because of the policy of detente between German states, the arrow of the barometer still pointed to the storm for him;

First of all, one must prepare for action in the initial period of the war. For this, it is necessary to train cadres of various categories for their special assignments, both single combatants and as part of operational groups. At the same time, there should be no formal continuation of the partisan struggle, it is necessary to choose new targets from the spheres of politics and secret services. To do this, it is required to train the relevant operational personnel so that they can carry out acts of sabotage, individual terror, the acquisition of technical exhibits, the seizure and capture of individuals, the support of anti-government forces. Operational personnel should be trained and trained to conduct reconnaissance, carry out destruction and seizure. We are talking about the training of fully trained, politically-operational fighters for the most varied periods of struggle in the operational field. “

Thus Scholtz defined the line of development in the seventies. Now that the Cold War has increasingly become a thing of the past (until recently with the re-emergence of tensions), the MGB continued to intensively prepare for a secret war against the Federal Republic.


We need to find, select and educate such young security officers, so that they can be told, you will go there and you will shoot there in an enemy country. Then he must go, and even if they grab him, then he will stand before the judge and say: “Yes, I killed that on behalf of my proletarian honour!” That is how it should be! The order that is given will be fulfilled, even if you perish at the same time. “

So openly Milke spoke in 1979 before the staff of the district department of the MGB in Cottbus. It could hardly have been more successful to formulate the task of the operational groups of the MGB in the operational field. It was only for them to go on a campaign, and in case of war they would leave behind them a terrible trace of blood and destruction. Sabotage, terror, kidnapping and murder were to be their methods. At the same time the soldiers did not have to protect their own lives.

Even their destruction by the enemy forces from the outset was foreseen by the plans. The operational groups, therefore, were in double respect the true suicide squads. This applied to their application not only during the period of tension and military conflict, but also in peacetime. It is noteworthy that the aggressive plans of the MGB against West Germany persisted to l989. Neither the policy of detente nor the new military doctrine of the Warsaw Pact, adopted since the mid-1980s, completely changed anything in these plans.

After the head of the RSM, Scholz, in 1972, contrary to the Treaty on the Basics of Relations, confirmed the rigid course of the secret ‘special conduct of hostilities’ of the MGB against the Federal Republic, the subdivisions subordinated to him tried to achieve further ‘professionalisation’ of their activities. Under the guidance of Stöcker, the direction ‘Special Issues’ (now called RSM ‘C’) was in 1973/74 the fundamental work for its future work. The comprehensive collection of instructions totaled at least 3,790 pages, and its full title was; ‘A Guide for Conducting Special Activities for the Development of Skills in Order to Train the Operational Staff of the MGB to act in various Operational and Combat Conditions.’ The authors have included in this detailed methodical course all the accumulated experience from their special field over the past ten years. In the Guide, the goals, tactics, methods and means of subversive struggle against the ‘imperialist FRG’ were presented in detail and to the smallest detail. Thus, the Manual was the basis for all subsequent planning and training materials of WGM / C.

As its important part, the ‘Guide’ included the so-called main principles. During the following disclosure herein, these ‘main principles’ will be quoted in somewhat more detail, since they show that the work of the MGB in the West, at least in planning, was not limited to obtaining intelligence information. It was also aimed at the physical destruction of potential adversaries in the Federal Republic. In the relevant documents of the MGB, the concepts of ‘liquidation’ and ‘destruction’ have been used repeatedly semantically and unclearly.

But in terms of the planned method of action of operational groups in the operational field, the quotes given here are more than sufficient in their semantic sharpness and uniqueness. In terms of content, the ‘main principles’ were ‘a structured organisational form of the use of the Chekist operational forces, the forms of their struggle, the special tactics they employ and generalised, principally attained targets that are implemented with respect to enemy objects of various types.’ The underground fighters had to act in the operational field as single Chekist fighters, task forces or teams. The operational group consisted of at most six members. Depending on the planned goal, the composition of the group changed, but, in principle, it included the following ‘experts’; scouts, specialists in explosive technology, radio and other communications, security and alarm systems, snipers, combat swimmers, fighters with foreign language knowledge. The task of the operational groups was the so-called chekist action; ‘(She) is a set of offensive conspiratorial actions by a single Chekist fighter or a Chekist task force to carry out a limited-in-time combat mission.’ The teams, consisting of more than six fighters, were to conduct more complex, larger-scale so-called Chekist operations under ‘headquarters’ also against several ‘targets’. The MGB strategies distinguished four different situations in which groups and teams were to be used :

Relatively peaceful situations (as a situation in conditions of a normal, based on peaceful co-existence, clearly defined co-existence with a progressive trend of international detente); a crisis situation (as an internal political, national crisis situation in the operational field with a comprehensive and profound political and social impact); the period of tension (as a period of the preliminary stage of the planned armed conflict with socialism, which already includes active operations of the secret war and military provocations); the case of war (as a state of open military confrontation with socialism, taking into account the various forms of use of weapons and the stages of its escalation).

As specific targets of the attacks, the ‘Guidelines’ were; “an individual, a group of persons, an object, a site, a device, an assembly, a document, important documentation, circumstances and conditions of the operational area (organisation, peace and order, discipline, combat readiness, solidarity, trust) “. In further passages in the instructions, its authors clearly formulated the goals that must be achieved, that is, the effect that ‘offensive Chekist military actions’ should have caused in relation to people, objects and conditions.

The goals were; destruction, damage, paralysis, interference, disabling, obstructing, disorganising, demoralising, instilling feelings of insecurity, liquidation, neutralisation (people), seizure. All these activities were provided with a detailed definition, which showed the differences in what exactly it was necessary to cause to any person or object. So, for example, the damage was unambiguously directed only against inanimate objects;
Damage involves changing the structure of the object, thing, object, important detail, so that this object is temporarily not more suitable for the purpose of its use. It is achieved by: the introduction of foreign bodies, the fitting of non-standardized parts that lead to its self-destruction, deformation, fracture, filing, loosening, unscrewing, influencing regulatory processes, as well as undermining, exploding, breaking, destroying, shooting, cutting, chemical or physical changes of parts, basic elements, parts of the object. “

Also, destruction was defined as an activity directed against objects :

Destruction includes the complete elimination of the structure of an object, thing, object by destroying its substance, so that it is finally no longer suitable for the original purpose of use and could only be replaced by a new object. It is achieved by; ignition, volatilisation, pouring, not subject to subsequent separation of mixing with other substances or evoking or initiating chemical or physical processes. “
Destruction differed from destruction only by methods.
It could be achieved by; “undermining, causing the explosion, breaking, destroying, shooting, cutting.” Further, such measures as disorganisation were envisaged, which were to be directed against things and people;

Disorganisation contains a violation of the interests of the organisational process of the object, things, the interruption of its impeccable functioning or its external environment. Achieved;
destruction, paralysing and obstruction of the activities of the governing and leading institutions, state, organisational, political and military centres, facilities and communication lines, as well as demoralising the moral potential, spreading a feeling of insecurity in the general situation by neutralising, interfering with the actions of defence and counter-intelligence agencies and institutions, liquidation or neutralisation of leading persons “.

Neutralisation was foreseen only against people;

Neutralisation of persons covers their incompetence in the broadest sense of the word. It is achieved; by taking hostage, by prolonged or temporary detention, by abduction, by disappearance, by provoked or compelled threat of flight, by concealment, achieved through the dissemination of genuine or false information, evidence, accusations of official resignation, resignation, deprivation of authority, dismissal, arrest, conviction , imprisonment or execution of the death penalty, undermining trust, respect, impeccability. “

Also, liquidation had as its goal;

Liquidation involves the physical destruction of individuals and groups of individuals. It is achieved; by shooting, stabbing, burning, blowing, strangling, beating to death, poisoning, strangulation. ” Thus, for the future it was unequivocally laid down what exactly in the activity of operational groups in the operational field should be understood by the term ‘liquidation’. This concept, judging by the documents of RSM / C, meant murder, as it was clearly different in its definition, for example, from destruction or neutralisation. And this understanding extended not only to periods of tension and war, but also to peacetime.

Needless to say, such intentions had to be kept strictly confidential. Therefore, the whole chapter of the ‘Manual’ of 1974 was devoted to ‘rules of conspiracy and vigilance.’ It says that the conspiracy of the socialist security organs is a form of the class struggle between socialism and imperialism that historically arose and developed in the course of the historical process, using secret means and methods.
The enemy, said there, uses secret means and methods, and therefore to fight it follows the same methods. Strictly speaking, the conspiracy is not the ‘main feature’ of the working class, and was imposed on it by the bourgeoisie. And then one can read; “The conspiracy of the socialist security agencies is a kind and method of camouflaging, concealing and keeping in secret the actions, methods and means of reconnaissance and fighting the enemy. The principles and rules of conspiracy are the basis for all actions in the operational field. “

But before you could act’, you had to first penetrate into the Federal Republic. The next chapter of the ‘Manual’ was  dealing with just this problem. Methods of penetration in the event of war should have been relatively simple; for example, by air using parachute jump or disembarkation from helicopters, as well as using combat swimmers and combat divers. In peacetime, the methods that the MGB often applied in reality were more difficult. Thus, for example, agents of the Central Intelligence Directorate and other Stasi units also entered the territory of Germany in the ways described here below. There was a ‘planned and organised border crossing’ under the legend with forged documents. For reasons of secrecy, the ‘illegal border crossing’ for operational groups was more important. There were several variants. Informal employees and couriers, under the protection of the staff of the Stasi (the so-called officers of the ‘lock’ – penetration through ‘locks (windows) on the border, who knew the locality exactly), after the departure of the East German border guards, they had to use ‘safe passage points’ . ‘Operational lock on the border’ allowed the penetration of operational groups with combat weapons of all kinds, as well as with communications equipment, and had to be insured on both sides of the border by those who know the area of ​​the National Assembly. Another goal served as a ‘target gateway’; “The target gateway is used only once for a violent, involuntary and secret passage across the border from an operatively interesting person or group of persons.” This path was foreseen, for example, for victims of abductions in the Federal Republic. Strategies of the Stasi took into account in their plans also various opportunities for penetration through third countries.

In the secret war on the ‘invisible front’, operational groups could not act, relying only on themselves. They needed helpers and allies in the operational field. What role the MGB foresaw for them, can be seen from the chapter of the ‘Manual’ devoted to working with ‘operational bases’ and interacting with ‘patriotic forces’. ‘Operational bases’ were the NC of Division IV, who had various tasks in the Federal Republic. The second part of this chapter of the ‘Guide’ dealt with ‘the importance of patriotic forces for a specific, offensive, chekist struggle in the operational field’. Very remarkable are the statements made here by the authors not only regarding tactics, but also about the strategic goals of the underground struggle of the MGB against the ‘imperialist FRG’. The beginning point for all their considerations was the following consideration :

The basic contradiction of capitalism, which also in the phase of state-monopoly capitalism, develops with unflagging acuity, continues to penetrate all areas of social life and further deepens due to the fundamental contradiction of the era, constantly generating all new social forces that in some way, by the very for various reasons and with highly differentiated goals, openly or more or less covertly oppose the imperialist ruling system.”

These so-called patriotic forces, as they hoped in East Berlin, would help in the growing class struggle to weaken capitalism, leading it to a revolutionary situation. The most consistent patriotic and revolutionary class is the class of workers. But also representatives of other classes and strata pursued ‘truly patriotic goals,’ which corresponded to the interests of the working class. This potential of the MGB was going to be used for its own purposes in order to cause a crisis situation in the Federal Republic :

This statement of the problem presupposes a position that could be designated as the first stage of a revolutionary situation. It differs from the workers’ ordinary under capitalism in that the patriotic forces, led by the conscious part of the working class, are consistently pushing the revolutionary demand for changing the dominant relations and persistently prove their readiness for mass actions. “

At the same time, it was necessary ‘to prevent the patriotic movement from undermining the ultra-left or ultra-right forces’ and ‘guaranteeing the leadership of the patriotic forces by the Communist Party, the most progressive part of the working class’.

The task of the operational groups of the MGB was to join the movement and take the military leadership of the revolutionary struggle into their own hands; “It is about using all the operational capabilities and all the potential for winning a class conflict with the enemy, organizing an armed struggle, educating and leading the fighters.”

One can argue about whether this scenario was based already in 1974 on the wishful thinking. But the MGB, thinking realistically, imagined so only one of the possible forms of underground struggle. In the planning of the seventies and eighties, the operational-military option played a much greater role; to pave the way for the invasion of the occupation forces from outside, the operational groups of the MGB had to paralyse the enemy’s infrastructure with the help of diversionary actions, as well as cause disorganisation and panic. Regardless of the specific method, the ultimate goal, however, has always been the same – the establishment of a communist dictatorship in the operational field. All of Germany was to become one big GDR. As a shield and sword of the MGB party, the task was set to create a suppression system based on the SED regime pattern on captured territories. As one document from the district department of the MGB in Berlin testifies, even in 1985, in the event of a military seizure, they planned a concrete structure with pre-selected personnel to create a second district office with twelve district offices for West Berlin. As their main tasks, then the chief of the MGB of East Berlin, Wolfgang Schwannitz, called, among other things :

Arrest, isolation or internment of hostile forces on the basis of existing documents, sending to the established detention centers under arrest, ensuring the first interrogation of important persons and purposeful analysis of the information received. Deploy an effective search system, to track down hostile forces that have disappeared into the underground and neutralise them. The main attention should be paid to special services, leading forces of well-known enemy organisations, leading police officers, prominent politicians, PID staff from the media (PID – political and ideological diversion), top officials from important areas of the state apparatus and secrets carriers from the sphere of economy, science and technology.
Capture and securing the protection of important enemy centres, seizure and initial evaluation of information and documents that are operatively important at the moment. Pay special attention to known objects of special services, police stations, military facilities, archives, plots of planning and management on the main objects of the enemy, objects of the state apparatus,
Scientific centres (academies and universities), centres of concerns, party, organisational instances and instances of hostile organisations, as well as data banks.
Support for a politically-operational struggle against the expected hostile actions on the part of the enemy. The use of the present NA from West Berlin and the capital for reconnaissance and for the penetration and neutralization of these hostile forces, the suppression of enemy resistance.
Support for the establishment of democratic bodies to maintain public safety and order, the necessary control and influence on the cadres, especially among executives. Protection of progressive forces from terrorist acts and hostile slander.

Note that such a terrible vision of the German reunification should have occurred ‘on the basis of existing documents’. This meant that the arrest lists with the names of ‘target persons’ in the operational field were on hand in the safes of the responsible MGB official offices ‘constantly in a state of daily readiness’ in anticipation of ‘Day X’. For example; in the department of the XVth District Administration of Berlin in 1988, a card file was prepared for more than 1,000 residents of West Berlin, ‘with their personal data and brief files.’ In the same district office, Division XX conducted a list in 1989 with the names of 1,389 people in the operational area who were suspected of ‘political clandestine activities’ (within the Stasi, for this there was even a special abbreviation; PUT – politische Untergrundtätigkeit).

