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Secret Intelligence Service

Room No. 15

London

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On Judgements that we Make

(C-III)

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This is an important consideration because it forms the basis of how we regard not just ourselves while in the process of forming judgements, but the views on how others do.

I want to just state what I think on judgement so to become a foundation for the discussion tomorrow on the treatment and maltreatment of women. I think it’s important to do this.

It is very complex philosophically, and as you’ve said. Aristotle‘s concept of judgment, in ‘Nicomachean Ethics’ posits to two dimensions of judgment in a broad sense of the word, actually between opposites and not-knowing, and these equally present in public judgments that are made (judicial and deliberative). In addition, in these cases taking on greater complexity due to the additional meanings which a Democratic system such as ours brings to the situation of judgment. It is as if the Democratic regime has developed and explored to the last possible degree and for political and judicial purposes, the potentialities involved in any judgmental situation. Judgment in the fullest sense of the term according to Aristotle >is only that which takes on all the connotations arising from its insertion in Democracy’s two most important institutions (political and judicial). In other circumstances, the terms ‘judgment’ and ‘judge’ can only be employed in a weaker sense and by analogy to public judgment/s. We can discuss these latter too, if you would like because it is interesting.

It is the intention of the rules and judgments based upon those rules whereby a society remains as functional, the ones you cited earlier during our discussion are not the same. This is because a Democracy, ie, in the case of the United Kingdom has as its two most important institutions; the political and the judicial, which are part of the system of election of a Democratic state and dismissal thereof, according to Aristotle in Nicomachean Ethics. The other, based upon the command of the insubstantial (Ten Commandments, or similar theological tenet), is incredulous in itself and any and all systems of rules and judgments based thereof equally incredulous and to cite these as being a useful system of rules, even partially bound to a Democratic system demonstrably results in schism, division, call it what you like.

The intention behind the origin of all religious tenets is control of others. The intention behind a Democracy is to enable freedom from these very instruments.

We are deliberating, ‘absolutely fundamental questions of human existence’ (according to Beiner 1983, xv)

Aristotle in ‘Rhetoric’ (4th century BC) posits the arousing of emotions which may not be related to the essential facts at hand, thus many judicial courts forbid discussion of what is not essential to the case, because it is not right to pervert the jury by moving them to anger or envy or pity. To the argument that rhetoric can be used unjustly, Aristotle answered that >this is true of any art and of all good things except virtue < Aristotle described the three modes of persuasion as the personal character of the speaker, the frame of mind of the audience, and the argument of the speech. First, people of good character are more readily believed than others. Second, when the audience is pleased, their judgments are affected. Third, the speech may prove the truth by reasoning. Thus the abilities needed to persuade are logical reasoning, understanding human character/goodness and understanding emotions.

Might emotional intelligence as you say be at heart in this?

For example, Aristotle in ‘Prior Analytics’ established the fallacy of petitio principii, I mean of begging the question and so; when a proposition that requires proof is assumed without proof, or more generally, when an assumption is used; ‘in some form of the very proposition to be proved, as a premise from which to deduce it‘. So as petitio principii refers to arguing for a conclusion that has already been assumed in the premise, this fallacy consists of ‘begging’ (emotionally) a listener to accept the ‘question (proposition) before the work of logic is undertaken. Petitio principia can refer to making an argument when the actual premise; ‘is different from the conclusion but is controversial or questionable for the same reasons that typically might lead someone to question the conclusion.’

A thought, and assuming this happens often in law courts.

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(C-III)

Secret Intelligence Service

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Adversitate. Custodi. Per Verum