Also during the eighties, the operational groups of the RSM / S were the spearhead of the aggressive plans of the MGB. In a document dated April 15, 1981, the chief of the RSM / S Stöcker again defined ‘the main tasks of operational groups in the operational field’. First, based on Milk’s order 107/6489, he noted that “operational groups of the MGB must, at any time and in any situation – both in relatively normal, peaceful conditions and in the event of armed conflicts – be prepared to successfully carry out active actions against the enemy and its deep rear. ” As before, the main goals were neuralgic points of important political, economic and military facilities, including individuals. Stoker’s statements about the use of operational groups as commands of murderers already in peacetime are noteworthy :

Fulfillment of specified in the order special separate tasks; liquidation or neutralisation of traitors; liquidation or neutralisation of the leading persons of terrorist organisations whose activities are directed against the state security of the GDR; the insecurity of senior officials in the centres of political and ideological sabotage by violating or paralysing the process of their activities, as well as damage or suspension of the activities of institutions, devices, equipment and records or documents of these centres; obtaining important documents, materials or specific enemy equipment; support of forces that oppose the imperialist apparatus of power. “

Another document from March 1982, written by a certain lieutenant colonel RGM / S as the basis for conducting training sessions and seminars in the preparation of saboteurs, is even clearer. Experience teaches that during the war there can hardly be any doubts or remorse when choosing means and methods to defeat the enemy. Therefore, I did not cite here the author’s statements regarding the tasks of the operational groups in the event of a military confrontation. But in order to prevent, nevertheless, the nuclear holocaust, even in peacetime, the greatest caution was required in tactical methods. But in periods of tension, this, however, presupposed the will not to bring the matter to the ‘final battle’. Such considerations were obviously completely alien to the planners of the RGM / S, because they already in this situation provided for actions with the extreme of violence. Thus, the leaders of the political and administrative sphere of the Federal Republic “should have been purposely eliminated.” Further provided for :

Alignment of senior officials in the imperialist apparatus of power with the help of anonymous phone calls, letters with threats, bombs in letters and parcels, sending other means of struggle, etc.  Interference or disruption of the work of the mass media through attacks on the technical devices of these means, the elimination or theft of leading personalities from these areas, such as editors, commentators, etc. Provoking of panic-causing activities, for example, with the help of large fires, food poisoning and drinking water or the threat of such poisoning. “

It was also planned to “liquidate or abduct leading persons with the right to make decisions, experts and experts” from the field of economy. These are just a few examples from a wide range of activities provided for in case of increased tension. In the document cited in 1982, the intentions of murders in peacetime, already named in the “Basic Tasks of Operational Groups” in 1981, were repeated almost verbatim and were even more sharpened in the following passage :

Alignment of leaders in the center of political and ideological sabotage by interference or disruption of their activities, as well as damage or paralysis of the work of institutions, devices, equipment and records or documents of these centers (for example, by means of targeted liquidation, hostage taking or kidnapping.) The carrying out of explosions or arson directed against the centres of these institutions, such as an explosion at the radio station Free Europe in Munich in February 1981. Especially during this period (in the conditions of the world), single Chekist fighters and task forces had to use the environment of terrorists and malicious criminals in order to under this disguise and cover prepare for fulfillment and fulfill their combat tasks. For this reason, I would like to recommend carefully monitoring all available information regarding the terrorist environment in the imperialist states, accurately studying and analysing the means and methods used by terrorists to be able to apply them ourselves. Forms of manifestation and ways of forming a wave of violent crimes and general criminality should also be attached to these considerations. “

Elsewhere in this document is stated :

The most important thing is always the ability, through effective camouflage, disinformation and secrecy, to dispel suspicions from the actions of single combatants and operational groups, and to send these suspicions to hostile regimes and extremist forces in the operational field. When using and using special security agents, it is always necessary to ensure that identification of these funds as Chekist agents would be impossible or at least greatly hampered and that they will not be left in the place of the action or in the space around this place because of loss or negligence. “

But the question does remain whether all this was purely theoretical statements of intent, or whether such operations actually took place. The sentence attached to the explosion on Radio Free Europe in 1981, in the cited context, could point to a second possibility, since the operational groups of the MGB, however, already in the sixties carried out such acts of terrorism in the Federal Republic. It is quite natural in the nature of things that such military orders for understandable reasons of secrecy were unlikely to be given in writing, and if such documents existed, they were first and foremost destroyed in 1989/90. One can say with confidence that RGM / C analysed this terrorist attack. So, in the dossier you can find messages from the Western press, for example, a copy of the article from a special magazine ‘Kriminalistik’ (‘Criminalistics’). In it, the author came to the conclusion that criminals had professional knowledge in the implementation of acts of sabotage.

Neither regarding the property of the explosive device, nor about the type of its fuse, the experts involved could not give clear evidence. Then the West German state protection agencies, on the basis of their specific experience, had a suspicion that the terrorist attack against the radio station was carried out by the secret service of one of the Eastern Bloc countries. This suspicion was also aided by the fact that one week later, an unknown to the day and, in its behaviour, a dubious ‘secret organization’ claimed responsibility for the explosion. The assassination attempt, unrevealed to this day, exactly corresponded to the mode of action stated in the cited documents.

Over the next years, the offensive task of RGM / C was repeatedly and clearly confirmed. Thus, the document on ‘setting goals for special operations’ in 1984 repeated verbatim the main tasks of 1981. In the subsequent 1987 document, “The Subject of Work of WGM / C,” was formulated as follows :

Planning, preparing and carrying out specific Chekist measures against politically-administrative, economic and military facilities that are important from an operational point of view, especially against their neuralgic points, as well as against elected individuals and groups of individuals.
The choice, preparation in the framework of specific specific measures to improve the skills and training of special forces for conducting special combat operations against the enemy and his deep rear. “

On February 26, 1988, Milke made a report to the heads of the district departments. It contained the main principles of the future mobilisation planning.

Milke summed up the work done and re-evaluated the tasks of the MGB in times of tension and in the event of war. At the heart of the revision was, in effect, the altered military doctrine of the Warsaw Pact, which now, in the case of a military conflict, for example, realistically also considered the possibility of military operations on the territory of the GDR. Regarding the special offensive task of the RSM / C Milke in his report, among other things, said:

In this body, specially trained fighters have been trained and trained, which form the main forces of the MGB for conducting special combat operations. The primary tasks for the work of the WGM / C at the present time are, first of all, the following tasks : Preparation and conduct of special KGB actions and actions against the selected main enemy targets for disrupting the process of preparation and reorganisation (transfer of the economy and state life to military rails and to inflict damage to the combat power during times of increased tension and in the event of war. “

Despite the expanded and changed sphere of competence and the changed military doctrine, the tasks of the WGM / S also remained the same after its renaming to Division XXIII in 1988 and the merger with Division XXII into Main Division XXII in 1989.

Were the responsible West German authorities aware of these actions? Among the surviving documents of the RSM, a secret investigation was made of the main headquarters of the ground forces in the Federal Ministry of Defense of the Federal Republic of Germany on November 30, 1981, under the title ‘Threat to the Rear Areas’. There, among other things, it can be read that the leadership of the Bundeswehr in the event of increased tension was fully considered with the possibility of active acts of sabotage by the Eastern bloc’s reconnaissance and sabotage groups. There was also a clear idea of ​​their possible targets.

Further in the study it is stated; “Due to the volume of necessary equipment and the required supply of these groups, it can not be ruled out that, for them, warehouses in the territory of the NATO countries are already being arranged or already arranged in peacetime. Nevertheless, there is no information about this “. In the future, the study was based only on assumptions. Western Germans had no knowledge of the number of operational groups or their training. Also, the study erroneously assumed that diversionary actions would have to come from units of the armed forces of the Warsaw Pact countries. However, the leadership of the Bundeswehr also took into account the possibility of participation of the special services of the Eastern Bloc countries in the expected subversive actions, but about the role of the MGB, had no information; ”On the scale of such sabotage actions led by special services due to strong isolation  enemy intelligence services can only make assumptions. Even if agents in the war or in case of crises are used for and in support of sabotage actions and further agents are to be thrown across the border, such actions can only occur in a very limited amount.”

Equally poorly informed was the Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution (BFF). Officials of this department in 1984 in one of their ‘internal materials’ were building different assumptions regarding ‘the preparation of sabotage by the intelligence services of the Warsaw Treaty states.’ ‘Inner material’ immediately appeared on the desk of Marcus Wolf, who on September 3, 1984, transmitted it to RGM with his cover letter. In assessing the material, Wolf specifically asked about the protection of his source.
In addition, the chief of RGM / S Stöcker was able to become acquainted with him and returned ‘this valuable material with great gratitude’ on October 10, ‘Valuable’ for Stöcker in any case could be confirmation that the West German guardians of the constitution were wandering in the dark. In their report, they stated in too general phrases that the secret services of the Eastern bloc under the leadership of the KGB were preparing extensive sabotage for a possible ‘Day X’. Realistic views were also on the possible targets of civilian and military infrastructure; “For example, the captain of the KGB Lyalin, acting under the guise of an employee of the Soviet trade mission in London, was exploring suitable landing sites for sabotage subversive groups, which in Day X were supposed to be dropped from  aircraft.” This was the only concrete fact in the entire report. Also, the officials of the department for the protection of the constitution could not justify their assumptions regarding the existing intelligence network for reconnaissance of objects of sabotage with real information. They were equally unaware of the plans of the MGB to eliminate people in the operational field. >>In the 1984 report, the East German MGB is not mentioned in a single word << Everywhere in it there were only general references regarding ”intelligence services of the enemy“.

By this date, RGM / C had already trained about 3,500 soldiers and specialists to conduct sabotage operations against Germany, and a dense network of agents of Division IV has for decades worked diligently and meticulously scouting targets for attacks.


Destroy, destroy, damage, paralyse, disable, interfere, hinder, disorganise, eliminate. The operational groups RGM / S were trained to carry out this activity in case of need with the simplest auxiliary means or even with bare hands. However, ‘usually’ they had at their disposal an entire destruction toolkit with considerable technical sophistication.

Appropriate ‘circles of specialists’ designate this toolkit as combat means for sabotage and terror. To an amateur, such ‘tools’ are known only from the exaggerated fantasy of various spy films, and can hardly determine what danger these means represent if they are in the hands of the secret services of authoritarian regimes or terrorist groups of any ideological colour. But the amateurish imagination is not sufficient to imagine the whole variety of subversive military means.

The operational and technical direction of the future RSM / S began its activity in 1962 :

There was close cooperation with the Soviet consultant, comrade Colonel Vetrov. At this time, comrade Colonel Scholz (at that time the head of the RSM) was tasked to develop a small military means for offensive use, to test it and make a sample.

The statement of the problem covered areas of explosive technology, incendiary weapons and special areas of weapons and equipment. The first attempts of profiling started in specific working directions (the working direction of the mechanic, electrical engineering and chemistry). Beginning with the creation of a material and technical base. the first machines for machining, electro-technical testing and measuring instruments, and laboratory equipment for the working direction of chemistry were purchased.

‘Soviet friends’ to some extent stood as a midwife at the cradle of this direction. Under their leadership, ‘fighters on the invisible front’ came to the matter as early as 1963/64; in close cooperation with the Soviet Chekists, military means were prepared and used to actively combat the enemy in the operational field, for example, carrying out active measures against the radio station NTS , actions against two printing houses of the NTS . The NTS (People’s Labor Union) was a Russian emigre organisation with a seat in Frankfurt am Main, which, among other things, tried to influence the Soviet troops deployed in the GDR through propaganda leaflets. In the future such explicit confessions in the implementation of terrorist acts in West Germany in the later documentation of the WGM / C were very carefully avoided.

In the sixties, the future direction 2 functioned as the IV / 3 department in the management of the RSM. Already at that time, experts developed electronic combat means. For example, during 1967, they designed a prototype for a new remote explosive charge detonation system, consisting of a radio transmitter and receiver, with a minimum range of three kilometers and with protection from other people’s interference.

Additionally in other areas of conspiratorial affairs, the master even then developed important innovations. They provided technical reconnaissance tools for IV / 1 divisions operating in the field of operations; “In collaboration with the IV / 1 department, a small format camera was reworked and successfully tested as a prototype. Greater reliability has been achieved in meeting secrecy by reducing the spatial volume, as well as simplifying and accelerating the use while saving film. “

For the operational and technical sphere, the slogan was justified in the MGB; “Learning from the Soviet Union the means learning to win.” As already reported, Major-General Scholz traveled to Moscow during 1969 to consult with KGB comrades regarding the problems of conducting a secret war. During these consultations, was also discussed “scientific information and practical skills in the development, manufacture and constant improvement of special combat and operational means.” Scholtz also wanted to know about the most appropriate equipping of single soldiers and operational groups with modern weapons, as well as the production of military equipment, the value of ‘Western weapons’ for equipping operational groups and the role of communication equipment when used in the operational field. The Soviet side advised Scholtz at the consultations that the special service of the KGB was equipped mainly with Soviet-made weapons. For their own use, Soviet specialists modified their standard weapons and technical devices, developed on the basis of their special models and ordered them, in contrast to the MGB, in the specialised industry for batch production. Specialists of the same WGM / C for reasons of secrecy, already since the beginning of the seventies, themselves produced weapons and military equipment in small batches for the requirements of the MGB. However, with the exception of two special types of pistols, Soviet comrades were able to offer little to the new curious visitor. However, at parting, they gave Scholz a self-suggesting advice, which concerned military assets; ‘from considerations of disguise to use in actions in peacetime exclusively Western weapons and sabotage’.

Between 1970 and 1973, the ‘product mix’ of the operational and technical direction expanded. It developed and tested miniature cars, all new radio control devices for remote detonation of explosive charges and for the control of cars and motor boats, as well as so-called ‘annoying’ means for moral and psychological impact (for example, bombs that had a foul smell).

The head of the WGM Scholz in 1973, along with the priority work on remotely controlled combat means of combat, delivered operational techniques to the operational technicians two more tasks; the development of armor-piercing combat vehicles and chemical fuses, on which their origin could not be determined.

In 1973/74, RGM / C 1973/74 created for itself an extensive fundamental work in the form of the ‘Manual’ aforementioned herein, in the development of which the operational and technical direction was also involved to a large extent. The fact that the means and methods of secret services on the one hand and the thieves and swindlers on the other hardly differ from each other, this ‘Guide’ explains in the extensive passages. This is particularly noticeable where the operational and technical direction for educational purposes documented the testing of its skills. Already in the era of Mata Hari, for example, the following idea was popular;

The fitting of weapons into a rifle container is carried out with the purpose of secretly transporting weapons, as well as simultaneously for a secret, unexpected opening of a fire from an installed weapon. It is necessary to give priority to automatic weapons, since exact sighting when firing from a light container is impossible, and a fan-fire line of automatic fire promises the greatest success. The installation of small submachine guns is most favourable, since for this, harmless containers can best be used. “

‘Contaminated containers’ served as a variety of containers. So the ‘Guide’ described, among other things, in every detail the installation of a Soviet Kalashnikov assault rifle in a suitcase and a small Czech pistol machine gun ‘Scorpion’ in a briefcase. To the arsenal of sabotage combat weapons were also self-made mines;

Homemade mines in their appearance should not look like mines of industrial production. The external shape should facilitate their use (installation), for example: the shape of a hewn stone for installation on cobbled streets.
The various possibilities for masking mines and mine-like combat charges should be used to the fullest, without sparing effort. As a result, the enemy must see the danger to their life in every column, in every stone, with every movement. “

With regard to types of mines, the ‘Guide’, along with precise instructions for the independent manufacture and installation of mines, calls the most diverse anti-tank mines for use against vehicles, antipersonnel mines based on high explosive, fragmentation or bullet action that could be used against humans covertly, disguised as a wooden peg, stump, pillar, park post, stone, etc. The constructive and destructive imagination of experts did not stop there.
On hundreds of pages in the ‘Guide’ were presented a variety of means and methods for destruction and murder.

Since 1975, the direction had not only the workshops, but also a real small factory, which allowed to intensify the production of small series of combat weapons and weapons. There, in the same year, a remote-controlled boat, equipped with explosives, and a similar car-kamikaze, were developed and successfully tested. The specialists produced detonators for subversive charges in a small series of imported Western materials in order to conceal their origin when used in the operational field, and proceeded to develop new incendiary charges and devices for spreading leaflets. Such devices should serve to deliver propaganda materials to certain distances (for example, across the state border with the Federal Republic). To equip the newly formed non-structural operational groups (NSE) with material and technical means, in 1975 the second working line was created in the structure of the unit. Among other things, was engaged in the installation of containers for the transport of weapons and devices for the rapid change of registration numbers into special cars intended for operational use, the creation of charges for the detonation of locks for the purpose of rapid penetration into buildings, and the development of auxiliary devices for concealing suspicious explosives substances of objects (SVG).

Because of the offensive nature of the tasks of the RGM / S, the unit required more and more weapons, combat assets and equipment of the enemy.

Many of the planned actions in the operational field could be carried out only with complete camouflage, which means, in the form and with weapons, equipment and vehicles of the enemy. In addition, a great interest in Western military equipment was associated with research and training purposes. Even for experienced agents of the General Directorate of Intelligence and Division IV, the acquisition of such materials in sufficient volume was problematic. In 1976, after the withdrawal of the United States in the war in Vietnam, RGM / C received a unique chance to replenish its arsenals. In the spring of 1976, the delegation of RGM / C went to Vietnam with ‘research’ purposes. The German chekists brought a long list of wishes to the comrades from the Vietnamese ‘sister bodies’ ; “To close the information gaps and to apply in the special operational planning for our line, we ask the IYB to provide the IYB with trophy armament and equipment / military equipment similar to arming and equipping the NATO armed forces in Western Europe, to create their own arsenal of enemy weapons / equipment.

The list of desires was really long; about 130 pistols, submachine guns, rifles, machine guns, rocket-propelled grenade launchers, mortars of various types, as well as several hundred thousand rounds of ammunition, hundreds of shells, hand grenades, mines, explosive charges and fuses of various types, flamethrowers, anti-aircraft missiles, bulletproof vests, radio stations, night vision devices, mine detectors, parachutes, service instructions, charters and dry rations (untouchable supplies) of the US Army. In addition, RGM / C asked for thirty-three complete sets of American uniforms and field uniforms, including camping equipment, gas masks and helmets. Returning home, the experts of the direction started to work ”to make analytical results of the evaluation of the items transferred to the MGB (weapons and equipment of the enemy special forces) useful for our line, to draw appropriate conclusions about their combat worth and expediency of using the funds used for our own purposes.” The American form was to be used as a so-called means of disguise and disinformation. At the end of the seventies, direction 2 had a real fund, an ‘operational chamber of uniforms’ in which the form and equipment of the Western armies were fully prepared for action in the operational field, but also civilian suits of clothes.

As part of its technical capabilities and experience, the direction also backed the ‘political and operational cooperation partners’ (POZW) in 1976 as well. At the same time, new developments could simultaneously be tested in practice. POZW’s partners were, for example, the GDR border troops; ”In the operational development of devices to ensure the protection of the state border in order to protect against incidents and sabotage by the enemy, active cooperation was conducted.”

What specific technical devices were specifically discussed, remains open. RGM / C worked both on the development of electronic security devices and alarm devices for conspiratorial bases, as well as on the manufacture of mines, ‘shotguns’ and ‘automatic self-fire’. From 1978, the direction supported technical equipment for diversionary use of underground groups abroad; “Within the framework of international solidarity, military assets were developed and produced, which were then transferred to the liberation organisation.”

During 1978, the specialists of RGM / S rendered ‘extraordinary help’ to ‘Soviet friends’. Since the sixties, specialists in operational technology had engaged in the so-called locksmith technique.

To overcome the lock systems and security and alarm systems, they developed the most cunning and well-thought-out means and methods that, when operating in the operational field or in the fight against terrorism, would quickly penetrate protected ‘enemy objects’. For educational purposes, the specialists carried out whole studies on doors and door systems and manufactured charges for the explosion of locks and miniature shaped charges for their opening. The RSM / S staff was able to apply the skills for the first time in practice in 1978 at the request of Soviet comrades; “The Soviet chekists in the Soviet embassy were given active support when opening the premises with safes. The reuse of these premises was restored. “

Along with the current development and production of sabotage weapons in the second half of the seventies, the direction began to mass-produce the so-called instruments of violence and ‘annoying’ means (moral and psychological impact) that were also supplied to other units. For example, since 1976, truncheons-electric shockers had been delivered, whose ‘improvement’  continued to work constantly. So their suitability was checked “in a modified external form for covert use inside buildings and in arid areas” and “the possibility of using a baton-electric shocker also through thick clothing” against people. In production there were also simpler “means of violence“, such as brass knuckles, gloves for striking, barbed chains for roadblocks and ”thorns” for piercing car tires. Particular attention was paid to the development of “systems for spraying irritating gases.”

Only in 1979 alone did the unit’s employees fire 60 aerosol devices for irritating foam, 2 irritant sprayers, 20 “smelly agents” and 12 “chemical batons” for use against potential enemies. In this area, further research and improvements had also been made. Specialists investigated, among other things, the suitability of aerosols with irritant to eliminate traces, developed various automatic aerosol systems and created a device for spraying irritating gas with high pressure. As irritant gases (irritants), CN (chloroacetophenone) and CS (chlorobenzalmalonodinitrile) were considered. Subsequently, containers were constructed to “fire” the CN gas, powered by a distance over the radio, combat charges with CN gas, CN charges for use against cars and a CN gas spray system driven by an engine. >>> Note. These systems could also be used to spray highly toxic, so-called warfare agents. <<<

With all these tasks does reside the development of conspiratorial high technology. Already in the annual plan of Direction 2 for 1979 it was indicated that in the future it would also be necessary to produce “exploding fabric.” The analysis according to the annual report reported on the completion of the assignment; “Six variants of towels and six rags made from materials of the OO (OO – in the original OG operational area) were made as use cases. Six towels and five pairs of socks are available for the purpose of testing. To do this, for the purpose of camouflage, only Western textiles, processed with Western explosives, were used. “Target persons” in the operational field were supposed to “explode” when using these items. In the same direction, further studies were carried out in 1979. Specialists of RGM / S checked mixtures of foodstuffs and household chemicals with such an explosive as ammonium nitrate for their “operational applicability“. The following development testifies to the same destructive sophistication; The task was to make a gas cylinder explode with a compressed gas such as a standard aerosol can or a fire extinguisher. To this end, remotely radio-controlled fuses were designed that could be safely placed in such devices, as a result of which harmless compressed gas cylinders, even without explosives, were converted into dangerous bombs. If an appropriate signal was sent by radio, an explosion would occur, and the “target persons” would therefore be seriously injured. In the early eighties the specialists of RGM / S were also engaged in laser technology for special purposes. So sniper rifles and assault rifles for operational groups were equipped with laser sights.

The employees of the operational and technical direction mostly ended up not only with a narrow profile study at the Higher School of Law at the MGB in Potsdam. Every year, employees were sent for external studies in higher education. For example, only the annual plan for Area 2 for 1982, along with numerous other types of advanced training, lists five external training courses for the unit’s employees in universities and institutes; the University of Humboldt in Berlin (chemistry), the Technical Institute in Ilmenau (electronics), the University of Rostock (electrical engineering), the Engineering School in Glashütte (engineering), the University of Friedrich Schiller in Jena (scientific instrumentation).

The notion of a wide range of works of the ‘weapons smithy RGM / S’ provides a report on the setting of tasks to direction 2 of 1984;

It concentrates its work on the modification, development and manufacture of selected operational and technical combat and operational assets specifically designed for this line, which are not available in the military and industrial fields, as well as in the OTS (OTC – Operational and Technical Sector)  and other service divisions of the MGB or can not be ordered there for reasons of conspiracy and secrecy. “

In a direction there were some working divisions. They planned, coordinated and implemented both research tasks and training of ‘fighters’ in dealing with ‘operational technology’. Further tasks were the independent manufacture or acquisition, storage and maintenance of weapons and military equipment. Each working unit was specialised. For example, there was a separate unit dealing with ‘weapons, ammunition and special equipment.’ The arms of the RSM / C included; special weapons and special equipment, additional devices for hand-held firearms, such as mufflers and optical sights, special shooting devices and shooting systems, and rifle containers (concealed weapons in containers). As for ammunition, there were a variety of special ammunition for special use and special conditions. They also included grenades for special shooting devices. The ‘special equipment’ included specially manufactured so-called combat engineering equipment (for example, mines), special additional equipment for combat engineering equipment, mechanical triggers for fuse systems and camouflage containers for military engineering facilities.

An additional working unit took care of electronic equipment and equipment for RGM / C communication systems. Under the key words electronics / electrical engineering, experts were engaged in, among other things, developing, testing and manufacturing the following specialised devices; trigger mechanisms for mine explosive systems, electronic warfare systems, systems for overcoming electronic security and alarm devices, and conclusions from this in order to protect their own objects, electronic equipment and units for technical operational and combat means for combating terrorism, electronic additional equipment for explosive vehicles, means of blinding and lighting for special combat operations. Technicians involved in communication systems worked on problems of tactical radio communication, wire communication technology, processing and preparation of information (for example, the encoding process), remote control systems and remote switching for special operational and combat missions, as well as reconnaissance and eavesdropping and recording special operations. In this section of the work, they also experimented with negative sound influences on the human psyche to use them against potential adversaries. Such oscillations of sound can be made, for example, with a simple technical device, oscillator. If oscillations produced by the generator reach a certain frequency, they cause physical harm to people, leading, for example, to a burst of eardrums. Even if the oscillations remain below this frequency, they can still be felt, and they cause strong mental inconveniences. You can achieve this, including, and by manipulating the modulation of sound vibrations. Such methods can be applied, for example, when people are tortured.

The third working group was engaged in ‘explosive, incendiary and chemical means’. Here, processes were developed for the independent manufacture, processing and masking of explosives, as well as their undermining. In the field of so-called incendiary facilities, specialists worked on the following problems; independent manufacture and amplification of the impact, ignition and auto-ignition process, expansion of the fire area and combustion process of a wide variety of materials, explosions of gases and explosive mixtures, masking of incendiary devices and ignition systems, chemical fuses and methods ignition. In addition, the specialists were engaged in methods of chemical destruction of the material, manufacturing and modification of pyrotechnic means, such as propellant charges, rocket charges and so-called ‘thunder and lightning’ – pyrotechnic charges for light and noise effects, using annoying tools for ‘offensive combat actions’, using aerosols and toxic gases. To produce such gases, RGM / S since 1980 had appropriately trained staff. After one year, the department installed a device for gas chromatography, a physical-chemical process for analysing gaseous mixtures from many different substances.
Simultaneously, with the help of the process, it is also possible to produce gases of high purity, for example, warfare agents.

The experts of area 2 of the WGM / S also dealt with ‘special means and methods of using poisons and drugs’. The department’s annual plans from the early 1980s show that selected employees received special training in handling poisons. RGM / C for highly toxic poisons, for conspicuous reasons, did not acquire directly in the trading system or from the manufacturer, but bypasses, for example, via scientific research institutes at universities. So, already in the seventies, connections were established with the section of criminology at the University of Humboldt in East Berlin. Like the section director, Dr. V. Katzung, a section scientist specialising in forensic chemistry, also worked for the MGB as an officer with a special assignment (OibE). He supported the Stasi not only with his extensive, top secret research on the use of poisons and drugs, commissioned by the ‘Chekists’, but also transmitted, for example, only between 1976 and 1977 ten times poison and chemical warfare agents at the disposal of the RSM / FROM. Under the myth that sections of criminology need such substances for research purposes, poisons through the Minister of Health of the GDR were acquired by the trade missions of the GDR even in Western countries. The transfer took place during conspiratorial meetings in parking lots on autobahns. As a result, the unit received from a doctor Katzunga a whole arsenal of highly toxic materials; high-speed poisons affecting the heart, narcotic materials for combat charges, convulsive poisons, deadly acting neuro-paralytic poisons, catalytic contact poisons, toxic substances that can be dissolved in food and drinks, after which they lead to a slow and immediately noticeable deterioration in health, chemical warfare agents that act on the skin, against which there is no antidote, poisons affecting the kidneys, poisons, so affecting in the airways that causes an epidemic of fear and nausea due to force a person to remove a gas mask, poison curare, used by the native Americans in their arrows, and chemical killers, such as arsenic and strychnine. No documents have yet been found that would inform me whether, and if so, where and how RGM / C applied these means against people. Katsung made for the MGB in 1986 a ‘Discussion Paper’ on “The use of Psychoactive Substances to Influence People’s Mental Behaviour.” In this case, it was, among other things, the use of such funds during the interrogation of prisoners. For example, influence on giving testimony could be achieved via ‘breaking the will‘ with the aid of ‘withdrawal from stupor‘, ‘dissolution of the deep psyche‘, of ‘drugs of truth‘ and ‘drug analysis‘, and ‘provoking the urge to speak‘ with the assistance of ‘pills of chatter‘ . According to Dr. Katzung’s ‘Discussion Paper’, there are the following possibilities for the use of psychoactive drugs;

“Calming down and without manipulation (chemical-pharmacological torture), capturing and arresting (kidnapping), presenting to the public and preparing to speak to the media, preparation and conduct of trials. “

Until January 1987, V. Katzung, on behalf of the MGB, prepared textual documentation based on computer data on “unusual poisonings” under the heading “DATATOX“. Already this one scientific work is read as a pedantically thought-out instruction for flawless poisonings. But not only that. In September 1988, Dr. Kattsung gave the MGB the following work on their order on the topic “Studies of Chemical Substances with a Special Forensic Importance” under the heading “TOXDAT“.

Containng 911 pages there is listed all the possible possibilities for killing people with poison. The study called more than two hundred toxic substances and accurately describes in what form they exist in nature, what are the possibilities for their acquisition, is it possible for them to independently manufacture and how, the most diverse methods of administering poisons, how and to which organs the poisons act, the manipulations to conceal the application poisons and increase their impact. For the experts of RGM / S, those chapters of the study that considered terrorist poisons, sabotage poisons and examples of unusual introduction of poisons could be especially important from the point of view of their offensive combat mission.

Already in the seventies, operational and technical personnel received training in handling radionuclides and non-medical X-ray equipment. After that, they were engaged, as definitely reported in the list of tasks of the direction 2 of 1984 under the key word “radiological means“, the use of radioactive isotopes. In the chapter on; Damage by the Use of Radioactive Materials, the TOXDAT study listed several radionuclides of a particularly dangerous nature;

uranium 235 and 238, radium 226, strontium 90, cesium 137, cobalt 60, plutonium 238 and 239 and mixtures of decay products obtained, for example, by dissolving the micromasses of burnt fuel rods from nuclear power plants. According to TOXDAT, these materials cause a person a harm of a combined nature, resulting from the chemical effects of poison and the physical impact of radioactive energy. They have very good suitability as terrorist poisons, it goes on to say, since the human olfactory organ does not perceive radionuclides. If you enter them, for example, into food and drinks, they cause serious damage to blood and bone marrow, leading to long-term chronic diseases, and a variety of cancers depending on the organ in the human body that will become the “target” of their impact. These effects can be achieved already with the help of “effective doses in the weight range up to micro – and milligrams“. Due to the fact that the symptoms are late and are not specific, the analysis of the causes of the disease is very complicated, radionuclides are characterized by a large “concealment potential“. Already in the long period of latency there is an irreversible damage to health, and thus the person subjected to such an influence does not perceive it.

Further, the study showed that radionuclides are also suitable for use in reconnaissance and counter-intelligence purposes. This example became known for the first time in 1997 thanks to the investigation of the Central Investigation Service for Combating Organised Crime (ZERV). Thus, the division of the MGB at the Karl Zeiss plant in Jena in 1978, planted documents to the physicist processed there by radioactive nuclides to expose his espionage activities. The agent charged with this operation could have contact with the processed documents for only twenty minutes and at a distance of one metre, while the victim, according to the Stasi documents, could undergo a five-fold dose of radioactive radiation. The prepared documents were provided by Department 32 of the Operational and Technical Sector (OTC) from Berlin.

As follows from the list of tasks of Area 2 of 1984, the specialists of RSM / C also dealt with the “use of nuclear mines“. In the same place the following item was called “Maintenance of Nuclear and Chemical Equipment” (KC-Technik). In this case, it was not a defence technique for protection from radioactive radiation, such as dosimeters and Geiger counters. For this, in WGM / C, not the direction 2, but the working group BCD (armament and chemical services) was responsible. Since it is impossible to service equipment that is not available, this quote should clearly suggest that the MGB had nuclear mines. Unfortunately, the source only informed about this fact, but not regarding the design and principle of the operation of such mines.

The existence of such a “nuclear weapon in a manual pocket format” is known since the seventies. As an amateur could imagine such a “damn machine,” follows from a document that the head of the RSM / S Stoker received on February 20, 1987 on his desk. He handed it to his specialists, who had to “process the material as indicated.” At the same time, it was about the information of the main department of the XVIII on Western research in the field of small nuclear charges, the so-called ‘Mininukes’. These small nuclear charges consist of a ball for the splitting and synthesis of atomic nuclei, the construction of which was described in detail in the information provided. Under the influence of the pressure wave of the exploding conventional explosive in the balloon, nuclear reaction, which theoretically can reach an explosive force of up to 8.8 tons in TNT. The diameter of the ball used for this splitting and synthesis of atomic nuclei is only 2.5 centimeters.

These small nuclear charges can be used very versatile, in particular, as a replacement for conventional ammunition or sub-munitions (for example, grenades that can be fired from conventional handguns with a special device). For Stöcker and his people, the use of such small nuclear munitions, perhaps, could be particularly interesting for sabotage and the purposes of sabotage;

Due to the small size of FFK (Fusions-Fissions-Kugeln, balls for splitting and synthesis of atomic nuclei), they can be easily and imperceptibly delivered to the site of application. As a camouflage means could serve a variety of objects that are not suspicious at all, which can even be provided with radiation protection. Also the evidence of using FFK creates problems in some cases. If they are used, for example, against a nuclear power plant, it can be assumed that after a catastrophe caused, it will no longer be possible to establish a difference between the total radioactive radiation present and the residual radioactive radiation of FFK. In view of this, priority targets for the potential use of FFK may be, first of all, such enemy facilities that play the most important role for the functioning of its economy – energy supply or its centers – nuclear power plants.”

It can be noted that the information just in this place acquires a clearly offensive nature of setting goals. The author’s considerations here clearly went beyond the defense of the GDR from terrorist acts. The atomic super–barism that was being considered here should obviously have been called up in the “operational area“, since the “power centres” in the GDR were known to be thermal power plants that operated on brown coal, rather than nuclear power plants as in the FRG. The question remains whether the RGM / C actually had the technique described. Nevertheless, it can be said with certainty that West German nuclear power plants were included in the list of targets for the planned diversionary attacks by the operational groups of the MGB.

Close cooperation in the operational and technical field also existed between RSM / C and the Main Intelligence Directorate. According to the internal report of 1986, it was about joint research in the following areas; ”the use of irritants against people; shelling of various materials with special ammunition (glass, doors, walls, bulletproof vests, cars, etc.); testing of electric shock devices; effective use of piercing and cutting weapons; joint production of training videos on the use of “special tools and methods.” The report further reports that the Main Intelligence Directorate conducted very costly tests in these areas, the results of which would also be of interest to RSM / C. The Main Intelligence Directorate suggested in this connection to use its “well-developed and large test facilities” for joint tests, as well as to obtain weapons and equipment items for the RGM / C in Western countries.

The description of the operational and technical achievements of the RSM / C could easily be filled with extensive research, which, however, would be useful to noone except for terrorists and secret services of state-terrorist regimes. Several questions remain open that have not been clarified at this point yet. What hands did this whole diverse instrumentation of destruction of RSM / C hit? It is well known that part of it was placed at the disposal of other divisions, and a part was transferred to the so-called liberation organisations. But the fact is that until today, as shown, for example, in the investigations in Schwerin in 1997, the search continues for the disappeared arsenals of the Stasi weapons. And what happened to the specialists of Stöcker after the end of the GDR? Where and for whose money do they use their knowledge today?


August 26, 1982 RGM / C did receive the following order;

Carry out reconnaissance of railway communications, power supply and parts of the communication system, as well as the main gas supply of some (initially unnamed) district centre in the operational area, which is an important hub for rail transportation of various types; to identify neuralgic points and with a sudden blow to interrupt all railway communications in order to temporarily paralyse the railway junction. “

At the heart of the decree lay the opening statement of the beginning of the growing tension between the two German states. Under the guise of great maneuvers in the FRG called reservists, intensified the psychological war and subversive struggle against the GDR. On September 7, 1982, four operational groups totaling twenty personnel penetrated into the operational field in various secret ways. Unidentified by the population and the authorities, on September 8 they conducted, as was ordered, reconnaissance of the objects intended for sabotage in the regional center A. Until the morning of September 9, they fired around a small town in four different places (in squares on the plan 6929, 8534 and 74 / 7534) undermining the tracks, interrupting the railway communication. Then the task forces were dispersed. With the help of the “operational bases” (NS), the “fighters” “went to the bottom” in the “operational area,” so as to separately get into the GDR. This action actually took place – as one of hundreds of exercises conducted by the operational groups of the RSM / C in “realistic conditions that are as close to combat as possible“. The Brandenburg town of Angermunde acted as a “district center in the operational field“, and the explosions on the railway “only” were imitated.

This was not the first and not the last time that Angermunde served as a target for such actions, because it was in this area near the village of Vartin until 1989 that the main training base of the “special forces” of the MGB was located. Already after the consultations that the chief of the RSM, Scholtz, held with the KGB in Moscow in 1969, it was decided that the training of operational groups should be 80% of practice and only 20% of theory. During his working visits to the educational bases of the then department IV / 2 in 1972, Scholz confirmed this approach. The framework program of the RGM / S of July 1, 1986, also determined the ratio of theory and practice as 25 to 75 percent. Between 1964 and 1972, 79 such “operational-tactical exercises” were conducted.

According to the list of March 22, 1985, the MGB had 3,497 employees by this date, which, starting January 1, 1962, passed this practice-oriented “special education“. At the same time, it was about the “members” of the various central and territorial units, but along with them, however, also about the full-time informal employees (hauptamtliche inoffizielle Mitarbeiter, abbreviated HIM) of Division IV and the unofficial employees of the Main Department I, especially in the border troops of the National People’s Army army. Since certain of these frames were no longer suitable for such operations by age, the WGM / C in 1985, for use in the operational field, counted on the actually available capacity of 1,044 personell. This corresponded to approximately 208 operational groups of five fighters in each.

In principle, the methods and objectives of training and training saboteurs between 1964 and 1989 have changed relatively little, although they, of course, were constantly supplemented and modernized during these years.

But since a principled aggressive decision; under certain assumptions, with the help of conspiratorial actions against certain people and infrastructure objects, let’s say, shoot at the FRG until it “ripens for assault“, remained in operation until 1989, then a suitable tactic and together, in addition, training has also changed only in the direction of the continuous growth of professionalism. So, for example, such training topics of ‘Chekist Special Tactics” as “secret ambush” or “surprise attack“, in fact, were already known to medieval knights, thieves and gangs of thieves. But if they attacked, robbed and killed only for the sake of low-cost money acquisition, then “comrade fighters” instilled sublime motives for their actions. In the last framework program of the WGM / C of 1986, can be read;

The training forces must be motivated and educated in connection with their tasks for conducting special combat operations of the MGB; fulfill the party and class task as a security officer in any situation to protect the GDR and its needs for national security with a risk to their lives, with fidelity military oath and its obligations in good faith and at any time; constantly provide a high level of combat readiness, improve the readiness and ability to carry out initiative and courageously every operational and combat mission received as a single Chekist fighter, relying only on himself or in a combat team; on the basis of clear political basic beliefs, a strong class approach, class behaviour and a differentiated image of the enemy, to recognise the enemy in any situation of the class struggle, to hate it deeply and uncompromisingly fight against it, to perform any combat task with courage, cunning and resourcefulness also in dangerous situations; consistently fulfill orders and demands in the MGB, deepen socialist relations and continuously develop Chekist military collectives; at any time, even in conditions of personal and collective tension, coolly and steadfastly act as an MGB Chekist. “

Similar educational goals can be found already in the ‘Principles for Special Measures to Improve Skills for the Parts of the Ministry of State Security’ in 1963 and in the ‘Manual’ of WGM ‘C’ in 1974. To educate the “fighters” of the above qualities, and at the WGM / C, the basis for any special training was also the so-called political education. The content for all these years has changed just as little as the goals of such education. As part of political education, employees are informed about the image of the enemy.


Among the topics are the following;

Lenin’s doctrine of armed struggle and the revolutionary situation. Secret war, its methods, means, forces and its place in the policy of imperialism. The role of special services in the ruling system of imperialism and their hostile actions against the GDR. “
(The Soviet) guerrilla struggle is a special form of class struggle for the sake of social progress.
An antifascist struggle to resist the German working class.
The role and significance of socialist scouts as fighters of the invisible front in clarifying and exposing the plans and intentions of the enemies of progress.
The FRG is the state of monopoly capital, aggression and reaction.
Spiritual manipulation of the population in the operational field, carried out by the imperialist ruling system.
The relevance of the Marxist-Leninist doctrine of the class struggle.
Class structure and trends in the development of the class struggle in the FRG.
Tendencies of development in the world revolutionary process and socialist military doctrine
The imperialist military doctrine is the basis of NATO strategy and tactics. The role of Germany in NATO.
The nature of the modern general war in Europe, its possible types, purposes and forms of manifestation. “

After the tasks of the military-operational struggle against terrorism were transferred to the sphere of responsibility of the then department IV / S (later RGM / C) in 1974, the following theme of political education was; “The essence and forms of the manifestation of terrorism in modern times and the definition of its place in the international class struggle “. In the eighties, psychological components were also included in the politico-moral basic education. So, in the framework curriculum of 1986 it is said that when preparing for “psychological operations.” Psychologically, it is necessary to involve the topics of the subject “operational psychology” of professional correspondence education of the MGB. Such “psychological preparation” had to be achieved, for example, by “creating difficulties and tests that correspond to combat tasks of psychological and physical situations” and “introducing elements of danger and risk into training.”

On this basis, the “special forces of the MGB” in the mid-eighties were to be trained in sixteen further subjects. Among them were special tactics, rifle training, military topography, engineering and technical special training, operational and technical training, special tactical actions in the application of aircraft, the study of a probable enemy, physical training, communication, diving training, preparation for protection against weapons of mass destruction and health education. What was hidden behind such relatively harmless military concepts, as, for example, special tactics, can be seen only with a careful reading of numerous preserved teaching materials. Essentially, it was about preparing the best qualified, professional and highly motivated specialists for terror, destruction and murder. They had to fulfill their orders under any circumstances. Therefore, the students were drilled so that they could use any, even the most insidious means and methods, without hesitation and remorse.

One such method was, for example, “a conspiratorial ambush against individuals, groups of individuals and vehicles.” In the corresponding training manual,  – in contrast to the military ambush – was defined as follows;
A conspiratorial ambush is a kind of battle between single Chekist fighters and operational groups in the framework of our special combat actions. It is an integral part of the operational and combat principles, which say that it – along with a sudden attack and diversion – is a kind of battle that has the supremacy of achieving the set goal of military operations, such as the Chekist operation and the Chekist action. “

The ambush should be carried out with the use of disinformation, deceit, cunning, resourcefulness and, if possible, with complete disguise (for example, in the form of an enemy), reads further in the training manual. Depending on this goal, there were five different types of ambush; an ambush for destruction, an ambush for capture, an ambush of security, an “embarrassing” ambush and an ambush within the psychological struggle. Here is an example:
“An ambush for destruction is carried out with the aim of eliminating people or destroying the corresponding object. The means and methods used can range from the use of lethal close (confusion) combat, small arms, to “causing an accident / accidents” and the use of mine explosives. There are no recipes for this. The nature of the object, its own capabilities, as well as the place, time and conditions are the determining factors for choosing the appropriate means and methods.

In contrast, the “ambush for capture” should serve to capture people (for example, as hostages) and capture items. The “disturbing ambush” was aimed at detaining the enemy’s plans and intentions. Examples of it in the training manual were the systematic supply of a facility or a meeting / conference that could be effectively prevented; in the first case, by attacks on supply vehicles, in the second – by strikes against individual visiting participants of the meeting. With especial cunning it was necessary to act with “conspiratorial ambush within the framework of psychological struggle“. With its help, the population of Germany needed to cause terror, panic and insecurity. The following method was envisaged;

Especially suitable for this ambush for destruction with the nature of terrorist activities. It is important that both the actions themselves and the result of their direct influence on the object in the ambush become widely known. At the same time, the impact will be strengthened not only by abstaining from the secrecy of the action and its impacts, as well as preventing, concealing and eliminating traces and evidence, but also spreading rumors and such actions. A planned psychological effect can also be achieved if a conspiratorial ambush is prepared and conducted in such a way that no traces and other the starting points for the performed action could not be found, and also by the fact that people of the most varied value are disappearing constantly and in increasing numbers. At the same time, depending on the goal, it can be either about arbitrarily defined objects or also about individuals from a certain target group. “

With the German thoroughness, the authors of the textbook did not want to give anything to the will of the case. Therefore, suitable places for ambushes (for example, in public buildings corridors, vestibules, toilets, rear entrances, emergency exits) were also planned from the very beginning, as well as the use of “fighters” during an ambush. The “attacking forces” were charged with “acting directly at the facility” in order to achieve the corresponding goal; “They carry out misleading, sudden strikes, scrapping resistance, eliminating, arresting or seizing, exporting the object.”
At the same time, the “security forces” had to prevent any interference. Their task was also to eliminate traces. This included;
Neutralisation of any possible living witnesses or prevention of threats on their part. Elimination of all traces that indicate the purpose, type of action, number of fighters, captured material, etc.; Preventing the object from being able to throw out any objects. Elimination of traces of prints of operational and technical devices, car traces, footprints, etc. Elimination of liquidated or destroyed objects or camouflage of the action, for example, by issuing it for a criminal offense. Leaving “evidence” for disorientation of the enemy. Demonstration of another goal with the help of appropriate recognizable actions, for example, when copying important documents that will be left to the enemy, but with the abduction of money and a car. “

The practical training of the operational groups also included “working off specific elements of a secret conspiracy“. These “special elements” were “certain key actions against the enemy, on the success of which the overall action depends, for example, the elimination of people by special means / methods under absolutely certain conditions.”

On the secret training bases of the RSM / with the murder of people were taught on specially equipped polygons – so-called. “Combat training grounds.” These places covered an area of ​​approximately 4,000 square metres, which housed, among other things, the following technical devices;
Ten control devices of the shooting range with the switchgear and the distributor, ten dolls-dummies in a standing, standing on their knees and lying position with indicators of hit in sensitive places of the body, five dolls-mannequins in a free and hidden position for working out strikes, stabbing and strangling, command-and-control devices for controlling systems with sound and light equipment .”

On the dolls there was training of murderers;
The possibilities of attacking deadly confusion combat can be of a very diverse kind. When training, it is necessary to specialise in those parts of the body that fully meet the goal. Attacks by blow, chopping and piercing strokes should be directed against relatively unprotected, sensitive places of the body. It is necessary to train the power of blows, chopping and piercing strokes, which guarantee immediate success. The methods of silent rapprochement and soundless killing should be given the greatest importance. The use of weapons must be trained on a doll, in general, priority should be given to training on dolls. “

In training, they taught how to stab, kill with blows and strangle people;
An attack with a thrusting weapon is carried out; by thrusting from above, thrusting a blow from below, thrusting a blow from the side from the outside, stabbing a blow from the side from the inside. Attack with a chopping and percussion weapon is carried out with the help of; a knuckle, an axe, a shovel, a stick, a pistol grip, a knife handle, a cable, an iron rod, a wooden baton, a hose filled with sand or lead, a bag of sand. Removal and strangulation is carried out with the following auxiliary means; suffocation by hands, strong rope, flexible wire, belt, pieces of cloth of a suitable kind.  The most sensitive places of the human body and head are the cranial lid, especially its posterior part, occiput, larynx, thoracic cavity, especially the heart region, the liver region, the triangle of the abdomen, the kidney area, the genitalia and the inguinal region, spine, eyes, nasal bone, upper jaw, carotid artery, temporal artery, subclavian artery, brachial artery, axilla, tip of chin, angle of jaw.

The operational groups of the RSM / C, prepared in this way, were to act not only against the enemies in the Federal Republic, but also, if necessary, inside the GDR itself against the opposition. For example, in one document, the WGM / C for 1985 clearly defined the use of “special forces” for “conducting operational operations against internal enemies“. According to the definition of 1988, along with the offensive “conduct of special combat actions” against the Federal Republic and the fight against terrorism, the task of the department XXIII, the successor of the WGM / C, which was to be created, was also “the disruption of the anti-socialist actions of the hostile-negative forces.” Special training manuals RGM / C did not distinguish between terrorists and unarmed “hostile-negative” people. Together they united under one concept of “hostile forces“.

The 1988 Sudden Attack Training Manual states; “This concept (hostile forces) covers both terrorist criminals, malicious criminals who use violence, (armed deserters) and hostile-negative individuals, as well as subversive forces and enemy saboteurs that need fight in a special situation.” Thus, the special Stasi fighting groups were also prepared for use against fugitive “hostile-negative” people. For this purpose the following method was proposed for the plans; “Search, prosecution and surroundings in the conduct of special combat actions of the MGB is carried out if: terrorist criminals / hostile forces were able to evade special tactical actions; tasks in the pursuit of a special nature require this. ” Further in the same training manual, one reads; “The purpose of pursuit is to overtake or overtake hostile forces in the shortest possible time and detain or liquidate them.” In none of the surviving teaching tools of the RSM / C there is an item with a categorical indication that unarmed fugitive people need only be detained, but otherwise their lives should be preserved. “The offensive, Cheka wrestling” did not know either moral doubts or legal restrictions on the use of state violence.

Further in the course of the educational process, future saboteurs acquired knowledge not only about the handling of explosive and incendiary weapons, but also about their independent manufacture “in conspiratorial conditions in the operational field.” So, the special curriculum taught the following skills’

Under special secret conditions, it is necessary, with the help of myths, to acquire such standard materials that serve to produce explosive and incendiary weapons; from these materials in secret conditions, avoiding or eliminating all traces should be able to produce explosives, ignition means and incendiary weapons; it is necessary to master knowledge about the properties and effectiveness of the produced explosives, ignition means and incendiary weapons, as well as the necessary calculations of charges, the principles of securing charges and the possibility of using these funds in conspiratorial conditions. “

This knowledge and skills of course participants had to train in numerous exercises with the help of ammonite, chlorate explosives and hexogen. They were also trained to independently manufacture a wide variety of electronic, mechanical and chemical fuses.

Especially valuable in diversionary operations were incendiary military means of conspiratorial own manufacture. Their significance has increased even more in the age of the scientific and technological revolution, they are mentioned in the ‘Manual’ of the RSM / C in 1974. Most of the planned targets, such as fuel production and supply facilities, warehouses, energy facilities, communications facilities, control and monitoring centres, could be destroyed with incendiary means more effectively than with explosive weapons.
In addition, the acquisition, self-manufacturing, disguise and use of incendiary devices can often be simpler. Such incendiary weapons were, for example, chlorate, phosphoric and thermite incendiary compounds, as well as incendiary jelly. The students studied the manufacture of all these means “with the help of simple instruments and household items in secret conditions (in dwellings, sheds, closets, cellars, attics and open air), while avoiding or removing all traces.” This also included: “the device and the filling of Material-TBK – dead mailboxes for the material “- i.e. caches, in this case – caches for storing various items by such means and features of their storage in them (waterproof packaging and masking of the material). “

The above training manual, in accordance with the cover letter of November 1971, was made available to Marcus Wolf, as it was obviously interesting for the General Directorate of Intelligence. Practical exercises with the installation of explosives and incendiary weapons took place at “training grounds for military equipment.” Target facilities such as railways, high-voltage power lines, telephone lines and water pipes were built there. The chekists demonstrated to them their various capacities for destruction.

Since this destruction work was to be carried out not blindly, but for reasons of efficiency, directed against neuralgic points of target objects, operational cadres were trained so that they became real engineers of destruction. They were given extensive knowledge of the technical details, structure, function and principle of the action planned for the attacks in Germany. So cadets, for example, with the help of numerous teaching aids, received accurate knowledge regarding “the fight against the objects of extraction of fuels and lubricants.”

The instructions also contained exact building plans and functional plans for these facilities. Especially valuable were the characteristics of neuralgic points for disrupting the production process. One of these items, along with ten others, was called, for example, a distillation column of an oil refinery. With it was necessary to “fight” in the following way;

Vulnerabilities; distillation column, especially the upper third; pipelines of all kinds, in particular, product lines that exit from the upper region; simultaneous destruction of fire extinguishing systems. Probable impacts: the outgoing hot products are predominantly immediately flared in the air; due to the type of construction of the processing device, the products will pour out only up to 15 cubic metres, the possibility of burning steel structures with the appropriate fire on the ground and at the same time the loss of the bearing capacity, with fire on the ground, the destruction of control lines and measuring instruments; destruction of the building will require, in most cases, depending on its size and species, up to several hours; the failure of the structure depending on the type of damage can be measured between hours and weeks (for pipelines several hours, with the destruction of distillation columns up to several weeks, depending on the repair capacity). “

For such actions, amongst other means, trotyl, “nitropenta” (teng) and hexogen were recommended as suitable explosives. It was also considered rational to combine them with incendiary substances, such as termite or napalm.

With the help of the 1980 textbook, saboteurs of the MGB were trained in “reconnaissance and fight against neuralgic points of the water transport system.” To this end, they first transmitted extensive knowledge regarding the inland waterways of the Federal Republic, for example, navigation on the Rhine. At the same time, the main attention was paid to possible target objects, such as floodgates, ship lifts, forward ports and control objects.
The basis for the training material was intelligence information obtained from the agents of Division IV and the Main Intelligence Directorate. Therefore, the instructors were instructed to violate the operation of the port on a very concrete example of a planned sabotage facility – the Hamburg harbour railway. Here is a small episode from this detailed description; “The railway network of the Hamburg harbour railway has approximately 554 kilometres of tracks, 2,450 arrows and 250 signals. The Hamburg Kai Port Station (Hamburger Embankment) serves the Hubenkerkay, Fersmannstraße and Kirchenpauer Straße regional stations on the right. The Hamburg-Sud railway station (Hamburg-South) serves the regional railway stations Ubersersecentrum, Amerikstraße, Australienstraße, Afrikstraße, Camerounweg, Nelshtrasse and Buchheimstrasse.”

After the authors of the training manual described the structure and operation of the facility in this way, they recommended the following method of action under the heading “Strike on the Railway”; “Vulnerable places are formed by: railroad tracks, centralization posts of arrows and signals, signaling devices, arrows, places unloading and unloading of wagons. Opportunities of struggle: the use of explosive military means against all vulnerable places, the use of mechanical force against control systems, disorganisation in the compilation of trains.”

Among the surviving RSM / C documents, thousands of pages of teaching materials have been found. It is impossible to document them here in full detail. But these documents also give an idea of ​​the sophisticated and destructive nature of the preparation of the MGB saboteurs. Therefore, I will mention here several more teaching aids, as if instead of numerous others; “Principles, Methods and Tools for the Construction of Hidden Weapons, Explosives and Supplies,” 1976;

Detective activities, measures of blocking, encirclement and harassment of enemy military and paramilitary counterintelligence agencies and tactics of Chekist operational personnel to overcome these activities in the operational field” 1980.

‘Politically-Operational Requirements for the Organization of the Communication System in Solving Specific-Tactical Problems.’ 1984. Here the students were given knowledge of the tricks necessary for routine everyday operations, including the design and use of so-called “dead mail boxes” (hiding places) about the rules for meeting with the connected, the use of conditional addresses and conditional phones, the use of codes and codes, and the use of cryptography.

‘Means of Masking and Securing RSM / S Secrecy’ in 1986. This training manual contains methods of the encoding process for the radio exchange of operational groups.

‘Requirements for Operational Monitoring of Persons and Objects in the Operational Area’, 1986.

Such training content also required special rules of the house. In the service manual for the training camp Vartin near Angermunde in 1982 it was noted that the specifics of the educational problems and the possibility of future combat missions resulting from it, in addition to the usual procedures and instructions operating in the MGB, require particularly strict requirements for secrecy. At the training bases, instructors and course participants were allowed to exchange only such information regarding personal data and activities that were indispensable for the implementation of the learning process. The students had no right to inform anything about the aims of the training, its contents and the places of its holding to the third employees of the MGB. Also, during the training courses they were able to keep in touch only with those employees of the training area that were represented to them. To keep the secret of their real personal data, instructors and students had to address each other only under pseudonyms. And further in the official instruction it is stated;

This educational institution can not be known as an object of the MGB. For third parties, the membership of the course attendees to the educational institution should not be recognisable. In training, trainees should behave in such a way that persons who are not attached to the training process could not draw any conclusions about the nature of the training. When teaching activities in the premises, the windows should be kept closed. When the lighting is on, the windows should be darkened. When teaching activities outside the facility, you must adhere to the agreed legend and the behaviour specified in the order to avoid special incidents. “

Quality” of training with RGM / S also convinced the chief of the Main Intelligence Directorate, Marcus Wolf. Because in March 1982, he turned to the Stoker with a special request. It was about “training, that being; training and ensuring the ongoing readiness of some few operational staff for very specific tasks in the operational field“. To this end, the RGM / S should have been offered “young operatives who have the necessary Chekist character properties and proved that they are worthy of any confidence, but also they know the official secrets, especially the secrets of the RSM / C.” They were required to undergo joint training together with the personnel of the Main Intelligence Directorate and, together with them, as separate fighters or as part of the task force to carry out, according to Wolff’s special desire, “very specific tasks“;

The main directions of the tasks envisaged are as follows; the struggle against hostile persons on a broad front of possible measures for their punishment, neutralisation, their delivery to a safe place for arrest; ensuring the protection and protection of persons; provision of important operational activities; provision, protection and transportation of documents, technical materials and equipment. “


In a report on an unofficial employee of Department IV under the pseudonym ‘Siegfried’, the operational officer who supervised the person (him) in 1980 wrote;

The National Assembly has the following qualifications about its objective function; the use of operational legends, the methods of operation of the enemy’s secret services, the conditions of the regime in the operational field and the activities associated with frequent trips to the operational area, the basics of information gathering and people searching and observation behind them, the basis for reconnaissance of the object and the basis for communication, rifle preparation (M 61 submachine gun, PPK pistol, Voere sniper rifle), topographical preparation and photographic work, masking, surveillance, delivery of reports, behaviour on the ground, preparation for hand-to-hand combat (stage I), the basis for the use of improvised explosives. As for civil qualifications, the National Assembly has; a driver’s license of category V, he received training for a wireless telegraph operator in the GST (Society for Sport and Technology – a paramilitary organization of the GDR, an analogue of the Soviet DOSAAF), has knowledge in the field of communications and electronics. In connection with these qualifications, the National Assembly is able, in accordance with its objective function, in today’s operational environment to implement the entire possible range of tasks (actions against people and objects), while updating operational knowledge is necessary. The National Assembly declared its readiness for the realisation of all the tasks set, including the use of physical force in relation to people. Along with the necessary interest in this work, the National Assembly also has the necessary firmness and ability to achieve its goals. Based on his military training, the National Assembly can, and is also ready to carry out politically-operative tasks unconditionally in difficult, or difficult conditions. “

Agents of department IV, so-named. ‘Unofficial staff’ (NA), as a kind of eyes and ears provided RGM / C with a foundation for aggressive subversive plans against West Germany. The size of the IV network in the Federal Republic of Germany, other Western countries and in the GDR itself can still only be based on assumptions in view of the following circumstances;

Subsequent to the tasks of the division between 1955 and 1959 were in the competence of the Main Intelligence Directorate, Division 3, it, from that date, existed as department IV in the sphere of management of the respective head of the RSM. On Milke’s order number 21/86 on January 1, 1987, the unit was again part of the Main Intelligence Directorate (GUR) as a department of the XVIII. All documents on the activities of the department, the composition of its NA and staff members were combined with the documentation of the GUR. It is because of this circumstance that the documents of the former department IV were destroyed along with the dossier of the Main Intelligence Directorate. All information regarding department IV is based on documents that have been preserved among the documentation of other divisions of the MGB, such as the WGM / C or the XII department (Archive). So, among the surviving documentation of the RSM / C, two lists compiled by Department IV were found, which in 1981 alone listed in total 346 ‘developed targets’ for the civil and military infrastructure of Germany. When realistically examined, it is clear that such an assignment could not be handled by a network of agents suffering from a mere shortage of personnel.

Milke in 1968, in his directive on working with the National Assembly in the operational field, among other things, decided that they should also conduct ”active political and operational measures against enemy centres to directly support the policy of party and state leadership.” Further in the directive it is stated, “Because of the difference in the tasks they perform and the specific requirements for unofficial employees, there is a certain division of them into different categories.

Milke in the document cited listed in total sixteen different types of such NA and classified them according to their functions. Certain of the most important categories of agents need to be mentioned herein; “National Assembly for Special Assignments” must carry out offensive measures and “combat missions“, not defined in great depth of detail. “Residents“, to which the “resident assistant” was often attached, were in charge of the operational field by a group of other NA. Other NSs were used as “recruiters” and “radio operators“. “Instructors” were to support personal, and “couriers” – impersonal communication (for example, through caches) with the NA in the operational field. One more NS worked for the MGB as “observers and gunners“, “agents of conditional addresses and conditional phones” and “agent-keepers of safe houses“. This categorisation extended to the GUR and all other units that supported agent networks in the operational field.

Division IV, in accordance with its offensive task, also had its own special categorisation for its National Assembly in the Federal Republic.
In the already referred to ‘Manual’ of 1974, the NS units were designated as “operational bases“;

“Operational bases are informal employees in the operational field who, structured separately or in groups, separated territorially in accordance with the directions and targets of the attack, and for the purpose of active co-operation with the operational forces during the conduct of Chekist actions and operations were for a long time and systematically legalised or recruited and trained, equipped and trained for certain specific operational activities, and thus belong to the combat system of offensive Chekist military operations. The operational bases within the tactics of the offensive chekist struggle also have an important task to realsze the attack from within, in which, ultimately, their role and significance and will find their full expression. “

Depending on their tasks, the NSs were again divided into five different categories. “Personal bases” (for people’s support) had the following tasks;

To facilitate, guarantee and ensure illegal stay, the movement of the Chekist operational forces in the operational field; make possible the legalisation of the operational forces and their withdrawal to the underground if necessary; implement the transfer of operational forces across the border from the operational area and into the operational area, as well as through third countries; to ensure the temporary stay and provision of combat-capable operational forces, to ensure the legend of the legalised operational forces. “

The “material bases” were to ensure the supply of operational forces with weapons, ammunition, combat assets, money, food, clothing and equipment. To do this, these NSs had to arrange secret warehouses or storage hiding places (the aforementioned “dead mail boxes for the material” – MTBK). They were also  to acquire items and materials that were absent in warehouses and in secret places in a short time.

Communication bases” provided, above all, the flow of information between the operational forces and the centre in the GDR.

An important role was given to the “information and intelligence bases“. Their function was;

Constantly collect, prepare and transmit information about the objects of attack indicated to them (objects, persons, conditions, etc.); conduct their own intelligence work on certain objects of attack from inside and outside and at the same time collect information about the enemy security system, the possibilities of secret, secretive or violent penetration of these objects and their neuralgic points; be able in a short time to clarify the necessary data about the objects of the attack; to obtain information and reconnaissance results, to cooperate with the KGB operative forces in the operational field and support them during the conduct of combat operations. “

Battle bases“, it is stated, should take part in direct attacks and attacks “on especially protected, specific objects and persons“. To this category, obviously belonged also the already mentioned National Assembly “Siegfried“. Since 1976,  operational officers prepared him for “secret facilities” (KO ‘Lesnichestvo’) and “safe houses” (CC ‘Rose’) of Division IV in accordance with his “objective function” as an “operational personnel officer” for the operational field. Between 1976 and 1980, he was sent to West Berlin and the Federal Republic several times to study “conditions of the regime.” Such “conspiratorial tourist trips” were a common practice for novitiate agents.

Before they received real tasks, they were often sent to three or four such study trips. In these trips, the National Assembly acquired for itself the necessary equipment from clothes and other personal tourist equipment of Western production. But even more important was that they at the same time learn to get used to their false, covered personal legends with personal data.

False personal data were often based, for example, on the so-called twinning basis. With the help of their National Assembly in West Germany, as well as using the personal data of West Germans received for the MGB at the entrance to the GDR and through it, it was not difficult for the MGB to obtain for themselves, in a variety of secret ways, personal data from unsuspecting citizens of the Federal Republic of Germany. To create false documents, the ID number and the number of the passport, the date of issue and the authority issuing the document were also required. The agents intended for use in the operational field then received the personal data of the person, under the guise of which they had to slip to the West with the task of knowing as accurately as possible details about his/her living conditions (for example, his/her place of residence and place of work). So, for example, a certain colleague of the agent “Siegfried“, who acted under the pseudonym “Gerold Bergmann“, on October 11, 1976 went to West Berlin to find out the address of his double. For “Gerold Bergmann” this operation was a routine. He had already completed several of these tasks and at the same time he used fake documents with the personal data of other doubles. This time he needed to know about the living conditions and the environment of one student from the West Berlin region of Lichterfelde, who was of the same age as the National Assembly.
The National Assembly photographed the house where the student lived, as well as his surroundings, sketched the terrain plan and prepared a report with reconnaissance results.

Already in his next mission from November 24 to November 27, 1976, which brought him to Duisburg, Munich and Vienna, the National Assembly used a fake document with the personal data of a West Berlin student. In hundreds of cases, the “twinning method” functioned flawlessly. But for “Gerold Bergmann” his next trip in January 1977 turned out to be fatal. He rented a car in Hanover, presenting forged documents. The firm sent an account to an unsuspecting West Berlin student who immediately contacted the police. After this, “Gerold Bergmann” on January 13, 1977 was arrested in Detmold and the following summer was convicted on charges of espionage activities and forgery of documents for one year and two months in prison. But already in January 1978 he was pardoned and deported to the GDR. The Supreme Court of Land in Celle, responsible for his case, probably would not have taken such a soft decision if the judges were aware of the past of this agent. He was trained in parachute jumping, diving, mine and subversive business and close combat and worked as a staff member of the National Assembly. Prior to his arrest, he conducted seventeen operations in West Berlin, Germany, as well as in the Netherlands, Austria and Denmark. These countries were the priority starting points for the operations of agents of Division IV, because they, like Switzerland, were the neighbours of Germany. In a certificate issued by their operational officer of January 14, 1977, you can read further;

Under operational missions, he was tasked with the following tasks; reconnaissance of regime conditions, reconnaissance of personal documentation of a twin, reconnaissance of objects, exploration of a private apartment in Amsterdam, creation of a system of hiding places in Stuttgart. The NS conducted reconnaissance of the following facilities: Heilbronn radio relay station, Heidelberg radio station, Grünwettersbach / Karlsruhe radio station, Deutsche Ban (West German railway) substation in Haltingen (Weil am Rhein), intermediate compressor station for gas mains / natural gas Karlsruhe “.

During his operations, the zealous spy used fake foreign passports and identity cards of the Federal Republic for four different surnames and two false identity cards of West Berlin.

Based on the results of the reconnaissance results obtained by the National Assembly, the targets were documented by Department IV together with photographs and cartographic material in special dossiers. Particular attention was paid to the characterisation of “neuralgic points“, as a result of the attack of operational groups on which it would be possible to effectively and at minimal cost to damage the functioning of the relevant target and to disable it. Division IV, in compliance with the strictest conspiracy, provided such files to the disposal of RGM / C. Thus, in the already mentioned top secret lists of 1981 with 346 targets, it is stated; “Only for use in the division of RSM / C. Issuance only on the instructions of the head “. The radio relay station in Heilbronn on Mount Schweinsberg, which served as the repeater of radio relay communication and a node for television, radio and telephone long-distance and local communication in the West German Federal Post system, was also on the list.

The 380-kilovolt transformer substation in Vöhringen close to Ulm was named as an “object of integrated strategic importance“, which is also important for the integrated electric power system for the supply of electricity to Austria (Western Tirol). The National Assembly of Siegfried, which has already been mentioned, received the following order in connection with this;

On instructions from the Ministry of State Security, you will travel to the Federal Republic of Germany, Stuttgart, from August 25 to 29, 1981. In doing so, you must perform the following task; conducting an external reconnaissance of the transformer substation in Voringen, based on the following points; 1. The exact location and vicinity of the transformer substation. 2. Clarify the sketch of the plan of the transformer substation and clarify the technical parameters of the structure. Behave there and carry out your task so that conspiracy is strictly observed. Install along with the technical parameters of the transformer substation also the direction of the passage of high-voltage lines on and near the facility, as well as their classification. Come back around 4 pm to Stuttgart and spend the night there. 28.8.81 again leave for Föhringen. In this regard, determine the neuralgic points along the 380-kilovolt high-voltage lines going to Grundrenningen and Delmenzingen, approximately three kilometers from the transformer substation, approximately, and pay special attention to the marking of the supports. “

Since the National Assembly had the necessary knowledge regarding the exploration of objects and about their undermining, he was able to find these “neuralgic points” to the satisfaction of his superiors.

Until the beginning of the seventies it was still accepted that the IV department of the IV near the reconnoitered objects of diversion had to organise caches for storing the material. So, for example, another NC of department IV with the pseudonym “Zygmund” in September 1963 received the following order;

Equipped with two systems, a 380-kilovolt high-voltage line from Koblenz to Mannheim should be scouted from the point of view of searching for vulnerabilities for an attack on a large span across the Rhine, five kilometers north of the city of Worms (the square of the topographic map 6316).  In connection with the necessary prompt collection of information by the National Assembly, each of the vulnerabilities chosen by it must prepare a large cache (TBK – dead mailbox) for the storage of operational equipment. Arrangement of the cache in the area of ​​the proposed action should be made according to the guidelines developed during the training process. About creating a hiding place after returning, you should make an accurate report. “

So that, if possible, such caches could not be made any conclusions regarding who made them, they never had explosives, but kept materials of Western production, from which could quickly make fuses and explosives.

The acquisition and storage of such raw materials was taken care of, first of all, by the citizens of the Federal Republic of Germany, who served the MGB as the National Assembly. They were on the most advanced line of the “invisible front.” The speech was, on the one hand, about agents with false personal data, provided with reliable and carefully thought out legends, which in various ways moved to West Germany and “legalised” there. “Legalise” meant that these people under false data received in some unfair way the real personal documents of the Federal Republic. But, on the other hand, the German nationals also spied for the Stasi. They were either secretly selected, evaluated and recruited during their trips to the GDR, or they were done by numerous recruiters and instructors of the MGB constantly traveling around the territory of the Federal Republic of Germany.

Contrary to popular belief in such recruitments, money and blackmail played a very small role. In view of the special nature of their activities and tasks, Division IV could scarcely afford to recruit agents other than on “the basis of voluntariness and belief.” Although the agents were compensated for the costs incurred during their “operational work“, and they received financial support, as well as premiums for special achievements, nevertheless, in the rest of the MGB, as a rule, it was very economical to pay such kind of pay. The NC of Division IV was predominantly Communists and enemies of Western democracy. They acted as “criminals by conviction“, proceeding from political and ideological motives. Quite often for the MGB, entire families were spying. As an example of many others here it is possible to consider the career of ”Comrade Jupp” and his family. In late 1984, the officers who directed them wrote about him in a certificate;

“The NA’s motives are unequivocally based on its class development as a conscious worker and communist. He showed his close connection with the GDR and with the MGB in every phase of operational cooperation. This is confirmed by many years of informal cooperation to solve complex operational tasks. It was used, among other things, for purposeful reconnaissance of important objects, areas, persons and situations. The National Assembly prepared a large number of important information from the operational point of view on neuralgic points on important economic, as well as military and commercial facilities in the FRG. The National Assembly also carried out high-quality collection of information and observation of people. For some time the National Assembly acted as a resident. During the period of many years of cooperation, the National Assembly acquired extensive knowledge of the intelligence work of the MGB. He was trained in one-way radio communication, encryption and work with the means of GS (means of cryptography – Geheimschreibmittel). He achieved abilities and skills in cache operations, the use of operational legends, the exploration of conditions of the regime, photography and display of footage, the use of containers (masked containers for the transport of messages, material and weapons) in a personal and impersonal system of appearances. The National Assembly did not allow violations of conspiracy. He always acted in a balanced and thoughtful manner, but with the necessary willingness to take risks. On the basis of a long and responsible informal activity, the National Assembly was repeatedly awarded and awarded, including bronze, silver and gold medals for faithful service, as well as a silver medal for the National People’s Army for their services.

Born in 1918, “Jupp” before his call to the Wehrmacht worked in the mining industry, then served in the infantry and fell into the American captivity. In 1945, he joined a trade union, and from 1953 to 1956 he was a member of the KKE. In 1958 he, together with his wife, recruited for the informal cooperation the then management of the Ministry of National Defense of the GDR. From 1959 to 1960, the couple went to the GDR training at the training courses of saboteurs in the special school of the Fifteenth Administration. At this time, the minor son of both was in an orphanage in the GDR. Returning to his permanent residence in the Bavarian town of Landsberg on the Lech River, Jupp, like his acting under the pseudonym “Louise” wife, was transferred to the IV Department of the MGB. At first, Jupp was responsible for the reconnaissance of the Landsberg-on-Lehe, Starnberg and Fürstenfeldbrook areas. Prepared as a radio operator, “Louise” with the help of “reverse radio communication” was supposed to transmit the results of espionage to the centre of the MGB in Berlin. On the transit route between West Berlin and Hof, Jupp received a radio station built into the car battery from the officer in charge of them. Nevertheless, comrades in the centre of the MGB waited in vain for messages from Landsberg. At the next meeting with his operational officer in the secret apartment (KK) in East Berlin, “Jupp” called the reason for the radio silence; “On the conduct of the test transmission, Comrade J. reported that for his part he could not send any telegrams, since at the first attempt The smoke went from the transmitter, and after that he could not work.

Agents in the territory of Germany received instructions mainly in the form of unilateral coded radio transmissions from the centre of the MGB on short waves, which could be received using conventional radio receivers. But “Louise” also listened in vain to the broadcast; “On receiving our radiograms, he reported that from October 1961 to the present day (May 15, 1962) none of the 25 telegrams sent could be accepted.”

But “Jupp” and “Louise” did not give up after these initial difficulties. To maintain communication with the centre anyway, Jupp arranged a system of three connection caches (TBK) and two caches for the material. Along with radio communication, encrypted letters, postcards and telegrams, this was another important opportunity to provide communication between the National Assembly and the centre. After creating the caches, the National Assembly documented them with photographs and layouts, which he then passed on to his operational officers in person. If the centre had now a message for the NA, then he sent a courier who hid this message to TBK. To each cache belonged and located nearby, also documented place, where it was possible to leave a mark, a sign attesting to the so-called. “Bookmark“, i.e. that there was something in the cache. There were three variants of such a sign; in the cache there is a bookmark, there is no bookmark in the cache, and danger (for example, if the enemy security services were behind the caches). The National Assembly was to appear at certain places at a place with a label reporting the cache and if it was indicated there was a message in the “dead mail box” to take it from there. On the other hand, the same system operated for the courier of the centre, if the National Council left its message in the cache for the centre. By the same principle, caches for storing the material also functioned.

At the next meeting at the safe apartment “Frolich” in East Berlin in January 1963, the zealous “Jupp” was able to inform the Chekists from the centre of their first successes. He continued to improve his knowledge in the field of explosives;

Theoretically engaged in the manufacture of initiating and chlorate explosives, as well as calculations of charge and the possibility of using chemicals in daily life. Exploration of favourable locations for the disruption of the railway network in the Landsberg, Starnberg and Furstenfeldbrook areas; reconnaissance has not yet been completed. After receiving the final results will be reported. Calculation of the charge to undermine the support of high voltage, accurate exploration of it for the action; The position of the poles was explored. Directly on the Lech River near Kaufering. Calculation of the charge has not yet been made, since the dimensions could not yet be determined. In autumn, in October, in early November, a brigade of painters worked in the district, which repainted the supports with anti-corrosion paint. Now we have a long, deep snow. As soon as the calculation of the charge is possible, I will report. “

During this meeting, the National Assembly broadcast a new radio station, which he hid in the cache for the material. During the following years, “Jupp” and “Louise” at special meetings continued their studies and raised the level of professionalism for espionage activities. The main task at the same time was the primary exploration of the INI pipeline, especially the INI refinery in Ingolstadt and the pipeline branch to Neuburg. In 1968, due to its reliability and effectiveness, JUPP rose to the post of Resident of Division IV in the operational field. To the sphere of his responsibility as a resident, the urban and rural areas of Landsberg-on-Lehe, Augsburg, Munich and Nuremberg now belonged. In 1970, in addition to his own wife, two more NSs, under the pseudonyms “Augs” and “Neumann“, with their reconnaissance assignments, were subordinate to him, in addition to his own wife. They were both citizens of Germany. To the network of his residence also belonged to the National Assembly “Rainer” as an instructor and the National Assembly “Hugo” as a courier, both citizens of the GDR. The instructor’s task was, among other things, to engage, along with the special political training of the resident and his subordinates. Particular attention was paid to political talks, as the NS in the territory of the FRG were constantly exposed to “enemy” influence and everywhere demonstrated manifestations of “ideological uncertainty“.

Even in the seventies, “Jupp“, with the support of “Louise” continued to diligently spy, without encountering any obstacles from the West German counter-intelligence agencies. So he oversaw the numerous objects of the Bavarian radio, such as a television transmitter and ultrashort wave transmitter on Mount Wendelstein in Upper Bavaria. Thanks to the influence of “Jupp” on his son, Division IV was able to recruit him in 1978 as an agent. He received the pseudonym “Gunther“. In 1978, “Jupp” at the age of 60 years retired. By that time, he had already left his resident post for reasons of age. Nevertheless, a vigorous retiree could not quit espionage. Now, when he was no longer disturbed by the annoying work on the specialty, he could devote himself all day to his passion. In the first third of the eighties, “Jupp” took over the implementation of large-scale tasks. For example, only in the second half of 1982 he was engaged in the following; He acquired the form and equipment of the Bundeswehr and the US Army and transferred them to his operational officers on the transit highway through the GDR. “Jupp” supplied numerous information regarding a variety of people (partly for the production of personal documents of twins) and extracted extensive “material on the regime“, such as city plans, geographic maps and tourist avenues. Together with “Gunther” he in August 1982 carried out reconnaissance of the NATO airfield in Lagerlahfelde.
Autumn, too, brought them a feverish activity. “Jupp” and his son received new tasks; “The acquisition of materials and information about the prison in Landsberg am Lech. Development of information, information and instructions on the stock of the medical material of the Bundeswehr in Kaufbeuren / Neugombonts. The primary exploration of the CEL pipeline, the Holzheim site, the Donau-Ris area; The most important facilities are the booster compressor station and the bridge over the Lech River. “

At a meeting in East Berlin on November 2, 1982, Jupp reported on the fulfillment of the task;

The National Assembly handed the employee a 2.11.82 baggage receipt for the luggage they brought to the employee to pick it up. In the suitcase were, including, the negative film with pictures of the prison Landsberg, as well as photographs of the warehouse of the medical material of the Bundeswehr.”

At the meeting, the National Assembly he gave explanations for these photographs. In addition, information on the issues of the regime was processed. The National Assembly obtained the relevant modern plans of the city, both prisons and warehouses. An overview sketch of the terrain was made with the National Assembly. The external reconnaissance of the prison was not carried out by the National Assembly alone; he was accompanied by the NA “Louise“, and they used a suitable legend (a visit to a former colleague). The primary reconnaissance of the warehouse of the medical-sanitary material of the Bundeswehr was carried out jointly by the “Jupp” National Park and the “Gunther” National Assembly. To this end, “Gunther” asked one of his customers at the gas station (Gunther was working at the gas station at that time), the gabariness of which he took advantage of. This Mr. H. is currently a soldier-contractor of the Bundeswehr and during the conversation he talked about the warehouse of medical supplies in Kaufbeuren, where he had already traveled on official business. The HC “Jupp” recorded the message about the warehouse on tape. On the sketch, the points from which the photographs were taken were marked. The photos were delivered to the meeting.

In connection with this report, a glaring mistake was made whichshould not have been made in any way as an agent “Jupp“. A colour film with photographs of the health care warehouse in Kaufbeuren / Neugomblonz, he simply gave to the Neckermann department store in Landsberg for the development and printing of the photographs, indicating a fake address. In a conversation with his operative officer, he justified this by arguing that the film was still machined up to its packing. “Jupp” received a serious reprimand for his “frivolous behaviour” and violation of conspiracy and security. He had to repent, engage in self-criticism and promise that in future he would deliver the films undeveloped.

At this meeting, Jupp also reported the first results of the CEL pipeline survey in the Donau-Ris area. Despite his mistake, “Jupp” on the occasion of the thirty-third anniversary of the GDR was awarded a premium of five hundred West German marks;

The National Assembly thanked and noted that he regards this celebration as well as gratitude to his family members. He assured that he would not spare his strength to carry out further tasks. At the same time, the National Assembly sees its main task in strengthening his son’s involvement in conspiratorial work. The impact of the personal example of the National Assembly plays a big role for the development of cooperation with the son and for his motivation. “

In 1983 the family of agents also worked tirelessly. “Jupp” received a new special task, which he had to deal with in 1984. Division IV was very interested in the central warehouse of products for South Germany, a large supermarket chain in Poing near Munich. Unlike the usual, the operational officers who ran “Jupp“, this time were not satisfied with his detailed reconnaissance results. Although he had already provided accurate plans and photographs of the facility, “Jupp” was sent over and over again for six months to reconnoitre further details. The question why Department IV was so interested in this warehouse remains, judging by the documents that have been kept in the archives, it is open, but in view of the aggressive task of this unit, this gives reason for reflection. Along with this, they did not neglect, however, other tasks. Thus, in December 1983, Jupp broadcast reports and assessments of activists of the peace movement in Landsberg and the surrounding area; “X. engaged in public political work. Active contacts are maintained with other party and trade union employees in Landsberg. Other ties are maintained especially with bourgeois circles. As a hobby X. uses his participation in the circle of choral singing ‘Merry temper’ (speeches, for example, also on May 1) “.

Louise” also expected information in this direction; “The task of the National Assembly” Louise “is to specifically inform about the activities of the women’s group Landsberg. Also, information is expected about the individuals participating in the group and current information about the activities of this group. The National Assembly must, taking defensive tactics, participate in the meetings of this group. ” In the summer of 1984, “Jupp” and “Louise” were instructed to investigate the television transmitter at the Olympic Tower in Munich. But before that the matter was no more; “On 24.10.1984 the National Assembly ”Louise” reported on DT (Decktelefon – a conditional phone) that the National Council Jupp on 10/15/1984 suddenly died a natural death. As far as we can understand from earlier information, his death was not preceded by prolonged hospitalisation. “

For decades, the MGB, with the assistance of voluntary informal staff, has been following the infrastructure of the Federal Republic to paralyse it in the event of war. Agents for the most part knew this purpose of their intelligence work. In the lists of 1981, with 346 targets, eight nuclear power plants and nuclear technical facilities were listed. These were the nuclear power plants of Neckarwestheim, Stade, Würgassen, Bibles, Phillipsburg and Gundremmingen, as well as the nuclear research facility Jülich in the state of North Rhine-Westphalia and the nuclear research center in Karlsruhe. It is still unknown how the operational groups of the WGM / C should have acted against nuclear power plants. After all, even if such an attack is carried out only by ordinary diversionary means and when preventing nuclear superavarians is directed “only” against neuralgic items, such as, for example, a central dispatching post or tapping of high voltage current, there is still a huge risk. For this reason, the planning of such projects is very doubtful, not only morally, but also strategically. The agents of Division IV provided a basis for such plans with the help of their spy services. It should be assumed that also criminals acting out of their political beliefs had sufficient imagination as to imagine what might have happened in the attack of saboteurs on nuclear power plants or, for example, also on dams and chemical plants.


When on 30 April 1975 the Viet Cong troops entered the capital of South Vietnam Saigon, the people of Stöcker followed the processes taking place there with the utmost attention. Such a scenario was also their goal; while the last members of the Bonn government still flee to emigration on American helicopters, Chekist task forces supported by “patriotic forces from the operational field” occupy the strategically important points of the West German capital as the vanguard of the victorious National People’s Army . To achieve this goal, it was necessary to assess and analyse the experience of Vietnamese comrades as soon as possible. Therefore, in February 1976, Stöcker compiled; ‘Materials for an Intensive, Especially for this Line Evaluation of the Combat Experience of the Special Forces of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam and South Ossetia in Vietnam.’ At the beginning of the document it is stated; “The presented set of questions regarding special operational and combat activities before, during and after the period of battles for the release of the SFE and the current phase of maintaining power and state security should serve to gain important for our specific line and essential basic data on this combat experience.” Most of all, the sabotage specialists of the MGB were interested in this, of course, the information that could be used to fight against West Germany;

Especially valuable is the experience of fighting in relatively densely populated areas, cities and industrial centres, primarily in attacks on objects, institutions, individuals and groups of persons in the political, administrative, economic and military spheres. Such acquaintance undoubtedly creates for the further development of our special line the most favourable prerequisites at the present time and guarantees a thorough analysis and use of the principles of use, armament and equipment for our own military operations against our potential enemy in the territory of the FRG. “

With the materials of Stöcker, containing five detailed sets of questions to the Vietnamese security agencies, the German security officers were preparing for a working trip to Vietnam so to study the situation on the ground. In a report for the summer of 1976, the results of the trip were documented as follows; “Information from various periods of struggle between the state security organs of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam and the enemy should be assessed as being of fundamental value for our own specific training and planning activities for work in the operational field, especially in difficult conditions.” Along with others, the MGB specialists were particularly interested in the experience of Vietnamese comrades in “conducting military operations with a special political nature“, such as “liquidation of persons acting in the police and administrative apparatus“, as well as “taking control of administrative facilities and seizing documents.” Nevertheless, colleagues from the Stasi wanted not only to learn from the experience of Vietnamese comrades, but also offered their “brotherly help.” So the Vietnamese special forces and leading workers were supposed to be trained on the secret training bases of the MGB to “fight against gangs.” It was also envisaged to supply them with weapons and equipment.

Regarding the satisfactory trip to Vietnam;

“In order to evaluate and prepare conclusions for specific training and planning activities of our line, the study and familiarity with the areas of military operations, in particular of a large city in which the remnants of capitalist relations of forces are still very visible, were very useful from an operational point of view. It is worth thinking about carrying out such studies also in other regions in which the imperialist forces were defeated in order to include all the experience gained in our specific planning work or to confirm our views and conceptual considerations or to verify their correctness, regardless of other operational conditions.”

In the future, RSM / C staff would be given the opportunity to conduct such “studies” in the course of numerous foreign operations. In September 1977, the delegation of the MGB went to Ethiopia. After the fall of the emperor in 1974, the country increasingly developed in the direction of real socialism. To strengthen this process, the MGB was interested in working with local security agencies. During the visit mentioned above, an agreement was signed on cooperation between the Ethiopian Standing Committee on Security Issues and the MGB. The Chekists wanted to help the Ethiopians in the creation of the Ministry of State Security through large-scale material support and dispatch of “advisers.” Already in early October 1977, the operational group RGM / C was sent to Addis Ababa and  there brought with them a large amount of “operational technology” and received the opportunity to perform “a studying of the regime” in the sense as aforestated. As evidenced by the photographs preserved in the archives, the Chekists went to the areas of armed conflict between the Ethiopian pro-communist regime and the movement for Eritrean independence. The photographs show that the staff of RGM / C were then most interested in the rebel army’s weapons, seized by government forces, and also worked diligently to photograph and filming. Then the members of the task force had the task of equipping in Addis Ababa a base for the thirty following comrades who were to act as advisors to Ethiopian state security. The task of the WGM / S in Ethiopia was to ensure in the future “military-operational” protection of the activities of these groups of MGB advisers. To do this, the employees of the unit in the eighties were there in a “long-term, multi-year military mission.”

Due to their “specific” goals and special training of staff, the operational groups of the RSM / C in the future could be found in the many crisis zones in the world. The effect of this was twofold; the staff could, with the assistance of the “study of the regime” on the ground, accumulate experience for “conducting special combat operations” against the Federal Republic, and at the same time they were used as “security and protection forces of the foreign missions of the GDR in regions of political crises and tensions.” Since 1980, the operational groups of the RGM / C had been operating under the guise of employees of the Foreign Ministry of the GDR in the following missions; Damascus / Syria, Islamabad / Pakistan, Baghdad / Iraq, Cairo / Egypt, Kabul / Afghanistan, Beirut / Lebanon, Mogadishu / Somalia, Madrid / Spain and Tehran / Iran. From January 1980 to February 1982, 52 officers were in the said states with similar security and protection missions. Later RSM / C staff were also used in other foreign missions of the GDR. Specialists of RGM / S were sent abroad for special tasks. For example, in January 1985, an operative group of ten men was sent from the head to the feet to the then “People’s Republic” Mozambique. There was to advise the state leaders of the so-called collectives of GDR citizens on security issues and ensure their protection against terrorist attacks and attacks. These teams consisted of military and economic experts who were were to assist Mozambique build socialism.
The aim of other international missions of the RSM / C was to train relevant “security agencies” in the host countries. So a group of three instructors in 1980 in the People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen (YDR) conducted together with the employees of the local “Committee of State Security” “Operation Sokol“. The “event” included; “training commanders of operational groups to implement control during combat operations against counter-revolutionary elements and bases based on single fighters.”

Chekist assistance to developing countries” on the part of the unit was not limited to the activities of advisers and training activities abroad. Already in the seventies, RGM / S “developed, produced and transferred to the liberation organisation within the framework of international solidarity combat assets.” Assistance of this kind continued during the 1980s. For example, the Minister of the Interior of Nicaragua in 1986 requested the MGB to supply equipment and weapons for paratroopers. Granting of corresponding materials in cost in 1 692 480 marks of GDR was realised by RGM / S.

Nevertheless, the main task of the unit within the framework of the international relations of the MGB was to train foreign cadres of the so-called liberation organisations. After the Soviet comrades provided vigorous and effective assistance to the creation of the “special forces of the MGB” until the beginning of the seventies, now they, in turn, could transfer the acquired knowledge and know-how to a third party. Since 1971, the training of officer-instructors on secret training bases for the training of foreign personnel began. The officers learned special pedagogical behaviour towards foreigners, studied the “environmental conditions and questions of the regime” of these countries and tried to appropriately adapt educational topics to the specific situation of these states. Instructors also taught foreign languages, such as English, French, Arabic, Russian, Spanish and Portuguese.

It is only possible to confirm the regular training of foreign personnel since the beginning of the eighties. In accordance with the specifics of the RGM / S, they were trained as commanders of operational groups, single combatants, combat swimmers, demolition divers, security experts and bodyguards. Responsible for this within WGM / S was Working Group 5 in close cooperation with Division IV (International Relations) under the Central Committee of the SED, the Institute of International Relations of the Higher School of the MGB, the Chief Intelligence Directorate, the Chief Department of Personal Protection, the “Felix Dzerzhinsky” The main department of personnel and training. The task of Working Group 5 was also the provision of educational material in foreign languages; “In 1980, the first steps were taken to develop foreign language teaching materials (in English). Within the framework of the combat program for the preparation of the 10th Party Congress [SED], work is being done to create foreign language teaching materials on the explosive case.” In the annual analysis of the working group for 1981, you can read that after a year, foreign language teaching materials were also used in the second language. As can be further understood from this analysis, foreign cadres were trained, however, not only as a sabotage struggle;

Within the framework of political measures to influence and service (foreign personnel), the staff conducted intensive and effective work with the documents of the 26th Party Congress of the CPSU and the 10th Party Congress of the SED. These materials were available in the required foreign languages. Also Erich Honecker’s “From My Life” – published in English and Spanish – could therefore be studied purposefully. “
Nevertheless, foreign cadres were not only trained in the spirit of the SEDG policy, but were subjected to surveillance and surveillance; “As part of the task of training foreign personnel, the staff developed political-operational thinking and conscious action to prepare abstracts and reports to clarify the question” Who is who? “Among foreign personnel.” Of course, from the point of view of the MGB, this was correct, because in the case of course participants, it was still often about members of organisations that did not politically coincide with the SEDG line.

It can be confirmed that between 1980 and 1989 members of the following organisations were trained here; ANC (African National Congress) from South Africa, ZAPU (Zimbabwe African People’s Union) ) PLO-PLFP, the PLO-Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PLO-DLFP) (these were two of the many factions in the PLO, in this case the Georges Habash group and Naif Khavatme), the Ministry of Security of the People’s Republic of Mozambique, the Department of State Security of Nicaragua, the Communist Party of Colombia, SWAPO (South West Africa Peoples’ Organization) from Namibia, the State Security Committee of the People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen, the Ministry of Security of the People’s Republic of the Congo, the Communist Party of Honduras , The Communist Party and the Socialist Party of Chile, the security organs of Ethiopia.

In the annual analyses of working group 5 for subsequent years, it is not possible to find the names of the organisations and countries of origin of the course attendees. There is only called the total number of trained for each year; in 1982, 132 foreign cadres, in 1983 107, in 1985 144, in 1986 92 foreign cadres. The figures for the following years until 1989 are not available. In general, between 1970 and 1989, 1,895 people from 15 states were trained in 164 training courses in the framework of “solidarity tasks“. In one analytical report of 1989 on the training of members of foreign “liberation organisations” and security services, it is ascertained that, in the intervening period, an average of 120 cadets completed the training courses each year. Further it states; “The training that has been conducted so far has caused great resonance and was highly appreciated by the leadership of partners and functionaries of the Department of International Relations of the Central Committee (this is reported to the Comrade Minister in March 1989 by the head of the Department of International Relations of the Central Committee of Intelligence of the Central Committee of Intelligence).” Nevertheless, these actions were not without problems for the MGB. Obviously, despite all the secrecy, information regarding the nature of the training did filter abroad;

The accentuation or worldwide desire for peaceful resolution of conflicts and training of commanders of groups for the ANC in the military field (in the amount of an average of 40 cadres) in the residence for official guests in Teterovo contradict each other and have long been calling accusations against the GDR on the international arena. Since this training is assessed even by the ANC management staff as irrelevant and inefficient, a new approach is required here. “

Rather than abandoning interference in the internal affairs of other states, the Department of International Relations of the Central Committee of the SEDG ordered in the letter mentioned mentioned prior to continue training commanders of groups “for illegal armed struggle.” Only now it was to occur in even greater secrecy;
With the consistent implementation of the principles and rules of conspiracy and secrecy, as well as working with legends, it is necessary to guarantee the operational safety of personnel during their stay in the GDR and create the preconditions for their illegal use in the country envisaged for carrying out these operations.”


The surviving dossiers rarely report anything to do with this. In the archives of the RSM / C there were, nevertheless, several noteworthy documents that allude to something regarding this topic; “In the process of preparing the central events for the twentieth anniversary of the RSM / C, it was decided to compile a chronicle that reflects both the Chekist and mass political , and the cultural and sport development of the unit “. Preliminary drafts written for its training by several officers during the spring of 1982 have been preserved. There under the heading “Cultural work” is spoken regarding such activities during spare time, in which no one would likely consider from RSM / C ;

Comrades consider the circles and handicrafts of our comrades over the past years, from knitting and crocheting to model building. On the production of souvenirs and memourable gifts, the production of gifts for guests on the occasion of political and service culmination moments by comrades serving in our division, which both material evidence also reflect high artistic and craftsmanship. Thus, culture has been and remains a constant companion to our daily work over the twenty years of our unit’s existence.

Great inspiration” probably inspired the “beer relay” at the sports festival of the party organisation of the department on September 10, 1977. After the greetings of the head of the unit and a certain friend of Monica, the participants started a very unusual humorous competition;

Bring a ten-litre tank with water (after 20 metres to drink one glass of beer), take and carry a ten-litre tank with water (after 20 metres to drink one glass of beer), skiing (after 20 metres to drink one glass of beer), carry skis (after 20 metres to drink one glass of beer), crawl through a section of the crawl (after 20 metres to drink one glass of beer), run with an expander stretched from the foot to the palm (after 20 metres to drink one glass of beer), open and close the handcuffs (after 20 metres drink one glass of beer). “

After each of them enjoyed a total of seven glasses of beer, the participants of this competition, perhaps, themselves could disqualify themselves from participating in further tournaments; shooting from air rifles and throwing hand grenades on accuracy. Sports in general was given much attention, and therefore employees of all directions of the RGM / C at the annual sports festivals fought for maximum results;

The held sports festival was again the culmination event. All active participants sought to compete for the highest achievements and encouraged each other. Team competitions were held with special ambition. Inactive comrades also participated in the organisation of the sports festival. They cared about food and drink for active athletes and fried sausages and entrecotes. The best teams were appropriately awarded.

In the reports on the sporting activity of the staff of the RSM / C, it is striking that hunting, which was very popular with other MGB employees, did not play any role for them. Those who are already in the service had to continuously engage in weapons of all calibres and the most diverse explosives, thus seeking via leisure more peaceful pursuits. Comrades fighters found a compromise between hunting and calm contemplation; “The group of sports fishing held joint competitions at the beginning and at the end of the fishing season on the lake near the service facility. Here in the sports competition, its participants competed for good results of catching, after which they spent time together in a pleasant atmosphere.

Chekists also took on the challenges of art; “We, in terms of cultural activities of the party organization of our department, provided for a visit to the cinema, which was also a big event for us. There was a film (the DEFA film studio) ‘The Bride’ in the programme. As the visit term approached, there were fewer and fewer participants, but we, persistent, were not at all frightened, as we took our spouses with us, and therefore we were again many. “

The staff of the division decided to attend the VII GDR art exhibition in Dresden in 1973. Then the party group held a discussion of what they saw; “Although we are all amateurs in this area, we, nevertheless, were able to evaluate a large part of the exhibits. We were, therefore, able to form the right opinion. This opinion was also later confirmed by publications in the press, on the radio and on television, where the assessments of the VII art exhibition were presented.

“On the first day we visited the National Theater in Weimar. In the repertoire was the ‘Gypsy Baron’. For us, both younger and older comrades, this was a real event. A new ensemble, another entourage, common memories. In the evening we still sat together for a bottle of wine and immediately exchanged our impressions.
Also visits to operettas like ‘Orpheus in Hell’ in the East Berlin Metropol Theater and Cabaret ‘Thistle’ served to strengthen morale.

Completely in its element “comrades fighters” turned out to be when it was necessary to pay homage to the women of their collective and at the same time to properly celebrate;

By the twentieth anniversary of the formation of the GDR, the women’s team was awarded a bronze medal for merits. This was the reason for the celebration. We decided to take a joint trip to Berlin. In connection with the March 8 (International Women’s Day) 1970, it was held. Visits to the Metropol Theatre were organised, followed by Ermelerhaus (a restaurant in East Berlin). Late in the evening we were still (unlike most ordinary citizens of the GDR) welcome guests. We are happy to recall a joint meal with eating the ‘slice of Gertrude’ (a signature dish named after St. Gertrude). The ice cream was flambéed (ie, drenched with alcohol and set on fire), so our driver could not eat ice cream. In the rest the senior waiter in a claret tuxedo somewhat softened the strict etiquette of his establishment. We could order as much champagne and beer as we wanted, not limited to the usual men’s set of two alcoholic drinks. We also were able to accompany the restaurant building with all its wonderful rooms. We still remember it with great pleasure.

The attitude of comrades to women in the unit was at the best of all good-natured, patronising, because they all served only in lower positions as a secretary or assistant in the kitchen. Because the ‘man’ could also once afford a generous gesture;

Visiting the Leipzig exhibition was a successful venture for all women. After all, they had a great desire to visit this exhibition once. And this desire was organised. They saw a lot of interesting things, and they were very happy on the trip and during their stay in Leipzig and the hotel. A lot of interesting news and impressions, they then with great pride told about this event during conversations and at meetings in party groups or work collectives.”

Concurrently things became frivolous;

In May 1972, the entire staff of today’s direction 1 spent an evening at the restaurant ‘Dryklang’ with music and dancing. We all settled comfortably in a wine cellar, and we were served courteously and discreetly. The central event – the show of the night clothes from the department store – relaxed the initially tense atmosphere, because among the gathered there were also those who were not already familiar with each other.
Following this demonstration it was possible to go bravely to the dances, and the bar also caused a great stir. All the participants were in a good mood and eagerly recalled these wonderful co-conducted clocks. Such general events have always been good for harmony in the team. “

More so, were only comfortable when it was possible not to deal with the public and remain among their own. On the own territory , on the MGB object – and then in the circle of comrades one could actually break away at full length. In one real satire under the heading “A wonderful event” a certain employee of the direction 4 left a deep insight into how the Chekists spent free time;

For the preparation, a festive committee was created, which solved all organisational issues together with the leadership of the house. For example, a night’s lodging, eating and drinking (of course, the best of the best), transport issues and a cultural programme. This programme included, for example, songs, solo and many-voiced, playing on musical instruments available there, amusing reports and compiling a collective newspaper. Since on the day of the event matches of the football major league were held, a football totalizator was organised. “

Comrades made  reports to each other, since illegal (according to the laws of the GDR) gambling dramatically sharpened the situation. The author and another comrade won all the betting odds worth 140 GDR marks, which the third comrade did not like that he started to protest loudly. Saddened by the unacceptable losing in the game, the loser stubbornly got drunk; “His alcohol level rose during the time, and he protested further. At about 22.00 he was put to bed. Only slightly dressed he stood in the middle of the table in a few minutes, I protest, I protest.”

Note; this could not be tolerated, and so the stubborn one was simply put out of action by something akin to a alcoholic Molotov’s cocktail; “Then I resorted to unworthy weapons. At our disposal was a whole bar with drinks, which we could mix ourselves. I mixed several varieties of strong cognac, liqueurs, etc., added spicy spices and stirred everything so that it turned out to be difficult to determine the broth. I gave the “death drink” to Comrade M. with the words: “If you drink this, you will get your bet back.” He drank and turned off for the next ten hours, naturally, without his bet. ” “Our mood and good mood have risen so much that at about midnight all the employees at home have already celebrated together with us. Their opinion was. ‘We have never had something like this before.’ I’m sure I will always keep this event in mind. It was a good adventure and a wonderful evening.”

Such exaggerated celebrations were the apogee of chekist well content. Real joy comrades drew from a completely different source. A grateful employee of RSM / C spoke about this with worried words. The message is entitled “Surprise“;

I quickly scanned the list of candidates and was happy for many well-known and well-deserved comrades, whom I personally know from the general work, and for their candidacies. Then my neighbour pushed me and said; – Congratulations. I asked: – For what? “Well,” he said, “if you already read, then read carefully, or are you so modest?” Yes, comrades, what can I say, in alphabetical order it was for Mä-Mei. I read and thought again and again, probably there is another person with the same name, but, nevertheless, it was a reality, I was on the list as a candidate. The feeling that moved me, it is difficult to describe. Happiness, pride and the thought that now you have to prove that you are worthy of it, work even harder. “

The fortunate one could go to the X Party Congress of the SED in 1981 to listen to the leaders’ guiding speeches, there for six days. Great, comrade, now you could once feel personally truly respected. But no; “Then I thought about all the comrades of our team and realised that this is a high collective award, and I firmly decided to do everything in my power and adequately represent the team.”

In fidelity to this collectivism again and again literally swore in all the preserved preliminary developments for the creation of the chronicle RGM / S in 1982. Nobody reported anything regarding cases of individual people. The sense of community prescribed, certainly accepted by the employees also for their free time, was supposed to create something like a “corporate spirit“. Individual pursuits at leisure could easily bring the notoriety of something illegal. Sergeant-major Stefan A. in February 1983 received a service reprimand with the following justification;
Comrade A. Feldwebel, engaged in his hobby as a philatelist, for a long time maintained stable contacts with several exchange partners in the GDR, as well as in the Soviet Union, without fulfilling his obligation to report such contacts to his superiors.” Rather than being engaged in leisure activities with such occupation, a comrade would have been better at engaging himself in a team.







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